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Abstract 
This research is in the field of document security and the investigation 
of existing security devices. Security documents can be of two types; those 
that have commercial value, namely currency, articles of value and those that 
have legal value, namely, passports, identification cards etc. It is of vital im- 
portance in today's world, where fraud and counterfeiting are the order of the 
day, to protect any article or document of aesthetic importance and value. 
After the tragic events of September 11th 2001, security and the lack of se- 
curity in every sense of the word is a much talked and researched subject. 
The literature review in Chapter Two will reveal that there are many secu- 
rity devices being currently used for various applications and each of them 
has many advantages and disadvantages. Devices such as magnetic cards, 
chip cards, biometric technology, optically variable devices, holograms and 
kinegrams and others have been described and their uses explained. Chapter 
Three is a continuation of literature review on Digital Watermarking and the 
available Digimarc technologies and applications in the field of security. Digi- 
marc Corporation, based in Tualatin, Oregon, United States has been the 
pioneer in the field of Digital Watermarking. Microbar Security Limited, a 
subsidiary company of Durand Technology Limited, based at the Shrivenam 
100 Business Park, Shrivenam, Oxfordshire, United Kingdom has developed 
its own watermarking technique, which has many advantages in comparison 
to the Digimarc Technology has also been described here. 
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In Chapter Four, an optical variable device, namely, the Lippmann Op- 
tical Variable Device, named after the nineteenth century scientist Gabriel 
Lippmann (1845-1921), has been studied in thorough detail. Much work 
has been done to prove it and to understand the principle behind the the- 
ory he proposed. Currently, this type of technique based on interferential 
photography can be applied as a unique security device on passports, identi- 
fication cards etc. The principles and theory of Lippmann photography has 
been explained in considerable detail. Experimental work done using various 
methods and using different photographic materials has also been described 
along with the results obtained. The application that has been emphasized 
here, is for passports for which this research was conducted in collaboration 
with Holographic Dimensions, Florida. 
Chapter Five, explains the principle of Covert Bar Coding which is the 
basis of the Microbar Watermarking Technique. Experimental results have 
been presented, these have been obtained using the MATLAB software. 
Finally, Chapter Six gives some ideas that can be pursued for future 
work. 
This work has produced two papers on Lippmann Photography and 
the mathematical evaluation of the emulsion co-authored by the author of 
the thesis. Abstracts from the papers have been used in this thesis. Also, 
it has produced two patents, one by `Holographic Dimensions', Florida on 
the Lippmann Photography and second, `Microbar Security Limited' on the 
`Covert Bar Coding Technique'. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In the digital age, the need to rely on secure communications is an im- 
portant matter not only for diplomatic or military purposes, but also for 
businesses such as e-commerce, marketing strategies etc. Even though Bio- 
metrics and other forms of authentication are generating a lot of interest, the 
high cost of these techniques is going to delay the mass adoption. Dataquest, 
a well known organisation which provides statistical information on Infor- 
mation Technology and telecom markets, cites a number of drivers for the 
increased security spending, from heightened awareness since the Septem- 
ber 11th 2001 terrorist attacks to well-publicised hacks, virus outbreaks and 
distributed denial of service attacks that have crippled some web sites. 
As rapidly as the enterprise world has become Internet enabled, so have 
the number of ways various security threats can attack networks, disable 
operations and compromise business integrity. The nature and complexity 
of threats is constantly changing, and a `one threat, one cure approach' is 
clearly not enough. The bottom line is today's threats are becoming more 
devious and so the security with which we tackle them has to be smarter. 
Securing our countries, our businesses, and our personal lives against 
1 
cyber crime and terrorism requires an unprecedented change in laws, poli- 
cies, culture, and attitudes about security, which will evolve over time. As an 
example, we can see that the dawn of the new century revealed completely 
new threats to the United States. The tragic events of September 11th 2001, 
demonstrated that relatively low technology attacks can cause massive casu- 
alties, extensive social and business disruptions, and huge financial burdens. 
Therefore, we can see that security - or rather, lack of security has become 
a major issue for businesses and society. 
The Figure 1.1 below shows that managed security revenues are ex- 
pected to grow nearly 25% annually through 2005. The term security 
Managed security service revenues 
2500 
2250 
2000 
ö 
N 
1500 
1000 
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5 00 
oC 
0 
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Figure 1.1: Managed security service revenues are expected to grow nearly 
25% annually through 2005 [data for the graph has been obtained from 
Dataquest] 
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document refers to a printed medium, the authenticity and validity of which 
we can verify. Security documents may have commercial value (currency and 
cheques) or legal value (passports, ID cards). There are indeed two kinds of 
threats for a security document: counterfeiting and falsification. 
A security document is realised by printing on paper an image that will 
help the public recognition of the document. Security printers use specific 
inks and patterns to differentiate the images produced from those used in 
commercial printings. However, due to the development of equipment such as 
colour copiers and scanners, which are commonly available and often require 
only a low level of skill to operate, it is easy to produce images of a good 
quality, allowing easy deception of the general public. 
Features such as nonfluorescence, watermarks, and security threads can 
be made an integral part of the paper from the very beginning of its produc- 
tion. Furthermore, the appearance of these features in reflection is different 
from that in transmission. This implies that the reproduction of such effects 
is extremely difficult with conventional image reproduction equipment. 
With the increasing importance and widespread distribution of digital 
media and imagery, the protection of the intellectual property rights of the 
owner for their media has become increasingly significant. One of the types of 
media is digital imagery, which can be copied and widely distributed without 
any significant loss of quality. A straightforward way to protect this is to 
completely encrypt the data and thereby require the end user to have the 
encryption key for the decoding. Another means to protect this data is to 
apply a digital watermark. 
The `watermark' has become synonymous with security because of its 
long and reliable use. It consists of an image integrated in a document that 
is visible chiefly in transmitted light and slightly distinguishable in reflected 
light. It is made during the wet paper-sheet formation and consists of varia- 
3 
tions in paper thickness and density, resulting in differences in sheet opacity. 
The watermark was probably the first OVD invented. These are various 
types of watermarks and many ways of embedding them in digital media. 
A watermark may be produced by two different paper processes, ap- 
plying either a Fourdrinier paper machine or a cylinder mould-made paper 
machine. The most secure watermark is the mould made watermark because 
it is more detailed and distinct, contains more visible halftones and has strong 
tactile relief. 
To ensure a good security level, the watermark must be three dimen- 
sional, multitone with an accurate position within a precise area of the secu- 
rity document. 
Digital watermarking is the process by which an image is coded with an 
owner's watermark and can be done using either of two general approaches. 
One approach is to transform the host image into its frequency domain rep- 
resentation and embed the watermark data therein. The second is to directly 
treat the spatial domain data of the host image to embed the watermark. 
Regardless of the embedding method, there are several requirements that 
the embedding technique must satisfy. First, the watermarked image should 
retain as closely as possible the quality of the original image. This means that 
it should not be distinguishable that there is a watermark embedded in the 
image. Second, once the watermark has been recovered from the image, there 
should be a very high level of certainty as to whether the image was actually 
a watermarked image. Highly desirable also is that this determination can 
be made easily, yet accurately. Third, the watermark should be robust to 
various types of image processing techniques. This requirement is due to the 
common application of such techniques, most notably compression, as well 
as the possibility that these techniques may be applied with the intent to 
destroy the watermark in the image. 
4 
1.1 Background to the thesis 
The current work describes the various security devices available and 
their many applications in the different fields and a literature review on digi- 
tal watermarking techniques. Work has been done in the area of Lippmann 
photography, a one hundred year old technique, invented in 1891 by Gabriel 
Lippmann. Lippmann developed the first theory of recording monochromatic 
and polychromatic spectra. Currently, this type of technique can be applied 
as a unique security device on security documents, like passports, identifica- 
tion cards, credit cards, driving licences etc. This method offers a very high 
degree of security and has many advantages which have been investigated 
and experiments have been carried out to prove the same. Lippmann pho- 
tographs are very similar to holograms currently used in security, but this 
technique gives a unique recording of each document so that a much higher 
degree of security can be achieved. 
As mentioned earlier, digital watermarking can be used as a security 
feature wherein due to the embedded watermark, important documents or 
articles of value can be prevented from being counterfeited. The Micro- 
bar Covert Bar Coding Technique has been explained and experimentally 
proved. It was not possible to make a clear comparison between the technol- 
ogy used by the current leaders in this area, namely, Digimarc Corporation 
with respect to the watermarking algorithm used due to the technology being 
confidential to Digimarc. A brief overview of the Digimarc solution has been 
included in the literature review. The Microbar however, is based on the 
principles of fractal field and fractal geometry. 
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1.2 Structure of Thesis 
The following chapter gives an overview of the main security devices 
currently on the market and their suitability for various applications. De- 
vices such as laminates, smart cards, biometric technology and others have 
been considered along with their advantages and disadvantages. An up to 
date review on the various watermarking techniques currently in use has been 
presented in Chapter Three. Digimarc Corporation have until now, been the 
pioneers of this technique which involves embedding the Digimarc watermark 
in images for their protection against forgery. In Chapter Four, the Lipp- 
mann technology for passports and identification cards has been investigated. 
Many practical experiments have been conducted to achieve an almost per- 
fect Lippmann photograph of various objects. A perfect reproduction is very 
difficult to achieve as it depends on many factors such as the emulsion used 
and its properties, time of development as well as the general conditions of 
the dark room. All the experiments were conducted in the Modern Optics 
Laboratory (Dark Room) at De Montfort University, Leicester. The results 
have been presented along with an analysis of the recording materials used. 
Chapter Five explains the Microbar technique based on the matched filter 
and linear frequency modulation principle and its suitability in watermark- 
ing. The software has been written using MATLAB. This technique can be 
further developed into a two dimensional watermark using the Fresnel the- 
ory of Optics and the principles of convolution and correlation. Chapter Six 
includes conclusions and further research directions in this field. 
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1.3 Original Contribution 
The work described in the thesis is in the fields of optical security, namely 
the Lippmann photographic technique and digital security, namely the Mi- 
crobar Covert Bar Coding and Texture Watermarking. The novelty in the 
Lippmann Technique was finding a new application for it in the field of se- 
curity, as it cannot be copied by conventional photocopiers and scanners, 
hence its uniqueness. Even though this technique has been around since 
1891, the first 18 months of the research were spent optimising the process of 
recording a Lippmann photograph and developing it to generate an optical 
variable device. The experiments have been conducted using the Lumiere 
and GP8 developers (see Chapter Four). With the facilities available at the 
Modern Optics Laboratory, De Montfort University, Leicester, photographic 
recordings were carried out under different conditions. In order to optimize 
the technique, various factors such as type of emulsion, size of grains in 
the emulsion, development time, recording time under various lighting con- 
ditions, etc. have been considered and varied accordingly to get the best 
results. Thus, the Lippmann photographic technique has been successfully 
studied and proved and its application to passports and identification cards 
has been practically implemented. Also the Lippmann photographs are very 
beautiful and have great archival stability. The Lippmann optical variable 
device (OVD) has very high resolution and is bragg sensitive, which means 
that the colour of the image recorded changes with the angle of illumination. 
This feature is very unique and has been successfully demonstrated. The 
author has also given suggestions to improve the method further. 
At this point, the author moved on to another area in security, namely 
using fractals and chaos as a watermarking technique. The Matched Filter 
(see Chapter Five) has been used to develop the covert bar code which can 
be used for product individualisation. This application is vital as product 
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manufacturers lose as much revenue in counterfeit products as in product 
diversion. The author has been involved in experimenting with the prototype 
pen scanner, details of which can be found in Chapter Five. The idea of 
one-dimensional watermarking has been extended to the two-dimensional 
stage using Fresnel based techniques, a detail analysis of which has also been 
carried out. The author found that the number of Fresnel rings and signal- 
to-noise ratio are the two key factors in watermark recovery. The author has 
also contributed to the software development of the texture watermarking 
technique using fractals. The `Microbar' is invisible to the naked eye and 
can be easily hidden in the background of an image or security documents. 
Microbar is far more secure than any other encryption method known, and 
from a mathematical point of view, it is effectively impossible to crack the 
coding system used. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review A: 
Overview of Security Devices 
2.1 The Evaluation of Document Fraud 
Resistance 
This subsection focuses on security aspects of designs that aim at pro- 
tecting valuable documents such as bank notes, ID cards, passports and 
products such as software, perfume, and watches to name a few examples. 
It is generally accepted that counterfeit resistance of security devices, and in 
particular diffractive OVD's, is an increasing function of their image com- 
plexity. Several hologram-manufacturing companies explicitly advocate the 
high image complexity of their products as an advantageous property that 
prevents counterfeiting. The following design aspects that must be taken into 
consideration when designing first-line security features and their functional 
integration in the overall design: 
9 The security feature must convey a message relevant to the product. 
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" The function of the feature must be obvious and intelligible. 
" The functions must be standardised. If the functions are diverse and 
if the designs periodically change layout, they will not likely become 
understood and will be complex to use. 
Figure 2.1 gives an overall picture of the design aspects involved in the 
design of a security feature. 
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Figure 2.1: Requirements for a security product 
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Fraud with valuable documents and products has two aspects. 
Counterfeit: The reproduction of a document, article or security feature 
with the intent to deceive the close scrutiny of a qualified examiner. 
Forgery: The replication or alteration of a document's data with the intent 
to defraud, for example a cheque amount, signature, data, etc. 
Security Awareness 
Security Policy 
Threats 
Methods of Fraud 
" copying 
Requirements " Imitation 
" Origination 
" Alteration 
Security Scheme 
Costs Bisk 
analysis 
Security Measures \ '-'1 Damage 
Implementation 
Product 
Figure 2.2: Development of a security product 
In the case of documents that are not personalized, the aim of the coun- 
terfeiter could be to replicate all or parts of the document. Three approaches 
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are commonly used: 
9 reproduce a document using exactly the same materials and production 
methods used to create the original; 
" replicate the document using like materials, production methods, or 
both; or 
" replicate the document using entirely different materials and methods, 
to generate an imitation or look-alike of the original. 
In addition to these methods, criminals might alter data on an unpersonalized 
document, perhaps to increase its original value. 
Personalized documents can also be replicated in the same way as de- 
scribed above and subsequently altered for illegal use. A method of fraud 
that has been hard to protect until recently, against other than with rigorous 
inspection,, is the use of genuine and unaltered passports by persons who 
sufficiently resemble the description data and the original holder depicted in 
the passport photograph like, family members. 
Employing organizational security measures throughout the entire logis- 
tic path of the document is, an important way to limit origination[1]. This 
includes ensuring that equipment, materials, and products are protected dur- 
ing storage and transportation. It also involves putting in place measures 
that monitor the availability of equipment and materials to authorised par- 
ties only from the early stages of development. 
The security measures that protect documents from being copied, imi- 
tated or altered are continually evolving as copying methods and other tech- 
nologies evolve. An interesting aspect of this evolution is that new security 
measures in turn necessitate complementing security devices. For instance 
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the use of specialised laminates to discourage alteration of personalised doc- 
uments requires a monitoring device to verify that the laminate has not been 
tampered with. 
The choice of security features is determined by a benefit (weighing 
the benefits of fraud protection) versus cost (price of a complete security 
system) analysis. The following aspects should be considered when choosing 
an appropriate security system: What attack method is expected to cause the 
highest losses? Against which attack method is protection most needed and 
at what price? In any eventuality, attack systems that can shutdown/destroy 
the entire system must be avoided at any cost. 
Ultimately, the effectiveness of the chosen security measures depends not 
only on the security features as such, but also on the overall security system, 
including the organisational measures accompanying the design, production, 
storage, distribution and the actual inspection method. In certain cases 
it could be beneficial to choose public security features, whereas in others, 
second-line features are needed that can only be inspected with specialised 
equipment. 
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2.2 Types of security devices 
2.2.1 Tamper sensitive paper 
Tamper sensitive papers are security papers that are treated to expose 
any attempt to alter the writing or printing on them[2]. It is the unique 
combination of its surface properties that permit high image quality and 
durable printing and its ability to incorporate security features that makes 
it the best support for security documents. For these reasons, it can offer 
a wide range of solutions to fight most known threats of counterfeiting and 
forgery. 
2.2.2 Optical Security in Laminates 
Materials or documents composed of several layers are manufactured 
by a laminating process and the products formed in this way are called 
laminates. The security features that can be obtained using laminates are as 
follows: 
" The document can be protected against wear and the effects of various 
substances or vapours such as moisture. 
" It can be reinforced so that creases or crinkles occur less rapidly. 
" It should be obvious that data are less legible on crumpled documents 
and that document creases are apt to show signs of wear more quickly. 
" Its appearance can be enhanced by providing it with a glossy surface. 
" Making alterations or falsifications can be discouraged because inks are 
inaccessible to bleaches and mechanical damage is easily visible on a 
flat regular paper surface rather than on a more irregular surface. 
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" The extra layer makes the document more complex, adding special 
properties that make counterfeiting more complicated and difficult. 
However, the drawbacks are as follows: 
" The original surface structure of the document is lost. This is espe- 
cially noticeable when the document has certain relief as the result of 
the printing technique applied, for example letterpress, intaglio, stamp 
printing. The top layer can be too thick to leave any visual or tangible 
sign of the original relief. 
" The same applies to the effect on a watermark. This can only be visible 
as light and dark patches in the paper, no longer showing variations in 
thickness. 
" If the quality of the protective layer is not of the correct standard, it 
might eventually cause discolouration in the document. 
Formerly, covering layers consisted of lacquer or varnish. With the ad- 
vent of synthetic and semi synthetic transparent foils, it became possible to 
apply protective layers on documents in a laminating process, which can be 
adapted to the users requirements. Compared to the application of the lac- 
quer, the advantages of the laminating are that no drying time is required 
and the manufacturing process is much cleaner, that is there is no lacquer 
waste and soiled equipment and tools. 
Types of laminates: The laminates used as security documents are of 
two types depending on their manufacturing method: 
" Fused laminates: Two chemically similar materials are fused by heat 
and pressure, for example, a plastic credit card. 
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" Adhesive laminate: Two chemically different materials are joined by a 
separate adhesive. Examples include paper documents on which per- 
sonal information is typed, laminated in a plastic pouch, like a passport 
sheet, containing photograph and personal information and covered by 
transparent plastic foil. 
Materials such as linear polymers which are flexible and pliable, have 
relatively stable dimesions, strong and difficult to tear can be used[3]. 
Distinguishing characteristics of fused and adhesive laminating processes: 
" The fused laminating process, which takes a relatively long time per 
card enables a large number of cards to be made simultaneously. It is 
applied by major card producers, linked with a centralised manufac- 
turing process, who usually have the required equipment for providing 
these cards with the card holder's personalisation. 
" The adhesive laminating process, which, albeit labour intensive for 
large quantities, can be performed quickly and easily for single cards. 
Hence, it is often applied in decentralised card manufacturing. 
" The fused laminating process has undoubtedly better adhesive qualities 
than the adhesive process. Delamination of the composite layers is 
impossible; printing ink however, can be detrimental to the adhesive 
properties. In principle, it is possible to separate the adhesive laminates 
by melting the adhesive[3]. 
Plastic cards, to a large extent, carry nonvisual readable data. To enable 
the input of this data, the cards are provided with a magnetic stripe or an 
integrated circuit (IC card or a chip card). The magnetic stripe may be 
applied by means of foil print or it may be integrated in the laminating 
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Magnetic Stripe 
Transparent Foil 
White Core 
Transparent Foil 
II ý- Signature Strip 
Figure 2.3: Magnified view of a possible composition of a laminated plastic 
card with signature strip and magnetic stripe 
process. Another type of data carrying card is the optical memory card, 
which resembles the compact disc. 
To discourage the reproduction of cards, they can be provided with 
OVD's, like embossed holograms. Semitransparent holograms are used to 
protect the underlying data and nontransparent reflection holograms can 
be used as carriers of visually legible data. Other diffractive OVD's such 
as exelgrams, kinegrams, or iridescent OVD's in general can also be used. 
In many applications, transparent holograms may be as large as the whole 
document itself in which case they are known as holographic foils[3]. 
Normally, cards are personalised by three main methods; the classical 
method being embossing the data. Another method is laser engraving of the 
card and a third method is thermal transfer printing, involving the use of 
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an ink ribbon containing a wax or resin-based ink. However, during recent 
years, new devices developed are connected to a control unit consisting of a 
computer system. The personal data of the prospective card holders is fed 
into the computer and stored. The control unit can be connected to a scanner 
or a video camera for scanning or taking a photograph and/or a signature or 
it can also be connected to a device for recording biometric characteristics. 
2.2.3 Visual and Optical Character Recognition 
Data can either be checked visually or by machine reading, referred 
to as optical character recognition (OCR). If the visual legibility is a main 
concern, then from a security viewpoint it will be advantageous to utilise a 
typeface that deviates from the types generally used. Machine readable char- 
acters can be read by both instrument and the naked eye, while, additionally, 
various optically readable codes or otherwise may be used. At present, OCR- 
B characters are most frequently used. Other types are OCR-A, magnetic 
ink character recognition (MICR), CMC7, and 7B for embossed cards[3]. 
Machine-readable data, which need not be visually legible, can be applied 
in the form of different types of codes like bar codes, dot codes, etc. These 
characters have a simple shape, essential for optimal readability, hence they 
do not provide any security, as reproduction can be fairly simple. Therefore, 
for enhanced security, such codes have to be covert. The technique of Covert 
Bar Coding has been fully investigated, implemented and has been described 
in Chapter Five. 
Machine-readable documents are automatically inspected so that their 
data contents can be stored directly in data files to be processed and verified. 
But this type of data can often be easily copied or falsified, like in the case of 
normal bar codes. Hence, covert bar coding reduces the possibility or even 
eliminates the possibility of fraud and duplication. 
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Due to the fact that all these detection methods have become known 
widely even among counterfeiters, there is a growing demand for second line 
security features operating in accordance with these principles. By means 
of simple pocket equipment like hand-held scanners, UV sources and so on, 
a document can be quickly and unequivocally detected as authentic or fake. 
It can be said that all the ongoing research and investigations in the field of 
document security will always have the basic principles based on optics. 
2.2.4 Non-Iridescent Optically Variable Devices 
The expression optically variable devices (OVD) has been coined for 
iridescent security features that show various tilt effects, like kinematic ef- 
fects and colour shifts, often obvious to the naked eye. Furthermore, OVD's 
cannot be copied by either colour copiers or colour scanners, and therefore 
demand great expertise from the would-be counterfeiter. It remains to be 
seen, however, to what extent these valuable properties are unique for irides- 
cent security features. For this purpose, we must examine the main optical 
phenomena apart from diffraction and interference. 
" Diffuse Reflection - paper, ink: white, black, colour, metameric colours; 
" Specular Reflection - metallic foils, window thread; 
" Diffuse Transmission - watermark, pseudowatermark; 
" Transmission - windows in Australian plastic notes; 
" Tilt/Parallax - transitory images, lenticular lens pattern devices; 
" Luminescence - photosensitivity: fluorescence, phosphorescence; 
" Photochromism - photosensitivity: colour changes activated by actinic 
light. 
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Except for the use of diffuse reflection of print, in general, these phenomena 
cannot be copied with the aid of current copiers. 
2.2.5 Optically Variable Print 
In general, diffusely reflecting security features, like microprint, fine-line 
patterns and intaglio print, are virtually invariant with respect to viewing 
angle and type of illumination (artificial light, daylight). They can therefore 
be considered optically invariable devices (OID's). Such OID's are most 
vulnerable to modern colour copying systems, and their major defence lies 
in creating fine detail near or below the resolution of such copiers[4]. 
It has been argued that the degree of micro structural order of opti- 
cal security features is an approximate measure of their value for document 
security. Examples of highly ordered structures are interference security im- 
age structures (ISISs), such as multilayer thin films and liquid crystals, and 
diffractive optically variable image devices (DOVIDs) such as holograms, 
kinegrams, exelgrams and zero order devices. An entirely different type of 
security structure is the random structure, for example paper fibres and non- 
woven fibre structure, which combines a complete lack of structural order 
with a high degree of security. The mass production of random structures 
is relatively cheap compared to ordered structures. The reorigination of or- 
dered structures is possible, while a random process never can be repeated 
and thus principally inhibits reorigination. Each random feature is unique 
per definition and are essentially limited to machine inspection. 
Additionally, the non-woven structure is three-dimensional, hence im- 
possible to counterfeit by any photographic reproduction technique. A few 
square millimetres of the non-woven structure are mounted in a visually or 
infrared transparent window in the security document, for instance a plastic 
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card or security label. The optical sensor captures two images of the struc- 
ture under different viewing angles. Because the structure has a significant 
depth (approximately 0.3mm), the two images are distinctly different due to 
parallax of the fibres which serves as an authentication measure of the docu- 
ment[4]. Non-woven structures are extremely cheap and render high security, 
machine detectable devices. 
2.2.6 Holograms as Anti-counterfeiting Labels 
The first commercial use of embossed holograms in security was by 
United States Banknote Company (USBC) in 1980[5]. The embossed holo- 
gram is a good security device because it contains so much information that 
no single view of the image can include all the information contained by the 
hologram. It has to be viewed from several different angles to see the whole 
holographic object. A security document containing a hologram cannot be 
counterfeited by photography and printing without forsaking the parallax 
and changing colours. 
The incorporation of a hologram into an otherwise complex, coherent 
document makes the hologram an extraordinary security feature. The success 
of the hologram as an authenticator of a security document rests not only on 
the difficulty surrounding its replication as a feature, but on the difficulty of 
incorporating the feature on or into the document itself. 
A more recent development has been the integration of an optical ele- 
ment in smart cards. Generally thought to be very secure, nevertheless, they 
are exposed to a number of possible frauds including the immobilization of 
the chip and the replacement of the chip itself. One solution includes the 
machine verification of the optical signal included in the hologram, and the 
integration of that signal with the magnetic information. From these two 
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"numbers", either encrypted or simply arithmetic, the quotient of the two 
numbers is written to the EPROM of the smart card[5]. Whenever the card 
is swiped, the magnetic and holographic optical numbers are compared to 
the chip's number, and if they match the card is `opened' for the transaction. 
The magnetic information on any card can be transferred, but the optical 
information effectively is hard wired directly into that particular card and 
cannot be changed. If the encrypted result of both magnetic and optical 
information matches the WORM part of the chip, it not only guarantees the 
authenticity of the chip but, should the chip be nonoperative for any rea- 
son, may allow (depending on the programming of the system) some partial 
transaction to take place (e. g. as a credit rather than a debit). 
2.2.7 The Threat of Computers and Scanners 
Recently, a way of desktop forgery has been developed that employs a 
workstation with high quality colour laser printer and scanner. As an ex- 
ample, say the object of the fraud is a legitimate bank cheque, made out 
to some company. The cheque is scanned into the computer. The signature 
and other information is left intact; only the numbers and the words are 
changed to a bigger amount. The manipulated image is printed out using 
the laser printer, using a magnetic ink toner for the black printing. Nowa- 
days, this type of fraud is counteracted by manufacturing cheque paper that 
incorporates a holographic security stripe. 
Unlike the credit cards, where only machine readable information is to 
be verified, there is a human component in the cheque processing chain. At 
the first human interface the person accepting the cheque does not know 
whether there are sufficient funds to cover the transaction. In many cases, 
banks have a signature book containing the signatures of all their customers 
and depositors and any cheque against their account for over a certain amount 
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is reviewed against the signature in the book. If the counterfeiter has not 
changed the signature on the falsified cheque, the bank will recognise the 
cheque as valid. However, it will be the holographic stripe that will trap the 
cheque writer. 
2.2.8 Currency 
Many countries such as Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Singapore, 
etc. have issued currency with OVD's. In the case of the Australian plastic 
bank note, the security feature itself is easily compromised by optical means, 
but the entire note is difficult to counterfeit because it involves the integration 
of the diffraction grating with a transparent plastic window and intaglio 
printing. There are three basic methods of using holograms in currency. The 
first approach is the hot stamping of a holographic feature on the finished 
note, for example using the portrait of the appropriate person, since human 
portraits are the most difficult type of holographic feature to simulate. 
The second approach is perhaps the most cost effective: the holographic 
security thread. However, both these features are unable to survive extreme 
hostile environments and the hot stamping process is expensive. A better 
method is to cast the hologram, cure it with actinic radiation, and attach 
it to a polyester carrier. This creates a thread that can be serpentined into 
the paper, leaving the holographic windows at various points and creating a 
solid shadow in transmitted light[6]. 
The third approach, already in use is to incorporate a stripe of holo- 
graphic foil at the leading edge of the currency note. The pattern is repet- 
itive, thus relieving the necessity of registering an image to the paper. The 
distinctive holographic pattern can survive mutilation sufficiently to continue 
to identify the uniqueness of the note. 
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2.2.9 The Holomagnetic Stripe 
The holomagnetic stripe consists of the combination of a holographic 
stripe with a diffractive code pattern and a magnetic stripe underneath called 
the HolomagTM stripe. The light diffracted by the various diffractive patterns 
can be machine read. The optical signal thus obtained from the diffractive 
code pattern is subsequently linked with the traditional magnetic data, re- 
sulting in a card with extraordinary security. There is the option of storing 
the digitised optical information only at the host authorising computer, mak- 
ing it impossible for anyone in the field to know what the optical read was 
telling the host computer[5]. 
2.2.10 Optically Thin-film Security Devices 
The effectiveness of optically thin-film security devices does not lie in 
the secrecy of their design, but in the lack of access of the public to materi- 
als with the same or similar iridescent properties. To prevent forgery using 
genuine security devices, it is important to ensure that they cannot be re- 
moved from a document and, after the document has been altered or replaced 
without the sign of tampering. This can be prevented by the incorporation 
of tamper-proof security seals or by the use of carefully selected adhesives 
and release agents which will not permit the intact removal of the coating 
from the document. To prevent counterfeiting, for example, by the transfer 
of an optically thin-film security device from a genuine lower denomination 
banknote to a higher denomination counterfeit, it is sufficient to customise 
the security device by the incorporation of a logo or denomination. 
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2.2.11 Additional Security Features 
Patterns and logos introduced into the optically thin film security coat- 
ings significantly increase their effectiveness. They can be registered and 
legally protected by the methods available for the protection of trademarks 
and documents. The presence of logos prevents the use of stolen material 
on counterfeits of documents other than the one for which it was originally 
intended. 
2.2.12 Liquid Crystal Displays (LCDs) & 
Document Security 
An obvious application to optical document security is the incorporation 
of LCDs in documents. US patent number 4,472,627 describes a nematic LCD 
stacked with a thin solar cell as a photovoltaic device to drive the LCD[7]. 
Such a liquid crystal/photovoltaic device can be embodied in a plastic card 
with a transparent window or can be incorporated in paper documents like 
banknotes during the manufacture of the paper, whereby the paper fibres 
capture the device. Since the paper will be sufficiently translucent, the pho- 
tovoltaic device will receive enough light to discharge the necessary voltage 
to drive the LCD. 
2.2.13 Biometrics 
Biometric technology is currently finding use in government applications, 
e-business, healthcare and computer networks all over. Instead of logging 
onto their networks with user names and the typical easily cracked passwords, 
about 2000 city employees in Glendale, California now enlist their fingerprints 
to securely sign on to their PCs[8]. In Belgium, the parliament used an 
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LCI-SMARTpen to sign an agreement with one of the government body's 
suppliers to authenticate prospective signatures. Though the SMARTpen 
device looks like an ordinary ballpoint pen, it contains sensors that capture 
the characteristics of a person's signature, like writing speed and pressure to 
authenticate proper identity. 
Biometrics is by far the best technology to overcome the weaknesses as- 
sociated with user name and password because it verifies human traits that 
cannot be passed to unauthorised users. The emerging biometrics indus- 
try will soon add a higher level of security and convenience to e-commerce 
transactions and user logon authentication applications. Combining biomet- 
ric technology with public key infrastructure will also serve to bolster its 
potential applications. 
2.2.14 Smart Cards 
Smart cards have the advantages of simple deployment, ease of use, flex- 
ibility and smart because of their embedded integrated circuits. Information 
on a smart card can be divided into four main sections: information that is 
read only, added only, updated only and information with no access available. 
A smart card can restrict the use of information to an authorised person with 
a password. Some smart cards are capable of ciphering and deciphering so 
that the stored information can be transmitted without compromising con- 
fidentiality. They can cipher into billions and billions of foreign languages, 
and choose a different language at random every time they communicate. 
This authentication process ensures that only genuine cards and computers 
are used and makes eavesdropping virtually impossible, making this form of 
encryption powerful, effective, inexpensive, easy to use and providing infor- 
mation with confidentiality and integrity. 
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A cryptographic smart card features a microprocessor with special cir- 
cuitry to quickly perform complex mathematical calculations, enough mem- 
ory to store multiple digital credentials and perform all digital signature and 
encryption functions on the smart card itself[8]. By generating and storing 
private keys directly on the card, the keys are never present in the vulnerable 
desktop and server computer systems where they could be accessed or stolen. 
Only smart cards offer the ability to store a user's digital identity on a device 
that is both portable and powerful. 
2.2.15 Printing Security 
Designers of good security documents utilize three printing processes: 
Lithography, Intaglio and Letterpress. Each of these processes provides a 
unique benefit against the various forms of counterfeiting and combinations 
of these provide increased security. 
" Lithography. Security printers use lithography in a fundamentally dif- 
ferent way from commercial litho printers. In commercial printing, a 
total pictorial reproduction is achieved by breaking the picture into 
dots using the four-colour halftone process[9]. Security printers cre- 
ate images by using a line structure formation and changing individual 
colours along the length of the line. Simulated 3-D effects are achieved 
through combinations of overlaying special line patterns on separate 
print workings. 
" Intaglio: Intaglio refers to print produced from plates on which the 
image is recessed. The recess is filled with ink, the surface cleaned 
and the ink transferred directly to the substrate. For security printing, 
thick paste inks are used with hand-engraved plates using high printing 
pressures. This gives security printing the distinctive variation in depth 
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of image and thus variation in tonal range. The pressure also creates 
associated embossing of the substrate. These variations in depth and 
image cannot be reproduced by planar printing processes such as litho, 
letterpress, etc[9]. 
" Letterpress: Security printers today still utilise letterpress printing to 
give each document an individual identification, principally achieved 
through the use of numbering. The counterfeiter has to choose be- 
tween providing all documents with a similar number and hence aiding 
detection, or finding a way to reproduce a variable number output for 
each individual counterfeit. 
2.2.16 Optically Variable Graphics Elements 
(OVG) 
OVG elements are available with full-surface or partial metallization, 
full-surface transparent dielectric coating, and combinations of both. In ap- 
plications such as driver's licenses and police ID cards, which often have to be 
verified under unfavourable lighting conditions, the kinegram is ideal. This is 
attributable to the specific kinegram microstructure that efficiently diffracts 
light in the direction of the observer. 
Semitransparent OVG elements are available as see-through devices to 
cover information like ID photographs as a security protection. Because 
of their semi-transparency, see-through diffractive devices in general reflect 
considerably less light to the observer than fully metallised diffractive de- 
vices[10]. 
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2.2.17 Zero-Order Grating Microstructures 
Zero-order grating microstructures constitute a new class of security 
features with improved security against optical and physical copying. They 
exhibit unique optical behaviour suitable for both visual and machine in- 
spection; since they are viewed in the zero order, they are visible even under 
adverse, diffuse illumination conditions. The microstructures can be fabri- 
cated by existing embossing and evaporation technology and can be fully 
laminated within plastic cards or in thin plastic film for application to pa- 
per[11]. They are designed with optical behaviour that is determined by the 
physical distribution of the refractive index within the grating microstruc- 
ture, typically utilising a dielectric grating material with a high refractive 
index. This gives a very high degree of inherent security against forgery by 
optical copying techniques, for example, contact or holographic copying, since 
the optical effect can only be reproduced by an identical physical structure 
and not simply by recording the wavefront in a different medium. 
2.2.18 Optically Variable Devices (OVDs) 
Advantages of these devices has been discussed in Chapter Four on the 
Lippmann Optical Variable Device. The Figure 2.4 shows the various types 
of optical variable devices. 
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Figure 2.4: The tree of iridescent optically variable devices : iridescence in 
nature and as applied to document security 
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2.2.19 Retroreflective Security Devices 
Most typical uses of the retroreflective products are for highway and ve- 
hicle reflectors, signs, license plates, warning emblems, and sports clothing. 
However, for the overlay films on the surfaces of official documents, much less 
retroreflectivity is required. Transparency is an essential feature to inspect 
when the document is covered with the retroreflective security film[12]. Any 
attempt to change a document protected by this overlay film involves the 
removal of or cutting through the film which breaks the continuity of the 
retroreflective image that is easily detected by inspection with either a hand 
held or table top verifier. Printing or marking on the surface of a retroreflec- 
tor also destroys the retroreflective image. This product finds applications 
in passports, identification cards, visas, driver's licences, immigration cards, 
etc. 
2.2.20 Types of Identification Cards 
Magnetic Stripe Cards: A magnetic stripe is a half inch strip of magnetic 
tape, bonded to the card substrate, and encoded by aligning the magnetic 
particles along the tape in one direction or the other. Magnetic stripes can be 
read in swipe readers, insertion readers and motorised readers where either 
the card is moved past the head or vice versa. Magnetic stripe technology is 
reliable and very cheap. Its disadvantage is that it is now so well understood 
that cards can be very easily copied. 
Chip cards: Chip cards can be either simple memory cards or complex 
microprocessor cards. These are much more difficult to counterfeit than 
the magnetic stripe cards thus lowering the opportunities for fraud. A chip 
card contains a single integrated circuit (IC) within the thickness of the card, 
connected to the outside world either by a set of contacts on the surface of the 
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card or by an antenna wound inside it. The IC's used range from very simple 
memory devices to 32 bit microprocessors with very special cryptographic 
coprocessors. The data stored in a chip card can be protected by a PIN 
number or a password. 
Optical cards: These use broadly the same technology as the compact 
disc (CD), in which lasers are used to burn holes in a reflecting surface and 
detect the presence of these holes. These cards have a large non-volatile 
storage capacity as compared to other cards which makes them suitable for 
storing health records and other applications where a portable data carrier is 
required[8]. Although the data may be stored on the card in encrypted form, 
this largely defeats the purpose of making the data itself portable, since it 
means that the reader must always be connected on-line to a central system 
where the reference keys are stored. 
Others: Other forms of machine-readable identification used on cards 
include the following: 
" Bar codes: For simple and read-only identification, bar codes are one 
of the most reliable and cost-effective tools. The limitation of the tech- 
nology is that it is read-only, although bar codes can be printed easily 
in the field and most codes can be copied and modified using computer 
printers and photocopiers. Copying of bar codes that are read in infra 
red can be thwarted by printing the code with carbon-based inks on 
a background that is dark or even black in the visible spectrum but 
transparent in infra-red[8]. An alternative, is to print the code in a 
coloured ink that is sufficiently infra-red absorptive on a background 
of the same colour and that does not absorb infra-red. 
" Two-dimensional bar codes: They offer much higher information den- 
sity, and are more difficult to reproduce since they cannot be printed 
32 
by standard dot matrix or thermal printers, or by bar code software. 
These must be produced to high standards of linearity and rectangular- 
ity, and the absence of widely available hardware and software makes 
them more expensive than the common bar codes. 
" Watermark tape: This can be used to enhance the security of the mag- 
netic stripe cards. The tape is encoded with a unique code by its 
manufacturer and this code, or data derived from it, is also carried on 
the magnetic stripe. The proprietary process for producing the tape is 
kept secret and is assumed not to be reproducible. 
" Holomagnetics: Here unique machine-readable data is contained in the 
hologram mounted on the card. This data is read by a proprietary 
device in an ATM or similar device and compared with the data on the 
magnetic stripe. 
2.3 Conclusion 
2.3.1 Security Effectiveness 
The technical security features applied to documents must be consistent 
and effective against attack. It is not effective security if high-quality secu- 
rity paper permits written entries to be mechanically erased without leaving 
clearly distinguishable marks showing illicit alteration. Similarly, security 
effectiveness is reduced if the photograph on a high quality document can be 
substituted because of lack of attention to secure ways to affix the picture. 
Nor is it effective security if laminates can be removed from a document 
without destroying the underlying paper. 
According to forensic statistics: 
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" Thin films and laminates should be more than just an adhesive film to 
cover a credit card or an ID document. Laminates with UV-luminescent 
printing, embossing structures and incorporating optically variable im- 
ages or laser engraved information prevent simple replacement of the 
transparent film. 
" Visa stickers with incorporated security features are more effective than 
traditional rubber stamps. 
" Documents that incorporate photographs as an integral part of their 
material perhaps solve the problem of photograph substitution. 
" Signatures of the holder of the document may be an useful tool for 
authentication. However, the signature must be authentic; scanned 
and reproduced signatures are of no value. 
The key to success in detecting fraudulent security documents is the 
general inspection; consequently inspection personnel must receive compre- 
hensive training. There are more and there are better counterfeited security 
documents demanding a concerted effort to document issuing authorities, 
document manufacturers, and law enforcement agencies to work together to 
increase the barriers for counterfeiting. Because security document counter- 
feiting involves organised crime, sometimes international strategies are re- 
quired. Counterfeited and forged security documents have reached a quality 
where often the differentiation between counterfeit and genuine has become 
a real problem. 
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review B: 
Digital Watermarking 
3.1 Introduction 
Digital Watermarking has recently become a popular research area due 
to the proliferation of digital data in this Internet age and the need to find 
a solution to protect the copyright of these materials. 
Digimarc Corporation based in Tualatin, Oregon, United Sates has been 
the leading provider of digital watermarking components and technologies 
used in a wide range of security, identification and brand protection applica- 
tions. Digital watermarking places an inherent digital identity into all media 
content, allowing media owners or issuers to: verify content, authenticate 
content, link media to related databases, manage and track digital assets, 
and prevent unauthorized copying. 
This chapter is a literature review on available digital watermarking 
techniques, followed by a brief account of Digimarc and Microbar solutions. 
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What is watermarking? 
Watermarking describes techniques which are used to convey informa- 
tion in a hidden manner by embedding the information into some 'innocent- 
looking' cover data. Watermarks are usually imperceptible, but there are 
also visible watermarks. Typically, this information is required to be robust 
against intentional removal by malicious parties. In contrast to cryptogra- 
phy, where the existence but not the meaning of the information is known, 
watermarking aims to hide the existence of the information from any poten- 
tial eavesdropper altogether. Watermarking has existed since approximately 
the 15th century and in the past watermarks were mainly used on papers to 
identify the mill who made them. These are called physical watermarks as 
they exist in physical media. Nowadays, physical watermarks are commonly 
used to authenticate important documents, for example, banknotes and pass- 
ports. With the advance of the Internet and the ubiquity of digital data, it 
is natural to extend the idea of watermarking to digital data. A popular 
application of digital watermark is to give proof of ownership of a piece of 
digital data (image, audio or video) by embedding copyright information as 
a watermark into the data itself. 
Watermarking is closely related to steganography in that they are both 
concerned with covert communication and belong to a broader subject known 
as information hiding. Watermarking, is usually a one-to-many communica- 
tion and has the added notion that the hidden message should be robust 
to attempts aimed at removing it. In the case of copyright protection, ob- 
viously the copyright information should resist any modifications by pirates 
intending to remove it. 
There exists a duality between watermarking and data compression. 
While compression aims to identify the perceptually insignificant parts of the 
data and remove them, information hiding techniques try to insert informa- 
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tion into them. From an information-theoretical point of view, information 
hiding is a game between the information hider and the attacker. Moreover, 
compression is one of the most common operations on images, therefore one 
must take into account of the effects of compression when designing a water- 
marking system. The most common compression standard at the moment is 
JPEG, which is based on the discrete cosine transform (DCT). 
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Figure 3.1: Relationship between digital watermarking, steganography, in- 
formation hiding and compression[13]. 
3.2 Basic Watermarking Systems 
All watermarking systems consist of an embedding part and a recovery 
part, which are shown in the following Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2: A generic watermark embedding (a) and recovery (b) system. 
The embedder takes the cover data, the payload and a (public/secret) 
key to produce the watermarked data. The recovery part takes the (pos- 
sibly modified) watermarked data, the key and/or original unwatermarked 
data and returns either the payload (decoding) or a confidence measure of 
how likely a specific watermark is present (detection) [14]. Regardless of the 
medium we are watermarking in, most watermarking systems share the fol- 
lowing properties: 
" Imperceptibility: The modifications caused by the watermarking sys- 
tem should be unobtrusive (with the exception of visible watermark 
obviously). This means one should use some sort of perceptual model, 
both for embedding a watermark and for evaluating the induced distor- 
tion. Being imperceptible also implies watermarks typically have much 
less power than the cover data. 
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" Redundancy: Since a watermark has much less power than its host, 
the watermark is usually redundantly embedded in the host to achieve 
robustness so that the payload can be recovered from a fraction of the 
watermarked data. 
" The use of keys: All watermarking systems use one or more keys to 
ensure security against intentional removal of the hidden information. 
This is in accordance with the Kerckhoffs Principle in cryptography, in 
which the attacker is assumed to have full knowledge of the system and 
so security must lie only in the choice of key. If the watermark can be 
read, it may also be removed by the same person. This is why public 
watermarking still remains as a major challenge to researchers. 
3.2.1 Watermarking Applications 
Depending on the specific application of a watermarking system, the 
actual requirements will vary. Below are some of the applications of Water- 
marking. 
" Video Watermarking: Watermarks can be created either in the spa- 
tial or in the DCT domains. In the latter, the results can be directly 
extrapolated to MPEG-2 sequences, although different actions must be 
taken for the I, P and B frames. 
" Audio Watermarking: Here the time and frequency masking prop- 
erties of the human ear are used to conceal the watermark and make 
it inaudible. The major problem lies in the difficulty in synchronising 
the watermark and the watermarked audio file but there are methods 
to overcome this problem which are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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" Text Watermarking: At the printout level, information can be en- 
coded in the way the textlines or words are separated which facilitates 
the survival of the watermark even to photocopying. At the semantic 
level, equivalences between words or expressions can be used. 
" Labeling: The hidden message could also contain labels that allow 
annotating images or audio. With watermarking, it makes it difficult 
to destroy the label. An application is in medicine helping to prevent 
dangerous errors. 
" Fingerprinting: The allows acquisition devices like video cameras, 
audio recorders etc. to insert information about the specific device 
like an ID number and date of creation. Watermarking makes it quite 
difficult to alter the signature though this feature can be achieved by 
other techniques. 
" Copy and Playback Control: If the message carried by the water- 
mark contains information regarding copy and display permissions then 
a secure module can be added to the copy or playback equipment to 
automatically extract this information and block further processing if 
required. This therefore requires agreements between content providers 
and consumer electronics manufacturers to introduce compliant water- 
mark detectors in the video players and recorders. This is being used 
currently in Digital Video Discs (DVDs)[161. 
" Signalling: The imperceptibility constraint is useful when transmit- 
ting signalling information in the hidden channel with the added ad- 
vantage that no bandwidth increase is required. An application in 
broadcasting consists in watermarking commercials with signalling in- 
formation that permits in automatic counting device to assess the num- 
ber of times that the commercial has been broadcast during a certain 
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period. 
" Copyright Protection: This is one of the major forces which drive 
the research in watermarking. Data can now be distributed in digital 
format with ease due to the existence of the Internet. The objective 
here is to embed copyright information into the data so that the right- 
ful owner of a piece of data can at least prove his/her ownership in the 
case of a dispute[15]. The watermarks in this case obviously require a 
high level of robustness and should resist attempts in removing them. 
Watermarks for copyright protection do not prevent people from copy- 
ing the digital data, they simply exist as a means for owners to assert 
ownership over some digital data. 
" Copy Protection: In contrast to copyright protection, a copy pro- 
tection mechanism actually prevents users from making unauthorised 
copies of the digital data. This is difficult in open systems like the 
Internet but it is possible to enforce copy protection in a controlled 
system like the DVD player. For example, the watermark which exists 
on a DVD, tells a compliant DVD player whether a user is allowed to 
copy the video. 
. Fingerprinting for pirate tracing: Watermarks are used in finger- 
printing applications to identify the legal recipient of the digital data 
and are typically used together with copyright protection watermarks 
in a transaction. The existence of multiple differently watermarked 
copies of the same data allow the collusion attack and so fingerprints 
must be designed to be collusion-secure. Watermarks for fingerprinting 
otherwise have identical requirements to that of copyright watermarks. 
" Watermarking for authentication: Fragile watermarks are used to 
authenticate digital data. For example, if a digital photograph is to be 
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used as evidence in court, we have to prove that the photo has not been 
manipulated. A fragile watermark can be inserted into the image as 
soon as it is taken. If the image is modified maliciously, the watermark 
will be destroyed. If the watermark can be retrieved by the recipient, 
the image is deemed authentic, otherwise, it should be discarded as 
fake. A low level of compression is usually permitted but not content 
alteration of the image. Therefore a fragile watermark will have some 
robustness rather than like a checksum which fails even if only 1 bit of 
the data has been changed. In addition, it should be difficult for a mali- 
cious user to simultaneously modify both the cover data and the fragile 
watermark. There are several types of fragile watermarks; some only 
allow to detect if an image has been modified; some allow to calculate 
an approximate version of the original image in the modified regions; 
while others allow to invert the watermarking process and recover the 
original unwatermarked image if it is successfully authenticated. The 
last type finds applications in the medical industry as medical images 
cannot afford to be modified as it can cause misdiagnosis. Invertible 
fragile watermarks allow to both authenticate and recover the original 
digital medical image. 
3.3 Current Watermarking Techniques 
Since the publication of a seminal work by Tanaka et al. in 1990[18], 
there has been an extraordinary growth of techniques for copyright protection 
of different types of data, especially multimedia information. This interest is 
not surprising in view of the simplicity of digital copying and dissemination: 
digital copies can be made identical to the original and later reused or even 
manipulated. 
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There is an increasing need for software or in the worst case hardware, 
that allows for protection of ownership rights, and it is in this context that 
watermarking techniques become useful. Perceptible marks of ownership or 
authenticity have been around for centuries in the form of stamps, seals, sig- 
natures or classical watermarks, nevertheless, given current data manipula- 
tion technologies, imperceptible digital watermarks are mandatory for most 
applications. A digital watermark is a distinguishing piece of information 
that is adhered to the data that it is intended to protect, meaning that it 
should be very difficult to extract or remove the watermark from the water- 
marked image. Since watermarking can be applied to various types of data, 
the imperceptibility constraint will take different forms, depending on the 
properties of the recipient i. e. the human senses in most practical cases. 
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Figure 3.3: Watermark insertion unit 
Every watermarking system consists at least of two different parts: wa- 
termark embedding unit and watermark detection and extraction unit. Fig- 
ure 3.3 shows an example of embedding unit for still images. The unmarked 
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Figure 3.4: Watermark detection and extraction unit 
image is passed through a perceptual analysis block that determines how 
much a certain pixel can be altered so that the resulting watermarked image 
cannot be distinguished from the original. After the perceptual mask has 
been computed, the information to be hidden is shaped by this mask and 
spread over the original image. This depends on the secret key to make it 
difficult to recover the hidden information if one is not in possession of the 
key. Additional key dependent uncertainty can be introduced in pixel am- 
plitudes as the perceptual mask imposes only an upper limit. Finally, the 
watermark is added to the original image. 
Figure 3.4 shows the typical configuration of a watermark detection and 
extraction unit. The detection involves ascertaining if a certain image has 
been watermarked with a given key. The watermark detector then produces a 
binary output. Parameters of importance here are the probability of correct 
detection and the probability of false alarm. These two measures are often 
used to compare various watermarking schemes[16]. Watermark detection is 
usually done by correlating the watermarked image with a locally generated 
version of the watermark at the receiver end. The correlation gives a high 
value when the watermark has been obtained using the proper key. Once 
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the presence of the watermark has been correctly detected, it is possible to 
extract the hidden information. 
3.3.1 Common Distortions and Attacks 
" Additive Noise: This can be due to D/A and A/D converters or from 
transmissions errors. An attacker could also introduce perceptually 
shaped noise which would increase the threshold at which the correla- 
tion detector works. 
" Filtering: Low pass filtering can affect the performance since spread 
spectrum like watermarks have a non negligible high frequency spectral 
contents. 
" Cropping: This is when an attacker is interested in a small portion 
of the watermarked object/image. Therefore inorder to survive the 
attack, the watermark needs to be spread over the dimensions where 
this attack takes place. 
" Compression: This is common in multimedia applications, e. g. audio, 
video, images distributed over the Internet. In order to survive this 
type of attack, the watermark has to be inserted in the same domain as 
the compression. As an example, DCT domain image watermarking is 
more robust to JPEG compression than spatial domain watermarking. 
" Rotation and Scaling: This type of attack is particularly successful 
with still images. Correlation based detection and extraction fail when 
rotation or scaling are performed on the watermarked image because 
the embedded watermark and the locally generated version do not have 
a common spatial pattern. Some authors have proposed the use of 
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Fourier-Mellin transform (rotation and scaling invariant transform) but 
it makes data hiding difficult. 
" Statistical Averaging: This occurs when an attacker estimates the wa- 
termark and then removes it by subtracting the watermark from the 
original image. 
" Multiple watermarking: This is when an attacker watermarks an image 
that is already authentically watermarked. A good approach to tackle 
it would be to timestamp the watermark by a certification authority. 
There are several watermarking methods proposed for various media 
such as image, audio, video and 3-D geometric models. The early water- 
marking methods include modifying the least significant bit of the data[17], 
embedding a secret information that resembles quantization noise[18], and 
etc. The reader is referred to [19-26] for excellent surveys of the early ap- 
proaches. 
Watermarking schemes achieved more imperceptibility and robustness 
by transforming the data globally using Fourier transform, Discrete Cosine 
'Transform (DCT) or wavelet transform. To prevent a watermark from be- 
ing removed without extreme degradation of data, a watermark is embed- 
ded into the most perceptually significant portion of the data by analysing 
frequency domain. Ruanaidh et al[27,28] modified the phase values of the 
Fourier coefficients to convey the information. Cox et al[25,26] used a spread 
spectrum method for information embedding to achieve greater robustness. 
Praun et al[29] addressed robust 3D mesh watermarking by generalising the 
spread spectrum approach for arbitrary triangular meshes. In some other 
schemes, the human visual or the auditory systems have been used to gener- 
ate a more effective watermark. Boney et al[22] generated a watermark by 
approximating the frequency masking characteristics of the human auditory 
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system. Podilchuk and Zeng[30] employed visual models to determine image 
dependent upper bounds on watermark insertion, and increased robustness 
to common image modification. 
In the mid-1990s, the military's interest in unobtrusive communications 
and public concerns over government efforts to control cryptography, started 
to drive rapid developments in information hiding[31]. Information hiding 
enables data to be hidden in other data, for example when a secret message 
is hidden in an MP3 audio file or a software's serial number is embedded in 
the order in which certain instructions are executed. Copyright marks do 
not have to be hidden to be effective. Some TV stations embed their logo 
in a visible but unobtrusive manner in the corner of the picture and many 
ECMS systems have control tags bundled quite visibly with the content. 
The DVD Marking Concept: The DVD consortium is aiming at 
finding a copyright marking scheme that will enforce serial copy management. 
The main idea is that for each disk, a ticket X is chosen which is a random 
number in addition to copy control information and some data unique to 
the physical medium. A one-way hash function h is used to computer h(X) 
and h(h(X)). This is embedded in the video as a hidden copyright' mark. 
Machines compliant with this should look for a watermark and refuse to 
play the track unless supplied with h(X). This is checked by hashing it and 
comparing with the mark. In other words a compliant device will record a 
track only when supplied with X, and h(X) is written to the new disk. Thus 
a `copy once only' track in the original medium becomes a `copy no more' 
track in the new medium[31]. 
Copy generation management using embedded marks, rather than at- 
tached data is quite robust for digital to analogue conversion and vice versa. 
The disadvantage however is finding a method of embedding a mark in audio 
or video which might be difficult to embed but can be detected readily and 
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difficult or impossible for an attacker to remove. Detection must be done by 
cheap mass market equipment with a low false positive alarm rate. 
3.3.2 Attacks on Copyright-Marking Schemes 
" In the beginning, many people assumed that the main market would 
be watermarking- embedding hidden copyright messages so that the 
ownership of a work could be proved in court. This has turned out to 
be untrue. Intellectual property lawyers do not seem to have a problem 
in proving the ownership of an article and they do not rely on technical 
measures which may confuse the jury, instead they rely on documents 
such as contracts with bands and model release forms. The legal use 
of copyright marks may rather be for fingerprints like hidden serial 
numbers. 
" Digimarc set up a service to track intellectual property on the Web. 
This system proved to be useful in that one of the main costs faced by 
multimedia producers is tracking the copyright of large numbers of im- 
ages and the royalties due to their owners. However, it was found that 
the Digimarc system could be easily defeated by guessing the master 
password or modifying the marking software so that it would over- 
write existing marks. Digimarc developed the `Marc Spider', a bot 
that crawled the Web looking for marked pictures and reporting them 
to the copyright owners. Again it was found that there are several ways 
to defeat this. More details on Digimarc products have been mentioned 
later in this chapter. 
" Many marks are said to be additive. This can cause a lot of problems, 
for example, say if all the frames in a video carry the same mark, it 
is possible to average them to get the mark and then subtract it out. 
48 
An even easier method is to supply some known content to a marking 
system, and then compare its input and output. Consider, there is a 
picture P, with a mark m. We have here a system P+m. A competitor 
whose mark perhaps is m' might say that the original was P+m+m'. 
This means that the published picture P+m was infact marked with 
m'. 
" According to the Kerckhoffs' principle, security of a system should re- 
side in the choice of key, not in the algorithm in use. But many design- 
ers simply ignore this principle. This principle becomes useful when 
marks are to be used in evidence as they have to be revealed in court. 
Infact, as even the marking keys will have to be disclosed, it may be 
necessary to protect objects with multiple marks. 
"A lot of research has been done to develop a marking equivalent of 
public key cryptography[31). For example, inserting a mark that only 
one principal could detect or anyone could detect a mark that only one 
principal could have inserted. The first option is possible if the mark 
can be inserted as the cover audio or video is being manufactured. 
Given a device that will detect the mark, an attacker can remove a 
mark by applying small changes to the image until the decoder cannot 
find it anymore. 
" More steganalysis techniques were developed to break particular em- 
bedding schemes. As an example, when the mark was added by either 
increasing or decreasing the luminosity of the image by a small fixed 
amount, this caused the peaks in the luminosity graph to become twin 
peaks, which meant that the mark could be filtered out over much of 
many images. 
9A typical Web browser, when presented with a series of graphics, will 
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display them continuously without any gaps, so a marked image can 
often be broken down into smaller images which together will look 
exactly like the original when displayed on a Web page, but in which 
a copyright mark will not be detected. 
" The most general known attacks on copyright marking schemes in- 
volve suitably chosen distortions. Audio marks can be removed by 
randomly duplicating or deleting sound samples to introduce inaudi- 
ble jitter; techniques used for click removal and resampling are also 
powerful mark removers. A tool called Stirmark[31] exists which intro- 
duces the same kind of errors into an image as printing it on a high 
quality printer and then scanning it again with a high quality scanner. 
The image is slightly distorted geometrically- it is slightly stretched, 
sheared or shifted and/or rotated by an unnoticeable random amount. 
This system defected all the then existing marking schemes and is now 
a standard benchmark for copyright mark robustness. The idea is to 
design marking schemes that will resist a chosen distortion attack, in 
which the attacker who understands the marking scheme distorts the 
content in such a way as to cause maximum damage to the mark and 
minimal damage to the marked content. 
A more detailed account of copyright marking schemes can be obtained 
from [32-33]. 
The technology is improving consistently but the drawback appears to 
be designing marking schemes that remain robust once the mark detection 
algorithm is known. 
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3.4 General Information-Hiding Techniques 
Until recently, hiding confidential information was considered much more 
important that enciphering it. Military organisations still believe in this view 
and use techniques such as microdots (used by spies) to the low-probability- 
of-intercept radios. 
When it involves hiding data in other data, the copyright mark or in 
the case of steganography, the embedded text, is hidden in the cover-text 
producing the marked text or in steganography it is called stego text. Some 
additional secret information is used during this process called the marking 
or the stego key and is needed to recover the mark or the embedded text. 
Text can be replaced by audio, video etc. 
There are a number of embedding schemes proposed. To mention a few: 
. The obvious technique is to hide the mark or the secret message in the 
least significant bits of the audio or the view signal. This is commonly 
used in many public domain steganography tools. Its main drawback is 
that the hidden data is easy to detect statistically as the least significant 
bits are no longer correlated with the rest of the image and is trivial 
to remove or replace. It can also be damaged due to lossy compression 
techniques. 
" Another method first invented in classical China is to hide the secret 
message in a location determined by the secret key[31]. In this case, 
both the sender and the receiver had copies of a paper mask which had 
holes cut out of it at random locations. The sender would place his 
mask over a blank sheet of paper, write his message in the holes, then 
remove it and compose a cover message including the characters of the 
secret embedded message. 
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"A more recent adaptation of the above technique hides a message in 
a gif format[31]. The secret key is expanded into a keystream, which 
selects an appropriate number of pixels. The embedded message is the 
parity of the colour codes for these pixels. In practice, even a large 
number of the pixels in an image can have their colour changed to that 
of a similar one in the palette without any visible effects. If all the 
pixels are tweaked in this way, then the hidden data is easy to remove 
by just tweaking them again. A better result is obtained if the cover 
image and embedding method are such that say only 10% of the pixels 
can safely be tweaked. Then if the process is repeated, but with a 
different key, an independent 10% of the pixels will be tweaked and 
only 10% of the bits of the hidden data will be corrupted. 
" The introduction of noise or distortion will introduce errors in the hid- 
den data irrespective of the embedding method unless error correcting 
code is added. The system used for banknote marking called Patch- 
work, uses a repetition code - the key selects two subsets of pixels, one 
of which is marked by increasing the luminosity and the other by de- 
creasing it. This embeds a single bit; the note is either watermarked 
using that key or it isn't. Most common techniques employed are the 
direct sequence spread spectrum techniques borrowed from electronic 
warfare. 
" Often spread spectrum encoding[30] is done in a transform space to 
make its effects less perceptible and more robust against common forms 
of compression. These techniques are used along with perceptual fil- 
tering, which emphasizes the encoding in the noisiest or perceptually 
most significant parts of the image or music track, where it will be 
least obtrusive and de-emphasizes it in quiet passages of music or large 
expanses of colour. 
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" Another method for marking print media exists which works by moving 
text lines up or down by a three-hundredth of an inch, or adding extra 
echoes to music below the threshold of perception. Such techniques 
are not yet robust as generic ones based on keyed embedding using 
transform spaces, spread spectrum and perceptual filtering. 
Watermarking can also be divided into two operational categories: pri- 
vate watermarking where the public is not allowed to access the watermarks 
in any way and public watermarking where the public is only allowed to detect 
the watermarks and nothing else[34]. As an example, consider a corporate 
website containing special images. Each original image is accompanied by a 
number of versions enhanced by some image processing tools. Each of the en- 
hanced images is watermarked with a text string describing the process that 
has been applied. Given the original and the enhanced images, an informed 
detector reveals the string describing the enhancement process. Therefore, 
here we have an informed detector being used in a public watermarking ap- 
plication. 
A lot of applications require watermarks to be detected in works that 
may have been altered after embedding. Robust watermarks are designed to 
survive normal processing but secure watermarks should resist any attempt 
to thwart their purpose. In most applications a watermark cannot perform 
its function if it is undetectable, therefore robustness is an essential property 
if a watermark is to be secure. However, robustness alone cannot be sufficient 
for security applications as secure watermarks must be capable of surviving 
novel processes, for example lossy compression, digital-to-analog-to-digital 
conversion, analog recording such as VHS or audio tape, printing and scan- 
ning, audio playback and re-recording, noise reduction, format conversion 
etc. that are designed to remove them. 
In practice, watermarking systems employ several strategies for han- 
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dling various types of distortion. Image watermarking systems commonly 
use redundant embedding across several coefficients. If some of these coeffi- 
cients in the image are damaged, the watermark in other coefficients should 
remain detectable. For more information on using this method and ways of 
recovery of the watermark, please refer to [34]. It is not necessary that the 
computation of watermark embedding be performed in the Fourier domain. 
A low frequency reference pattern can be easily represented and embedded 
in other domains such as the spatial or temporal domains. Basically the de- 
scription and analysis of a watermark can be performed in one domain but 
the embedding and detection can be done in any other domain. 
Another method that has been used in the frequency domain to embed 
watermarks is the spread spectrum coding method. In this system, messages 
are encoded with sequences of symbols which are transmitted in a temporal 
sequence, each one being represented by a signal called as chip. Chips are 
pseudo random sequences of 119 and Os spread across a wide range of frequen- 
cies in the frequency domain. This means that if the signal is distorted by a 
process that damages only a fraction of the frequencies, such as a band pass 
filter or addition of band limited noise, then the chips will still be identifi- 
able. Here the two main characteristics important to watermarking are the 
low signal to noise ratio reduces the risk of perceptible artifacts. However, 
the detector output signal may still have a high signal to noise ratio as it de- 
spreads or concentrates the energy present in a large number of frequencies. 
Also. The watermark dispersed over a large number of frequencies makes it 
robust to many common signal distortions. 
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Figure 3.5: Simple Spread Spectrum audio watermarking method 
Another method commonly used is embedding the watermark in percep- 
tually significant coefficients. Some coefficients are so susceptible to distor- 
tions that they are unlikely to be useful. Most image processing techniques 
damage the high frequencies in the Fourier representation of an image. Lossy 
compression quantizes many high frequencies to zero, half-toning adds high 
frequency noise, etc. If the information in such unreliable coefficients is used 
during detection, it will reduce the reliability of the whole system. For further 
information please refer to [34]. 
Yet another method is embedding the watermark in coefficients of known 
robustness. As an example, if the image watermark has to withstand spa- 
tial shifting and linear filtering, then the watermark might be embedded in 
the Fourier magnitudes of the image. Other domains such as the log-polar 
Fourier Transform or the cepstrum transform can also be used. Identifying 
the coefficients that best survive the distortions can be done either analyt- 
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ically or by empirical tests, which involves comparing the content directly 
after embedding and before detection. It is obvious that such experiments 
will have to be performed over a wide variety of content and numerous trials 
are needed to build a satisfactory model with sufficient statistical reliabil- 
ity[34]. 
Most methods of watermark embedding attempt to create a watermark 
that remains relatively unchanged after normal signal processing. A rel- 
atively different approach is to attempt, during the detection process, to 
invert any processing that has been applied since the watermark was embed- 
ded[34]. As an example, a clockwise rotation of an image can be inverted 
by a counter clockwise rotation of the same angle. Obviously, for rotations 
that are not multiples of 90°, this inversion is likely to approximate due to 
interpolation and round-off error. 
It is sometimes possible to explicitly identify parts of the image etc. 
that are robust to expected attacks and embed the watermark in these. If 
the detector used is informed, this can even be done on a per image basis. If 
the detector can determine the process that has been applied to the image, 
then it can invert the process or apply it to the reference mark. 
Research is being done on increasing the robustness of watermarkes to 
geometric distortions like temporal delay or spatial scaling as they are more 
difficult to handle than valumetric distortions. There are a few approaches 
proposed by Cox and Bloom[34] to this problem. Exhaustive search entails 
inverting a large number of possible distortions and testing for a watermark 
after each one. As the number of possible distortions increases, the computa- 
tional cost and false positive probability can become unacceptable. However, 
synchronisation and registration patterns can be embedded to simplify the 
search, thus preventing an increase in the false alarm rate and also compu- 
tationally more efficient. But the registration pattern may not be detected 
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and also the watermark may be undetected after registration. A type of wa- 
termarks called invariant watermarks can be constructed using the log-polar 
Fourier transforms. These can survive some forms of geometric distortions 
and so are quite robust. 
In some applications, even the minimal distortion introduced by em- 
bedding a 160-bit signature might be unacceptable. A classic example is 
in medicine where any modification of an image can be considered as mal- 
practice. This has lead to the concept of erasable watermarks. The method 
employed is as follows: A cryptographic signature is embedded in the article 
to be watermarked in an erasable manner. The person who receives it ex- 
tracts and records the embedded signature. The watermark is then erased 
at which point the article becomes exactly identical to the original unwater- 
marked work. For verification purposes, the recipient computes a one way 
hash of the article and compares it with the hash decoded from the sender's 
signature. If both the computed and the received hashes are identical then 
the article is authentic. However, the fundamental problem this concept 
raises is that in theory, it is impossible to make an erasable watermark that 
can be embedded in 100% of digital content and also has a high false positive 
probability. 
Semi-fragile Watermarking by Quantizing DCT Coefficients: An image 
authentication system called the E-DCTQ/D. DCTQ uses a semi-fragile wa- 
termark designed to survive specific levels of JPEG compression[34]. In the 
JPEG image compression system, images are quantized in the block DCT 
domain where the quantization step size for each coefficient depends on its 
frequency. By default, the step sizes are obtained by multiplying a predefined 
quantization array by a given constant factor (Table 3.1). 
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16 11 10 16 24 40 51 61 
12 12 14 19 26 58 60 55 
14 13 16 24 40 57 69 56 
14 17 22 29 51 87 80 62 
18 22 37 56 68 109 103 77 
24 35 55 64 81 104 113 92 
49 64 78 87 103 121 120 101 
72 92 95 98 112 100 103 99 
Table 3.1: Luminance quantization matrix used in JPEG. The upper left 
value (16) is the base quantization factor for the DC term of each 8x8 block. 
The lower right value (99) is the base quantization factor for the highest 
frequency term. These base values are multiplied by a global quantization 
value to obtain the actual quantization factor used[34]. 
Table 3.1 shows the quantization array used. The constant factor is 
usually a simple function of a "quality factor" between 0 and 100, which is 
entered by the user. Although it is possible for JPEG encoders to use more 
sophisticated algorithms, e. g. designing a unique quantization array for each 
image. However, the authentication system here is targeted at the default 
JPEG behaviour. 
Fragile and semi-fragile watermarks are often not secure against mali- 
cious tampering as they succumb to copying. Also, semi-fragile watermarks 
are only able to authenticate those properties of an image they are em- 
bedded within. For example, in the watermarking system mentioned above 
(E-DCTQ/D-DCTQ) the authentication watermark is only embedded in the 
high frequency coefficients of the block DCT, as it becomes too visible if 
embedded in the low frequency coefficients. This makes it obvious that only 
changes in the high frequency will affect the watermark and any changes in 
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the low frequency with the high frequency remaining unaffected, will report 
the system as being authentic. 
There are two main advantages of using a system of this type. The 
first approach being that the counterfeiter cannot make a copy by one simple 
attack as each image has a different watermark embedded. And secondly, 
the signature is based on properties of the image that cannot be changed 
without causing unacceptable fidelity problems. 
Another type of watermark called the tell-tale watermark[34] exists 
which means as the name suggests, it is a way of investigating how an image 
is corrupted by examining how the known embedded watermark has been 
affected. This type of watermark would distinguish between a wide variety 
of distortions. Research in these schemes is still in the early stages how- 
ever, substantial amount of research is being done into the problem of using 
watermarks to determine where an image has been affected. 
The types of security required of a watermarking system depends on the 
application. Applications may require the prevention of one or more of the 
following scenarios: 
1. Unauthorised embedding 
2. Unauthorised detection 
3. Unauthorised removal 
4. System attacks 
Each of the above type of restrictions involve varying degrees of security. 
A new digital image watermarking system that complements a wavelet 
based insertion module, with a resynchronisation module and a method for 
selecting the watermark using an estimated quality based average has been 
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proposed by Fullea and Martinez[35]. This technique seems quite robust 
and has been tested intensively with attacks performed by Stirmark with 
results of robustness over 90%. The proposed systems comprises of three 
modules: Insertion module which inserts the watermark in the digital im- 
age; Resynchronisation module which estimates a possible transform caused 
by geometric attack and reverses it prior to the watermark extraction pro- 
cess. This makes the system robust against signal processing attacks like 
quantification, compression, filtering etc. and geometric ones like rotation, 
shift, scaling etc. The extraction module recovers the watermark from the 
resynchronised distributed copy making use of the original image. The out- 
put of this module is coupled to an additional error correction module which 
depending on the application will present a specific reliability/number of wa- 
termarks rate which means a specific rate between the number of bits used 
for error correction and identification. The advantage of the technique is that 
the system parameters are configurable and therefore can be adapted to the 
particular application. For further information please refer to [35]. 
Another watermarking scheme proposed by Erard, Kutter, et al[36], pro- 
vides data hiding and retrieval with the use of a secret key. The unmarked 
image is not required to retrieve the hidden information and an integrity 
check on the embedded data can also be performed. The secret key gener- 
ates the binary random sequence and it is mixed with the actual watermark 
before the embedding process. Thus, without the knowledge of the key, it 
is impossible to extract the watermark, let alone prove its existence in the 
image. The CRC-16 checksum method is used to assert the integrity of the 
retrieved watermark. This technique is based on the amplitude modulation 
technique[37]. 
Data integrity verification is extremely important to judge the authen- 
ticity of the data as it is quite easy to tamper with digitised data and leave 
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no traces. Verification of data has been broadly classified into two main 
categories: digital signature based and watermark based. The difference be- 
tween the two being digital signature is a representation of the characteristic 
of the image, stored as an extra file and used at a later stage for authenti- 
cation. Alternatively, watermarking embeds secret information in an image 
which is extracted using various methods to verify the authenticity of the 
data. A good authentication scheme should be robust to tampering and at- 
tacks. According to the underlying technology used, the above methods can 
be classified into quantization based[38-41], feature based[42-43] and relation 
based[44-45]. Kundur and Hatzinakos[38] designed a wavelet based quanti- 
zation process which has a disadvantage in that the method cannot resist 
incidental modifications and the tampering detection results are very unsta- 
ble. Mark Liao, Lu et al[46] have proposed a multipurpose watermarking 
scheme for image/audio authentication and protection. Here they combine 
a host data dependent quantization and a complementary watermark hiding 
strategy[47] to conceal watermarks and present various detection methods 
with a high degree of robustness and fragility simultaneously. 
For feature based authentication system, Bhattacharjee and Kutter[42] 
proposed to generate a digital signature for encrypting the feature points of 
an image. The positions of the feature points are then compared with those 
decrypted from the previously encrypted feature points. The disadvantage 
here is that it is not shown if the approach can resist JPEG compression with 
middle-to-high ratios. Dittmann et al[43] presented a content based digital 
signature approach for image/video authentication using edge characteristics. 
This is similar to [42], but different extraction techniques are used. 
In order to make the designed image authentication system survive 
JPEG compression, Lin and Chang[44-45] proposed to preserve the invari- 
ance between the DCT coefficients before and after quantization. However, 
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it does not show how the method can withstand other incidental manipula- 
tions. Here although the invariance property is used to authenticate images, 
it should be noted that this relationship is random because the invariance 
property of any two `random' DCT blocks are stored as the digital signature. 
Liao and Lu[46] have proposed a new image authentication scheme where 
the `structure' of an image's characteristics is considered as the digital sig- 
nature. The structure of the image content is composed of parent-child pairs 
in the wavelet domain. The method is robust to content-preserving manip- 
ulations and fragile to content changing distortions. 
Researchers at the Purdue University, US have proposed a new 2-D wa- 
termarking scheme called the Variable-Watermark Two-Dimensional Algo- 
rithm (VW2D)[50-51]. It involves the use of semi-fragile, spatial watermark 
and the technique generates a pseudo-random sequence from a small key file, 
which is uniquely associated with an owner. The sequence, consisting of ei- 
ther 0,1 or -1,1, fills multiple 8x8 pixel blocks to eventually cover the entire 
original image. The collection of blocks forms the full watermark, which is 
the size of the original image. The marked image is formed by arithmetically 
adding the watermark to the original pixel data. 
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Test Statistic 
Figure 3.6: VW2D testing procedure 
With reference to the above testing procedure schematic, as part of the 
marking procedure, the inner (dot) product between each watermark block 
and corresponding marked image block is computed. Testing consists of 
computing the inner product between a test image block and the mark and 
subtracting this from the previously stored value. This algorithm has been 
shown to detect linear and non-linear filtering and the JPEG compression. 
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3.4.1 Image adaptive watermarks in the DCT and 
Wavelet Domain 
Research on robust, image-adaptive (IA) watermarks is being conducted 
at Bell Labs, Lucent Technologies[30]. The image adaptive watermarks are 
based on the robustness of the basic spread spectrum technique. This tech- 
nique embeds a normally distributed zero mean pseudorandom sequence, into 
the transform coefficients (DCT or wavelet) of an original luminance image. 
To verify a possibly altered marked image, the normalized correlation coeffi- 
cient (test statistic) between the watermark and the version of the watermark 
extracted from the marked image is obtained. A value near 1 indicates the 
presence of the mark; a small value (<0.1) indicates that the watermark 
under test is not in the image, or that the image has been severely and vis- 
ibly degraded to the point of removing the watermark. Figure 3.7 shows 
the Image Adaptive watermarking procedure. Another watermarking 
algorithm proposed at Purdue University can be described by the following 
two figures. Here Delta is a measure of how much the watermark has been 
altered as a result of changes to the images. The results have shown that the 
watermarks detect all but the most minute changes to an image. A 
two dimensional Digital Watermarking method has been proposed by Tirkel, 
Schyndel, Osborne[50], where a robust, undetectable, digital watermark has 
been coded on a standard 512*512 intensity image with an 8 bit gray scale. 
This watermark is capable of carrying authentication or authorisation codes, 
or a legend required for image interpretation thus finding applications in 
image tagging, copyright enforcement, counterfeit protection and controlled 
access. The method is based on linear addition of the watermark to the image 
and Least Significant Bit (LSB) manipulation followed by correlative recov- 
ery. The watermarks here are chosen from two-dimensional array patterns 
based on m-sequences[51,17] or extended m-sequences. 
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Figure 3.7: Image-adaptive watermarking procedure 
Walton[52] in 1995, proposed a novel technique involving a fragile wa- 
termark, where, by deliberate design, any distortions render the watermark 
non-recoverable and this serves as proof of tampering. The method also uses 
LSB manipulation and introduces as effective palette manipulation technique 
to increase the watermark effectiveness by involving complete RGB image 
components. 
The FRFT (Fractional Fourier Transformation) domain watermarking 
concept has been proposed by Djurovic, Stankovic, Pitas in December 2000 
[53]. This method results in the possibility of generating more watermarks 
in the FT and DCT domains. Results here show that the method is more 
robust on many attacks performed, by pirates. 
Su and Kuo[54-56] proposed three watermarking schemes consisting of 
complete watermark embedding and detection system. The first method 
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Figure 3.9: Watermarking Testing Algorithm 
is an integrated approach to image compression and watermarking. This 
coding scheme is EBCOT (Embedded Block Coding with Optimized Trun- 
cation), accepted by the JPEG2000 compression standard as the core coding 
algorithm. Due to this, the embedding and retrieval system is more effi- 
cient than the existing schemes. Both the embedding and detection occurs 
in the compressed domain to eliminate the need to compress the host image 
after embedding and decompress the watermarked image before detection. 
The embedded watermark is robust against various signal processing attacks 
including compression and filtering while the resulting watermarked image 
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maintains good perceptual quality. It can be detected progressively without 
waiting for the whole image to be downloaded. The embedded watermark 
can be detected without the reference of the original image so that it is a 
blind watermarking scheme. 
Most existing watermarking schemes are based on the additive spread- 
spectrum method because of its robustness against noise and distortions. 
However, they fail to detect the watermark when the image undergoes geo- 
metrical modifications such as cropping, rotation, scaling, etc. This is due to 
the loss of synchronization between the watermark detector and the embed- 
ded watermark. Since the possibly existing watermark is hidden in a very 
strong noise, i. e. the image content, it is very difficult for the watermark 
detector to predict the correct position of the hidden watermark when the 
image is cropped, scaled or rotated. Cropping or scaling can cause informa- 
tion loss of the watermark so that the embedded information may not be 
correctly determined. 
To overcome the above drawback, a spatial-frequency composite wa- 
termarking scheme has been proposed. Two watermarks will be embedded 
into a digital image using the spread spectrum approach, one in the spatial 
domain and the other in the frequency domain. The frequency-domain wa- 
termark contains the desired hidden information that will be carried with 
the host image. The spatial-domain watermarking method is used to achieve 
self-registration of the investigated image with the original image. After the 
registration process as a result of spatial-domain watermark detection, the 
hidden information can be successfully determined from the registered image 
by detecting the frequency-domain watermark. Both spatial- and frequency. 
domain watermark detection processes are blind. The watermark can sur- 
vive a combination of manipulations, including cropping, scaling, rotation, 
shearing, change of the aspect ratio, column/row dropping and linear trans- 
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formation. 
Block-based watermarking is a general type of scheme, in which the im- 
age is divided into blocks for watermark embedding and detection. With 
divided blocks and their local statistics, the balance of robustness and in- 
visibility of the watermark can be achieved. Block-based Discrete Cosine 
Transform (DCT) is utilized in many existing watermarking schemes. By 
decomposing the image into several frequency bands using DCT, the wa- 
termark is embedded into the significant frequency coefficients to attain a 
robust watermark. The watermarked image is then formed by applying in- 
verse DCT on each image block. The sensitivity of the human visual system 
to DCT basis functions has thus been extensively studied. It is advantageous 
to use the visual model within this framework in block-based watermarking 
systems to reduce the impact of quality degradation and, at the same time, 
to make the watermark survive JPEG compression attack better. Moreover, 
spatial division can be used to increase the amount of the embedded water- 
mark, i. e. groups of blocks are embedded with different information so that 
multiple bits can be carried by a single image. Security of the system can 
also be increased by scrambling the order of the blocks so that the watermark 
cannot be detected correctly without the correct descrambling process. 
Existing researches on block-based watermarking focus on the robust- 
ness against filtering/compression attacks and perceptual issues. However, 
geometrical attacks are very difficult to resist, especially for the block-based 
methods. The geometrical attack will seriously limit the usage and applica- 
tions of the related researches on block-based watermarking. 
Watermarking schemes based on the Discrete Wavelet Transform(DWT) 
are also becoming increasingly used, with the development of the JPEG2000 
standard. Research in this area is in the initial stages, though evidence 
exists that DWT could enhance the robustness of the watermark against 
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attacks[57]. Mandyam and Ahmed introduced the DLT (Discrete Laguerre 
Transform) in 1996[58]. It has been shown by Gilani and Skodras[59] that 
the quality of the DLT domain watermarked images is higher than the cor- 
responding DCT domain watermarked images, though from the robustness 
viewpoint, both have similar performance. 
A wavelet based reversible watermarking system proposed by Jun Tian 
from Digimarc Corporation[60] can be applied to audio and video. This 
method uses an integer wavelet transform to losslessly remove redundancy in 
a digital image to allocate space for watermark embedding. The algorithm 
starts with a reversible colour conversion transform, then the integer wavelet 
transform is applied to one or more decorrelated component/s. These two 
transforms remove the irregular redundancy in the digital image so that regu- 
lar redundancy can be embedded in the form of hash of the image, compressed 
bit stream or any other image content dependent watermark. An SHA-256 
hash of the original image is embedded for authentication purposes. 
An Adaptive Digital Image Watermarking Technique for Copyright Pro- 
tection has been proposed at the University of California, Santa Barbara[61]. 
Here the watermark embedding consists of two steps: the scrambling of the 
watermark image and the insertion into the host image. The recovery is then 
the reverse of these two steps. 
In the scrambling stage, the pixels of the watermark, each with only one 
bit of data, are pseudo-randomly permuted to form a new watermark image. 
This permutation is done using a linear feedback shift register. By setting 
the state of the shift register, a pseudo random sequence can be generated 
that is recoverable by resetting the shift register to the original state. There 
are two ways to use the shift register, one is to use it to generate a random 
sequnece of new row and column induces for the two dimensional watermark. 
The second, which is easier to implement involves performing a raster scan 
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of the watermark to generate a single row vector from the watermark. The 
elements of this row vector are then pseudo-randomly permuted into a new 
vector via a single execution cycle of the linear shift register. The shift 
register can only perform one permutation of the indices of the raster scan 
vector. A new raster scan vector is then generated by assigning the elements 
from the old one to the positions of the new vector. An inverse raster scan 
process is performed on this vector to produce the scrambled watermark. 
Once the binary watermark is scrambled, it is inserted in the image. 
This is done by inserting the pixels individually into blocks of pixels of the 
host image in a pseudo random method. The image to be watermarked (host 
image) is divided into nxn blocks into which one bit of the watermark is 
embedded. This depends on the size of the host image and the number of 
pixels that make up the watermark. 
This algorithm has been shown to be robust to low pass filtering, median 
filtering, scaling, cropping, rotation and lossy JPEG compression[61]. An 
embedded signature image can be recoverable and recognisable even after the 
watermarked image has been tampered with by image processing techniques. 
3.5 Applications of Digimarc Technology 
Digimarc ID Systems designs secure ID documents that combine a wide 
range of security features and technologies into a layered card that meets 
customer security requirements within their budgets. Their ID cards can 
use a range of security features including microprinting, optically variable 
devices, digital watermarking and multicolor UV printing in layered identity 
cards. The increasing use of digital imaging systems is making it easier than 
ever to duplicate, alter and distribute images. In a security environment, it 
is becoming increasingly vital to manage and track digital images securely. 
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Digimarc ID Systems card technologies are used in a variety of appli- 
cations including driver licenses, child identification, national identification, 
voter identification and smart cards. It is an integration of the technologies 
to create complete, cost-effective and state-of-the art identification solutions. 
3.5.1 Defence and Intelligent Imaging 
Digimarc digital watermarking as a security feature in digital images 
enables: 
" Management and distribution of digital images 
9 Tracks content as it travels 
" Adds a covert digital identity that stays with the content as it is dis- 
tributed 
3.5.2 Digital Solutions 
Digital systems electronically capture and combine portraits, signatures, 
and alphanumeric data with any of several preprogrammed, full-color card 
designs - including such custom components as logos, seals and officer signa- 
tures. The completed cards can be previewed prior to printing or saving and 
can be produced instantaneously using PVC card printers or at a central lo- 
cation on proprietary high-volume card production systems. Digital systems 
allow data to be stored electronically providing the ability to: 
" Update/reissue cards without the subject present or even via the In- 
ternet 
" Retrieve and transmit an individual's dossier in minutes 
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9 Incorporate biometric security features including finger imaging and 
facial recognition 
3.5.3 Hybrid Digital/Analog Solutions 
Sometimes the right solution for an identification system is neither pu- 
rely digital nor completely photographic, but rather a hybrid of the two. 
Hybrid solutions are often a cost-effective means of capturing data in 
remote locations, where volumes are too low to warrant a full-fledged digital 
system or the infrastructure is inadequate to support an electronic system. 
3.5.4 Driver Licenses 
Digimarc ID Systems is the leading supplier of driver license systems in 
the U. S. They also deliver driver license systems internationally and provides 
solutions to the United Kingdom, Russia, several Canadian provinces, Costa 
Rica, Botswana, etc. 
3.5.5 National ID 
Many countries issue national ID cards in an effort to provide a stan- 
dardized identity document, reduce illegal immigration and prevent benefits 
fraud by requiring citizens to present identification for access to government 
programs and services. Digimarc ID Systems' card materials are durable, 
tamper-resistant and include security features that prevent counterfeiting or 
alteration. 
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3.5.6 Voter ID 
Voter ID cards are frequently instituted to ensure the integrity of a 
country's election process. To help prevent voter fraud, cards can be pro- 
duced using a secure process that includes security features and even records 
biometric data. 
3.6 Product Capabilities 
A Digimarc digital watermark is imperceptible to the human eye. It 
is a special message embedded in an image i. e. video, photo or other di- 
gital content by making subtle changes to the data of the original digital 
content. The changes caused by watermark embedding can be calculated 
by subtracting the original image from the watermarked image. Digimarc 
digital watermarking product capabilities are an effective defense in security 
applications: 
" Applicable to packaging, value documents, plastic cards, holograms at 
low production cost and without need for additional materials 
" Applicable to digital images 
" Data carrying 
" Covert 
" Machine readable by standard reader technology, such as Web cameras 
and scanners, and our special software 
" Compatible with other security features such as holograms, bar codes, 
special inks and papers 
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9 Resistant to alteration or duplication 
" Recognizable under automatic inspection 
" Cost effective - low production costs 
9 Easy to implement 
" No design change necessary 
However, the actual algorithms being confidential to Digimarc, are not 
available for testing purposes. 
3.7 The Technology 
3.7.1 Digital watermarks and methods for security 
documents 
Security documents (e. g. passports, currency, event tickets, and the 
like) are encoded to convey machine-readable multi-bit binary information 
(e. g. a digital watermark), usually in a manner not alerting human viewers 
that such information is present. The documents can be provided with overt 
or subliminal calibration patterns. When a document incorporating such a 
pattern is scanned (e. g. by a photocopier), the pattern facilitates detection 
of the encoded information notwithstanding possible scaling or rotation of 
the scan data. The calibration pattern can serve as a carrier for the wa- 
termark information, or the watermark can be encoded independently. In 
one embodiment, the watermark and the calibration pattern are formed on 
the document by an intaglio process, with or without ink. A photocopier re- 
sponsive to such markings can take predetermined action if reproduction of a 
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security document is attempted. A passport processing station responsive to 
such markings can use the decoded binary data to access a database having 
information concerning the passport holder. Some such apparatuses detect 
both the watermark data and the presence of a visible structure characteristic 
of a security document (e. g. a printed seal of the document's issuer). 
3.7.2 Multiple watermarking techniques for 
documents and other data 
Multiple digital watermarks, each of which has different characteristics, 
are embedded in a document. The characteristics of the various watermarks 
are chosen so that each of the watermarks will be affected in a different man- 
ner if the document is subsequently copied and reproduced. The detection 
process or mechanism reads each of the watermark and compares their char- 
acteristics. While wear and handling may change the characteristics of the 
digital watermarks in a document, the relationship between the character- 
istic of multiple digital watermarks will give an indication as to whether a 
document is an original or a counterfeit. 
3.7.3 Printing and validation of self validating security 
documents 
Security documents can have multiple fields or areas, each of which con- 
tains information that is perceptible in more than one way. One field can 
contain a visually perceptible image and a digital watermark that can be 
detected when the image is scanned and processed, another field can contain 
machine readable OCR text that can be read by both a human and a pro- 
grammed computer, and still another field can contain watermark data which 
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can be correlated to the output of a fingerprint reader or apparatus which 
scans a user's iris. Documents are produced by beginning with a template 
which defines the placements of elements on the document and the interre- 
lationships between hidden and visual information on the document. The 
template specifies the placement of elements such as images, photographs, 
and text and also the interrelationship between information that is visually 
perceptible to a user of the document and information that is hidden by 
means of digital watermarks. Different hidden digital watermark data is 
included in multiple elements of the document. The watermarks in the dif- 
ferent graphic elements of the document are correlated to each other and to 
the visual material on the document. Thus, the document cannot be forged 
by replacing one element (such as a picture) with a similar element from 
another document. In order to produce a document defined by a particular 
template, appropriate pictures, graphics and digital data are extracted from 
a data bank, and watermark data is embedded in the pictures and graphics 
as appropriate. The merged digital data is then sent to a printing engine 
and the final document is produced. An automatic validation system of the 
present invention reads multiple fields on the document, and it also auto- 
matically detects information about the user. The various information is 
correlated to validate the document. 
3.7.4 Method and system for digital image signatures 
A signature is inseparably embedded within the visible image, the sig- 
nature persisting through image transforms that include resizing as well as 
conversion to print or film and back to digital form. Signature points are 
selected from among the pixels of an original image. The pixel values of 
the signature points and surrounding pixels are adjusted by an amount de- 
tectable by a digital scanner. The adjusted signature points form a digital 
76 
signature which is stored for future identification of subject images derived 
from the image. In one embodiment, a signature is embedded within an 
image by locating relative extrema in the continuous space of pixel values 
and selecting the signature points from among the extrema. Preferably, the 
signature is redundantly embedded in the image such that any of the redun- 
dant representations can be used to identify the signature. Identification of 
a subject image includes ensuring that the subject image is normalized with 
respect to the original image or the signed image. Preferably, the normalized 
subject image is compared with the stored digital signature. 
3.8 Digimarc Products 
3.8.1 Digimarc ImageBridge 
`Digimarc ImageBridge' digital watermarking is the industry leading 
digital watermarking solution that allows digital image owners to place im- 
perceptible codes into their digital images and photographs. The software 
is designed to work with Adobe Photoshop 7. The technique is integrated 
into image editing applications for simple digital watermark embedding and 
reading. When an image is opened in a Digimarc-enabled image editing ap- 
plication, the image is automatically checked for a Digimarc watermark. If 
it is found, then a copyright symbol, ©, is added to the image title bar to 
show that the image is being protected. Thus the image reader allows to 
" Determine the copyright owner of an image 
" Contact the owner directly for image licensing 
" Enable licensing and e-commerce opportunities 
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The Digimarc ImageBridgeTM Digital Watermarking Software Development 
Kit (SDK) available through a flexible C/C++ callable application program- 
ming interface (API). The Digimarc ImageBridge Digital Watermarking SDK 
provides three basic function calls: Detect Watermark, Read Watermark and 
Embed Watermark. Detect Watermark offers a quick means of determining 
if a digital watermark is present in an image, typically in less than one sec- 
ond regardless of image size. Read Watermark retrieves the contents of a 
Digimarc digital watermark found in an image. Embed Watermark embeds 
a Digimarc digital watermark in an image. The developer controls the three 
functions through two basic structures. The first describes the location of 
image data in memory and the second describes the data that is to be em- 
bedded in the image. This simple interface provides quick integration and 
maximum developer control. For maximum flexibility, applications provide 
pixel data to embed, read or detect functions. 
3.8.2 Digimarc MarcSpider 
This is another image tracking technology which offers the following 
advantages: 
" It scans the most widely used public areas of the Internet for Digimarc 
ImageBridgeTM digitally watermarked images and reports details on 
when and where the images are found. 
" It also maintains an archive of images found, searchable by date range, 
so no information is missed out. 
Digimarc MarcSpider image tracking uses hundreds of individual spi- 
ders, or search engines that look through the web for images which contain 
Digimarc ImageBridgeTM digital watermarks. To effectively cover the Inter- 
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net, MarcSpider makes some decisions along the way. In general, MarcSpider 
will visit any given Internet page in its database once a month and check if 
that particular page has changed. If it has, MarcSpider will visit it more 
frequently - increasing the frequency of its visits. However, it is unable to 
access pages that are password-protected. 
3.8.3 Digimarc Excalibur copy detection technology 
This is part of the security class family of digital watermarking tech- 
nologies. The copy detection watermark is designed to be used in a variety 
of printed media where the identification of an original versus a counterfeit 
is desired. The technology has the following characteristics: 
" It detects counterfeit print when reproduced on colour copiers, con- 
sumer flat bed scanners or commercial grade drum scanners. 
" It can be used to detect re-origination 
" It cannot be seen or read without use of proprietary hardware and 
software 
" It carries data for source tracking 
" It is secured so that only authorized parties can embed or read the 
mark. Every customer is assigned a unique digital watermark. 
3.8.4 Digimarc Excalibur Secure Authentication Tech- 
nology 
The secure authentication mark has the following characteristics: 
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" It is designed to survive reproduction and is applicable to printed ma- 
terial without change in material cost or production floor workflow 
" It is secured via protocol keys so that only authorized parties can embed 
or read the mark. 
9 It carries data for source tracking 
" It cannot be seen or read without use of proprietary hardware and 
software 
3.9 Security Features 
1-D and 2-D Bar Codes - Bar codes allow data to be stored on cards. 
1-D conforms to AAMVA standard. 2-D conforms to AAMVA and 
PDF47 standards. 
Altered (or Modified) Fonts - Slight modifications of text characters are 
obvious only to trained personnel. 
Biometrics - Unique features of the card carrier (fingerprints or iris pat- 
terns) are tied to an identifier, often a number, and recorded in a 
database. The identifier is encrypted and printed on the issued card. 
The system scans the card carrier's unique identifier and matches it 
against the information in the database to confirm the card carrier's 
identity. Biometrics are used for both 1-to-1 authentication at the 
time of renewal/registration and 1-to-many verification of the new ap- 
plicant's unique identity as compared to the database of existing docu- 
ment holders, which reduces the opportunity for obtaining valid iden- 
tity documents under false pretenses. As an integrator of secure identi- 
fication technologies, Digimarc ID Systems favors no specific biometric 
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Figure 3.10: Customized Digimarc ID solution example[Used with permission 
from Digimarc] 
technology and recommends solutions based on the client's technology 
and political environments. Digimarc ID Systems, in conjunction with 
Visionics, has deployed a range of biometric solutions. 
Fine-Line Printing -A pattern of fine lines, similar to those found on 
currency, can be placed on documents and photo backgrounds. This 
feature can thwart attempts at photocopying. 
Ghost Image -A faint photo image covers printed data, making it virtually 
impossible to alter and requires no special equipment for verification. 
Microprinting - Used on currency, the resolution required to create this 
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printing on the base material is far beyond that of any known photo- 
copier. Often combined with misspelled words, this feature also pre- 
vents misuse of base material and can be read with a small (10) power 
magnifier. 
Optically Variable Ink - Images or text are printed on a card's inner lam- 
inate with gold or silver optically variable ink. This printing appears 
and disappears with the angle of viewing and cannot be photocopied or 
altered without destroying core laminate. It requires no special equip- 
ment for verification. 
Signature Area - Signature is captured electronically and printed digitally. 
Split Fountain - This refers to the use of a colour degrade that cannot be 
colour copied. 
Unique or Sequential Numbering - Numbers can be added for authen- 
tication and to keep track of production materials. 
Digital Watermarking - Digital watermarking technology allows issuers 
to embed digital codes in cards. These embedded codes can be imper- 
ceptible to humans, but read by image-capture devices enabled with 
special reader software. Unlike overt data carrying features, such as 
barcodes, there is little to alert the forger that a security feature ex- 
ists. Even if the forger is aware of the feature's existence, it is virtually 
impossible for the counterfeiter to manipulate that feature in that doc- 
ument or replicate it in another. The covert digital watermark carries a 
packet of digital data used to authenticate the card and enhance card- 
holder verification; data, such as a document number, expiration date, 
birth date, or other data specific to the bearer. The software-based 
reader can easily be added to primary or secondary inspection. Exam- 
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ination of documents that use digital watermarks can reveal alteration 
or forgery by comparing the digital watermark data to other card data. 
Overlapping Images - Overlapping images prevent tampering or image 
substitution. 
Multicolour UV - Multicolour images made from red, green and blue ul- 
traviolet ink are visible only when viewed under an ultraviolet light 
source. 
Optical Two-Colour Printing - Two-colour optical printing causes an 
image or text to shift from one colour to another with the viewing an- 
gle. This feature is destroyed with tampering and it cannot be colour 
copied. 
Pattern Printing - This feature incorporates both visible and ultraviolet 
printing of a pattern or logo on the inner surface of the laminate. Again, 
it cannot be reproduced with photography or copying. 
Ultraviolet Ink - Images printed in UV ink on the laminate are visible only 
under an ultraviolet light source. Any alteration destroys the feature. 
Security Indicia - This feature incorporates words or symbols that are con- 
cealed on a document and appear only when a specially grooved plastic 
viewer is moved across it. This is an inexpensive authentication method 
which prevents fraudulent use of base material. 
Magnetic Stripe - Magnetic stripes can be encoded with information, such 
as demographic data. It conforms to AAMVA, ANSI and ISO stan- 
dards. 
Writeable Back -A Specified area allows an ID to accept ball-point pen 
ink. 
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Microtaggant Particles - Microscopic particles are colour-coded by cus- 
tomer, and can only be seen under a microscope. Optional UV fluores- 
cent feature offers a "quick check". 
3.10 Microbar Security: An Overview 
There are many ways of making it difficult for counterfeiters to produce 
counterfeit credit cards or high value paper such as bank notes, vouchers, 
travellers cheques, tickets or bonds. However, many times people handling 
the cards or the bank notes do not inspect them carefully and do not have 
the expertise or equipment necessary to detect forgeries. 
`Microbar' is an innovative way of using conventional printing techniques 
to give secure machine readable validation. It utilises fractal geometry to 
encode data into the background of the document. Once the data to be 
included in the Microbar has been decided, a mathematical formula turns the 
data into a seemingly abstract pattern or dots. A second formula and key is 
then used to blend this pattern into the background image of the document 
being marked. The document can then be scanned using a conventional 
scanner and the Microbar can be read and decoded. If it is forgery, the 
scanner, using the key hidden in the pattern telling it how to unlock the 
data, cannot decipher the Microbar and the user is alerted of the problem. 
The main benefits of the Microbar are as follows: 
" Microbar is invisible to the naked eye and can be easily hidden in the 
background of an image, such as the watermark on bank notes and 
certificates. 
" Because it uses standard printing and reading technology, Microbar can 
effortlessly be put on anything from bank notes and plastic cards to 
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shipping containers. 
" Authentication is via a simple, low cost scanning technology which is 
able to differentiate between the presence of an encrypted signature 
on an original from a very good copy with extremely high levels of 
confidence. 
" Microbar is far more secure than any other encryption method known, 
and from a mathematical point of view, it is effectively impossible to 
crack the coding system used. 
3.10.1 What is Fractal Geometry? 
Martin J. Turner et al[63] in their book on `Fractal Geometry in Digital 
Imaging' gives a very good account of the mathematical analysis of Frac- 
tals. Fractal geometry is being widely used in diverse fields of physics and 
mathematics. This technique is particularly suited to model natural objects. 
Fractal geometry dates back to the late 1800s and early 1900s. Mathematical 
curves, such as the Peano Curve can be called as a mathematical fractal. 
The term `fractal' was coined by Mandelbrot in 1975 to describe the ir- 
regular structure of many natural objects and phenomena. A fractal descrip- 
tion may be a deterministic fractal, for example the Von Koch snowflake[63]. 
In real life the description is statistical when discussing random fractals that 
are more useful in modelling textured images. 
Fractal Mathematics: 
The Fourier Fractal Dimension (DF) of an image is given by 
DF=82,0 
where ,3 is the spectral exponent. 
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A synthetic fractal is created by filtering white noise of the required 
size with a low pass filter, q. If Q is the Fourier Transform of q, then for 
two-dimensional processing 
Q(k, -, kv) = Ik1012 
where IkI =F+ ky7 and ,Q=8- 2D. A synthetic fractal landscape is 
created on the principle of forming two-dimensional fractal noise. The same 
principle can be applied to creating synthetic fractal signals. The four stage 
process of creating fractal noise is described below: 
1. Create a random Gaussian array with zero mean and unit variance. 
Create a uniform random sequence (normalised) of the same size. 
2. Calculate real and imaginary parts of the noise using Ni = Gi cos 27rUi 
and Mi = G; sin 2irUi, defining G; as amplitudes and U{ as phases. 
3. Filter Ni and M; with WW _F to create N' and M', where f3 = 8-2D 
{ 
and I k; I=x+ ks . 
4. Apply Inverse Fast Fourier Transform (IFFT) to obtain 
ni = Re 
(. fr-1{N' + iM'}) where J'-1 is the inverse Fourier transform. 
The theory of fractal geometry and its algorithms are used extensively 
in the Microbar two-dimensional watermarking schemes. These schemes are 
described in depth in Chapter Five. The detailed mathematical analysis of 
synthetic fractals can be obtained from [63]. 
3.10.2 Microbar: The Concept 
There are numerous methods available to protect printed artefacts from 
counterfeiting. Many of these however rely either on the incorporation of an 
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overt feature (which might otherwise not be desired for space/design reasons) 
or require the use of special inks, substrates or taggants linked with bespoke 
reader technology and/or expert intervention to validate originals. 
The MicrobarT M technique integrates seamlessly into existing printing 
infrastructures to provide a secure anti-counterfeit mark which can be totally 
camouflaged yet will allow fast automatic verification without recourse to 
expert intervention. 
3.10.3 Microbar: The Product 
MicrobarTM is an internationally patented invention which makes use 
of a multi-dimensional statistical encryption to give powerful, non-repeating 
patterning that is in itself a digital code. This technique may be applied 
either to the whole artefact or specific areas where the marking is disguised 
as an incidental or artistic feature. This option ensures an unobtrusive cod- 
ing and yet provides for integrity, of the coding information so that it may 
still be validated even if damage or defacement of the surface has occurred. 
MicrobarTM can be used in a variety of printing techniques in either black 
& white or colour. 
Easy to Use - MicrobarTM is a validation system that uses standard print- 
ing and reading technology. Statistically robust results can be achieved 
using scanning resolutions as low as 100 dpi. 
Secure - MicrobarTM protection cannot be reversed. However detailed and 
apparently `perfect' a copy is the validation system can easily distin- 
guish it from the original. Also it is impossible to work backwards from 
an original printed document to recreate the original MicrobarT M file 
in order to counterfeit the document by reprinting. 
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Covert -A graphics file to be protected 
is modified by MicrobarTM but 
appears visibly unchanged when printed. 
Low Cost - Once the graphics file has been encrypted normal printing meth- 
ods are used. No special inks, substrates or taggants are required. 
Unique - This level of security has never been possible 
before using standard 
printing and scanning. 
3.10.4 Physical Testing and Security 
Such non-destructive validation is very attractive for high value bonds 
and documentation. MicrobarTM is being developed in partnership with 
Debden Security Printing, a wholly owned subsidiary of The Bank of Eng- 
land. Physical security of the unique Microbar system can be ensured at 
the Bank's printing works where all the Bank of England's banknotes are 
printed. 
3.10.5 Other Uses 
In addition to simple authentication, any suitable scanner is capable of 
reading and extracting digital information from the encrypted signature on 
the surface of the marked card, label or document. This covert information 
can be processed either by itself in the case of documents/vouchers/labels 
or used in conjunction with magnetic stripe/microchip data in the case of 
credit cards to validate the medium. MicrobarT M has the capability to hide 
and contain a significant amount of data and so has the potential to act 
as a covert tracking mechanism for brand owners concerned as much with 
diversion as with counterfeiting. 
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3.11 Conclusion 
Various Watermarking algorithms in use today have been reviewed and 
briefly referenced in many instances. It has been found that the watermark 
schemes in the spatial domain, LSB etc. are much faster than those in the 
transform domain like DCT, etc. However, in the spatial domain they are 
less robust to compression and geometric distortions. Watermarks using LSB 
can easily be removed using compression and low pass filtering. 
Digital watermarking is still a very active research area and by far a 
mature field. Currently, there is research in three directions. Watermarking 
algorithms that are more content dependent are being investigated to combat 
copy attacks. The copy attack copies a watermark from one image to the 
other without knowledge of embedded systems or cryptographic keys used. A 
watermark that is dependent on the contents of the data being watermarked 
will resist this kind of attack. 
The second direction in which digital watermarking research is progress- 
ing is the digital video area. Many research activities are now directed to 
low bit-rate video watermarking. Also some research activities are now being 
conducted for watermarking systems that watermark both video and audio 
parts of an audio visual data to protect against alteration of one of the 
components without interfering with the others. The final direction of wa- 
termark research deals with providing potential users of watermark systems 
information about the system's performance. Research is being carried out 
to develop an internationally recognised watermark benchmarking system. 
However, there is no significant discussion about whether the watermarking 
system should be standardised. 
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Chapter 4 
The Lippmann Optical Variable 
Device 
4.1 The Theory of the Photographic Process 
4.1.1 Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the basics of the photographic process, 
the exposure of the object to the photographic material, formation of the 
latent image and the development to give a stable permanent image. It also 
explains the Lippmann photographic technique and its practical applications. 
A mathematical model of the emulsion has been developed and extensive 
laboratory tests have been conducted to prove the principle and its suitability 
for security applications. 
Photography is basically a two stage process involving firstly the for- 
mation of an image by physical means and secondly the preparation of a 
permanent copy of this image by chemical means. The image may be formed 
by the lens of a camera, by shadows cast by X-rays or gamma rays, or by 
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the trace of a moving electron beam, or by other invisible electromagnetic 
radiation such as infrared or ultraviolet radiation. 
The photographic material used is the silver halide material similar to 
the one used in holography. The main advantages of this material are that it 
has high sensitivity in comparison with other photographic materials avail- 
able and it can be coated on both film and glass. It also has some drawbacks 
such as it is absorptive and requires wet processing. 
A silver-halide recording photographic material is based on one type or a 
combination of silver-halide crystals embedded in a gelatin layer, commonly 
known as the photographic emulsion. This emulsion is coated on a flexible 
or stable substrate material such as film or glass. 
The basic sequence in obtaining images by means of silver halides is as 
follows: 
" Exposure to electromagnetic radiation to form an invisible latent image 
- the exposure H is defined as the incident intensity E times the time t 
of exposure of the recording material. If the intensity is constant during 
the whole exposure time, which is usually the case, then we have the 
relation: H= Et. In reality, the exposure necessary for obtaining a 
certain density in the developed material is not constant but depends 
on time t. For very short exposures at high intensities E, as well as for 
very long exposures at low intensities, H has to be strongly increased 
to get the same density as the one required for the optimal values of E 
and t. As the intensity increases, more absorbed photons are required 
per grain to produce the same density in the developed material as 
when compared with exposures at lower intensity levels. 
" Amplification of the latent image by development to render it visible 
and subsequent processes to make the image stable and permanent: 
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The exposure of a silver halide material, will after processing - i. e. de- 
velopment and fixing result in a certain optical density of the material, 
as silver is created during the development. The higher the exposure of 
the material, the higher the density will be upto a certain limit. Optical 
density is a useful characteristic of the light-absorptive property of a 
particular region of a photographic negative. The greater the density, 
the less light is transmitted. 
Due to the fact that the developed silver halide emulsion consists of 
millions of discrete silver particles, it is obvious that when a normal photo- 
graphic image is enlarged enough, the areas which appeared homogenous to 
the unaided eye will now show a granular pattern. The smaller the grain 
sizes, the higher is the contrast in the image. Silver halide crystals of the 
conventional photographic film can be larger than one micrometer, which 
results in high granularity. 
The resolving power of the photographic material is another important 
property, which gives the measure of the ability of the material to record fine 
detail. It is the ability of a photographic material to maintain in its developed 
image the separate identity of parallel bars when their relative displacement 
is small. Normally the resolving power of photographic materials is tested 
by using a resolution test chart. The highest number of lines per millimetre 
that can be resolved in the emulsion corresponds to the resolving power of 
the tested material. 
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4.2 Lippmann Photography and 
Its Principles 
4.2.1 Introduction 
In 1886, Gabriel Lippmann (1845-1921), professor of mathematical phy- 
sics at the Sorbonne in France developed a general theory of recording colours 
as standing waves in a light sensitive emulsion. In 1891, he developed the In- 
terferential photography, also called interference colour photography, which 
was the first direct technique to record colour photographs[87]. He also devel- 
oped the first theory of recording monochromatic and polychromatic spectra 
in a black and white emulsion using the principles of Fourier mathematics. 
The new technique however, was not very effective for colour photography 
since it was complicated and the exposure times were too long for practi- 
cal use. The difficulty in viewing the photographs was another contributing 
factor, in addition to the copying problem, which prevented Lippmann pho- 
tography from becoming a practical photographic colour-recording method. 
However, a new optical security application of this technique has been 
investigated. Currently, this type of technique can be applied as a unique 
security device on security documents, like passports, identification cards, 
credit cards, driving licences etc. This method offers a very high degree of 
security and has many advantages. 
To list a few of these advantages: 
9 The Lippmann OVD has a very high archival stability. 
" The Lippmann OVD is Bragg sensitive, which means it changes its 
colour depending on the angle of illumination and observation[87]. 
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" The Lippmann OVD cannot be copied by conventional colour photo- 
graphy nor can it be copied on colour copy machines. 
High-resolution panchromatic recording materials suitable for Lippmann 
photography are currently available. In particular, the use of colour pho- 
topolymers from DuPont has been investigated for modern Lippmann Pho- 
tography. Since the colour photographs contain no dyes or pigments their 
archival stability is very high. The photopolymer material requires dry pro- 
cessing and no expensive equipment, such as lasers, are needed to explore 
this photographic recording technique, only a modified camera (described 
later) has been used. 
4.2.2 Principle of Lippmann Photography 
The recording material has to be of a low light sensitivity due to the 
demand for high resolving power for recording Lippmann photographs. The 
photosensitive emulsion coated on Lippmann plates is brought in contact 
with a highly reflecting surface[89]. Lippmann used mercury in contact with 
the emulsion. This mirror reflects the light into the emulsion, which then 
interferes with the light coming from the other side of the emulsion. Station- 
ary standing waves of the interfering light produce a very fine fringe pattern 
throughout the emulsion with a periodic spacing of A/(2n) (A is the wave- 
length of light in air and n is the refractive index of the emulsion). The 
colour information concerning the object is recorded in this way. For exam- 
ple a large separation between the fringes in the emulsion indicates that the 
recorded wavelength is located at the red end of the spectrum, however more 
closely spaced fringes indicate a shorter wavelength, such as green or blue. 
This is only applicable when monochromatic colours are recorded. When the 
developed photograph is viewed in white light, different parts of the recorded 
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Figure 4.1: Adapted from [93] Principle of Lippmann Photography 
image produce different colours due to the separation of the recorded fringes 
in the emulsion. The light is reflected from the fringes, creating different 
colours corresponding to the original object. There is a severe requirement 
on the resolving power to record the fringes separated in the order of half the 
wavelength of the light. The processing of these plates is critically important, 
changing the separation between the fringes would create wrong colours. To 
observe the correct colours, the illumination and the observation must be at 
normal incidence. The colour of the image changes with the angle of viewing 
called as iridescence, an important attribute of the Lippmann photograph as 
a document security device. 
Lippmann photography involves no phase recording; the recorded in- 
terference structure is a result of phase-locking the light by the reflecting 
mirror. 
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4.2.3 Early Lippmann Photography 
Lippmann used albumen emulsions containing potassium bromide[89]. 
The plates were sensitised in a silver bath, washed, flowed with cyanine 
solution and dried. The sensitivity was extremely low and exposure times 
were high, sometimes more than an hour. Auguste and Louis Lumiere in 
Lyon introduced very fine-grained silver-halide gelatin emulsions which later 
became the main recording material for Lippmann photography. These plates 
reduce the exposure time to a few minutes. The preparation of the emulsion 
and the processing were absolutely critical in order to obtain good colour 
photographs. 
Most experimenters used developers based on pyrogallol and ammonia, 
which were formulated to suit the particular emulsion. A surface developer 
performed well since no image information is located deep inside the emul- 
sion. Development time was one to three minutes. Sometimes the image 
was fixed. The Lumiere brothers recommended immersion in a potassium 
cyanide bath[89]. However, sodium thiosulfate bath was also used. Often it 
was recommended not to fix the developed image, since that would change 
the thickness of the emulsion and, thus, change the colour of the image. 
Rarely was the plate intensified, redeveloped or even bleached. Ives tested 
other developers based on amidol and hydroquinone and used bleaching to 
create phase gratings which came out more brilliant and narrow band than 
pyrogallol-developed ones[89]. 
4.2.4 Modern Lippmann Photography 
Single-beam Denisyuk reflection holography shows similarities to Lipp- 
mann photography[89]. In both the cases an interference pattern is recorded 
in a high-resolution emulsion and the principle of Bragg diffraction applies 
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to both. The fundamental difference however, is that in the Lippmann case, 
there is no phase recording involved; the recorded interference structure is 
a result of phase-locking the light by the reflecting mirror. In holography, 
the phase information is actually recorded, being encoded as an interference 
pattern created between the light reflected from the object and a coherent 
reference beam. A Lippmann photograph therefore can be regarded as a 
reflection image-plane hologram recorded with light of very short temporal 
coherence. The reference wave is a diffuse complex wave front, the mirror 
image of the exit pupil of the recording lens. 
The recording of monochromatic light in a Lippmann emulsion is very 
similar to recording a reflection volume hologram. A broadband polychro- 
matic spectrum, such as a landscape image, is however different. In this 
case, the recorded interference structure in the emulsion is located very close 
to the surface of the emulsion in contact with the reflecting mirror. Thus, 
an emulsion thickness of only a few micrometers is needed and actually pre- 
ferred. 
4.3 Recording Materials for Lippmann 
Photography 
4.3.1 Introduction 
New and improved recording materials combined with special recording 
and processing techniques have made it possible to develop the new OVD 
method. The optimal recording material for Lippmann photography has 
to be isochromatic to give a correct colour recording. Most holographic 
materials are not perfectly isochromatic and therefore colour correction filters 
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are sometimes used for recording Lippmann photographs to obtain the right 
colour balance. 
The two holographic recording materials suitable for Lippmann pho- 
tography are panchromatic ultra-high-resolution silver halide materials and 
panchromatic photopolymer materials. Silver-halide materials require wet 
processing. Here the ultra-fine-grain panchromatic emulsion (PFG-03C emul- 
sion) from Slavich coated on film has been used. Some characteristics of the 
Slavich PFG-03C material are presented in Table 3.1. 
Silver halide material 
Emulsion thickness 
Grain size 
Resolution 
Blue sensitivity 
Green sensitivity 
Red sensitivity 
PFG-03C 
7 nm 
10 - 20 nm 
ti 10000lp/mm 
- 1.0 - 1.510-3J/cm2 
N 1.2 -1.610-3J/crn2 
- 0.8 -1.210-3J/cm2 
Color sensitivity peaked at: 633 nm, 530 nm, 450 nm 
Table 4.1: Characteristics of the Slavich PFG-03C emulsion 
The panchromatic holographic photopolymer materials from E. I. du 
Pont de Nemours & Co. require only dry processing (UV-curing and baking) 
which makes them particularly suitable for Lippmann OVD security prod- 
ucts. Although, less sensitive than the Slavich silver-halide emulsion (which 
is also slow, by modern photographic standards), it has its special advantages 
of easy handling and dry processing. 
A Lippmann photograph is recorded in photopolymer materials in the 
following way. The photosensitive polymer layer has to be thin, of the order 
of a few micrometers only. It is coated on a flexible transparent base and a 
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special type of reflecting foil is laminated on top of the photosensitive polymer 
layer under safe light, making sure it is in absolute perfect contact with it. In 
the experiments, the panchromatic photopolymer material (HRF-700X071-3 
film) having an emulsion thickness of about 2 to 4 pm is used. As a reflecting 
surface, silver sputtered (800A) polyester film without the standard anti-dust 
oxide (InO) top layer is used. Sometimes a colour correction filter may be 
needed in front of the camera lens to obtain correct colour balance. 
4.3.2 Practical work on Slavich silver-halide emulsions 
using various test targets 
These tests proved that the Lippmann technique works very well. It 
involved exposing the test targets for different times in order to get the right 
colour balance and developing them using the Lumiere developer. Tests were 
also carried out using the Birenheide HRT (German) and Slavich plates. It 
was found that the Slavich plates gave better results. These tests were carried 
out indoors under artificial lighting conditions. An example of the test target 
used is a sample passport shown in Figure 4.9. 
Tests have also been conducted using the GP8 developer and a compari- 
son from the results shows that the Lumiere developer might be better under 
indoor conditions. A few tests were also conducted under outdoor conditions 
with varying degrees of sunlight. 
Various other test targets were used, for example the Macbeth Colour 
Checker (Figure 4.2) which is a very good example of the sharpness and 
quality of the colours that can be achieved with this technique. 
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Figure 4.2: Macbeth Colour Checker 
The Lumiere developer consists of the following: 
Solution A Solution B 
Pyrogallol 1g Potassium bromide 10g 
Water (distilled) 100ml Water (distilled) 100ml 
When viewing Lippmann photographs, the reflection from the gelatine 
surface of the emulsion can cause colour distortion as a result of the phase 
shift in the gelatine/ mercury interface during recording[94]. In addition, the 
specular surface reflection has to be separated from the image in order to 
see it clearly. This can be done by attaching a wedged (angle about 100°) 
glass plate on top of the emulsion using index-matching glue, e. g. Canada 
balsam. The back of the photograph is painted black, covered with black 
paper and the edges sealed. The photographs could also be viewed enlarged, 
by projecting the reflected image using a special projector. 
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Formation of the latent image and Development[96] 
Gelatine is a necessary component of photographic emulsions because 
it contains labile sulphur compounds, which easily decompose when heated 
producing silver sulphide (A92S). The sensitivity specks that silver-halide 
grains exhibit on their surface and which are formed during the emulsion 
manufacturing process are made up of silver sulphide. 
The silver halide crystal is an n type photoconductor with a valence 
band of electrons and with a conduction band in which injected electrons 
are free to migrate throughout the crystal until trapped by a lattice defect. 
During the exposure of the emulsion, photons are absorbed by the crystals. 
When a photon of sufficient energy is absorbed, an electron from the crystal 
is promoted to the conduction band, leaving behind a positive hole which is 
a free halogen atom: 
Ag+X' (silver halide crystal) + by -º Ag+X° +e 
where v is the frequency of light (photon energy). The photogenerated hole is 
trapped at a surface sensitivity site by partial SZ- charges from the adsorbed 
silver sulphide specks. This results in a positively charged Ag2S+ particle, 
which dissociates into AgS and Ag+. 
Ag2S+ --> AgS + Ag+ 
The silver ion then attracts the photogenerated electron to form a silver 
atom. 
Ag+ . +- e- «-º Ago 
Typically, the isolated silver atom has a life time of about one second. In 
order to create a sublatent image speck on the silver halide crystal, where a 
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diatomic silver molecule is formed by the process of nucleation, a second silver 
atom is needed to combine with the first silver atom during its life time. The 
sublatent image speck grows larger with further photon absorption, resulting 
in photogenerated electrons. The latent image is usually regarded as a collec- 
tion of a few silver atoms at one site produced by the reduction of silver ions. 
For all the exposed grains, chemical development will then reduce the entire 
silver-halide grains to metallic silver. Development however depends on the 
sensitivity and the size of the grains in the emulsion. A highly sensitised 
grain requires fewer photons than a less sensitised grain and larger the grain 
size, higher is the sensitivity. At high intensities, electrons are produced at 
a rate that there is not enough time for the mobile silver ions to neutralize 
the trapped electrons. Recombination of electrons and holes may occur and 
as a result, the latent image becomes inefficient. At low intensities however, 
if the isolated silver atom has not combined with another silver atom in its 
lifetime, then it will decompose into an electron and silver ion again. This 
shows that a long exposure at low light levels becomes an inefficient process 
for the latent image formation. 
Lumiere developer used becomes active only when it is alkaline with 
activity increasing with the alkalinity. During the development some of the 
unexposed silver halide grains also get developed and this causes fog in the 
photographic emulsion. In order to prevent this a `restrainer' such as potas- 
sium bromide is added to the developer. 
Practical Work 
The work described in this section has been performed solely by the 
author at the Modern Optics Laboratory, De Montfort University, Leicester. 
In order to record Lippmann photographs the following camera was used: 
102 
Eastman Kodak Co. (Folmer & Schwing Div. ) Auto Graflex 4x5 inch 
camera equipped with a Kodak Aero Ektar F. 2.5,178mm lens. The camera 
can accommodate both film and glass plates. The panchromatic PFG-03c 
emulsion, coated on 1.5mm thick glass (plate size 4x5 inches), was used 
to record the Lippmann photographs. Here the gelatine-air interface acts as 
the reflector of light. The plate was inserted in a conventional dark slide 
with the emulsion side facing away from the camera lens. The plate holder 
was then inserted in the camera, mounted on a tripod. When the plate is 
exposed without mercury, the exposure time is slightly increased compared 
with recording with a mercury reflector. 
Similar experiments were conducted using the Slavich film and using 
a Canon 35mm camera which has been specially modified for Lippmann 
photography. 
To explain the reason why it is possible to obtain a Lippmann photo- 
graph without mercury, the difference between a reflection at the mercury 
surface and a gelatine-air interface has been studied[93]. A node is located 
at the mercury reflector (an optically thicker medium than gelatine), which 
means that at the gelatine surface there is a phase shift of f7r. However, 
a crest is located at the surface when the reflection is obtained from the 
gelatine-air interface, (an optically thinner medium than mercury) which 
means that as no phase shift occurs in this case, a silver layer will be created 
at the emulsion surface after development. In the mercury case, the first 
silver layer is located at a distance of a/4 inside the gelatine emulsion. With 
regard to the second silver layer, it will be a/4 closer to the gelatine surface 
compared with the mercury reflector case. Since the coherence length of or- 
dinary light is extremely short, the difference in distance from the gelatine 
surface is extremely important. The slightly increased modulation (caused 
by a higher degree of coherence) in the gelatine-air reflector case can some- 
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what compensate for the weaker reflection obtained in this case. However, 
the exposure must be slightly increased to bring the recording up on the 
linear part of the Hurter-Driffield curve[108]. The problem concerned with 
the surface reflection being out of phase with the image when viewing a Li- 
ppmann photograph is only valid in the mercury case. When using the air 
reflector, the surface reflection is in phase with the image. However, in this 
case as well, it can be recommended to add a glass wedge in order to improve 
the image contrast. 
The Slavich emulsion is rather soft, and it is important to harden the 
emulsion before the development takes place. The emulsion thickness is about 
7µm, which is thicker than necessary for Lippmann photography. The inter- 
ference pattern is recorded in a very thin volume at the top of the emulsion. 
This area has to be maintained intact after processing, justifying the pre- 
hardening step. Emulsion shrinkage and other emulsion distortions caused 
by the developer must be avoided. 
The following bath was used for this first processing step: 
Distilled water 750m1 
Formaldehyde 37% (Formalin) 10ml (10.2g) 
Potassium bromide 2g 
Sodium carbonate (anhydrous) 5g 
Add distilled water to make llitre 
Processing time 6minutes 
Among the old developers, the Lumiere pyrogallol developer mentioned 
earlier, gave the best results. The development time is about 90 seconds 
at approximately 18°C. After a 10-minute wash, the plates are soaked in 
distilled water that contains a wetting agent. Finally, the photographs are 
slowly dried at room temperature. The Lippmann photographs contain no 
dyes or pigments and their archival stability is very high. Broadband or 
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narrow band Lippmann filters are another possible scientific application of 
this photographic recording technique. 
4.3.3 Photopolymer materials 
A photopolymer recording material consists of three parts: A photopoly- 
merisable monomer, an initiator system (initiates polymerisation upon ex- 
posure to light) and a polymer (binder). To explain briefly, how it works; 
first, an exposure is made to the information carrying interference pattern 
which polymerises a part of the monomer. Monomer concentration gradients, 
formed by variation in the amount of polymerisation due to the variation in 
exposures, gives rise to diffusion of monomer molecules from the regions 
of high concentration to the regions of lower concentrations. The material 
is then exposed to regular light of uniform intensity until the remaining 
monomer is polymerised[94]. 
A typical filter, which has been used, for the present studies has been 
shown in Figure 4.3. 
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061 Nfist Blue 
Transmission 
0 
400 500 600 700 
Wavelength - Nanometres 
Figure 4.3: Typical filter used in experiments 
The above filter was chosen to recreate the colours in the original image 
after development. However, a catalogue of colour filters are available for 
colour variations. DuPont recommends about 100mJ/cm2 exposure at 350- 
380nm. After that, the photograph is put in an oven at a temperature of 
1200°C for 2 hours in order to increase the brightness of the image. 
Sample Lippmann photographs are shown in Figure 4.4 and the spec- 
trum recorded in Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.4: Sample Lippmann Photographs 
SPECYNAi. RADIANCE F+F: p}{ Ci 616 no* 
ýr 
sl 
$0- 
, 
ýL. 
- 1 
3i^ý 6.4 r MeassJ! arg 
t 
S3 
XN- 
nrº 4{. 4 ]NN 60ia 706 
Figure 4.5: Spectrum recorded from Lippmann Photograph of a parrot[87] 
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4.4 Applications of Lippmann Photography 
in Document Security 
An important key to the subject of document security appears to be the 
microstructure of matter, which varies between random and highly organised 
patterns. It appears that the degree of regular organisation of matter is a 
rough parameter of its value for security features. A highly random structure 
of matter on a microscopic scale brings about diffuse scatter and renders mat- 
ter optically invariable; that is; its optical properties become highly indepen- 
dent of the angle of observation. This state of matter appears reproducible 
most easily because colour copiers and other reproduction techniques apply 
diffusely reflecting inks and toners. However, as soon as matter assumes a 
more or less regular microstructure, its optical properties change radically 
and iridescent effects take the place of diffuse scatter. Metallic paints, thin 
films, multilayers, gratings and holograms exhibit an increased degree of or- 
derly micro-organisation, and at the same time tend to offer an increased 
usefulness for security purposes. In the combat against counterfeiting, much 
attention is therefore being given to the development of an optically vari- 
able device that will be virtually impossible to copy and at the same time 
will have excellent archival properties. There is however, a complete gamut 
of valuable and effective noniridescent security devices such as watermarks, 
intaglio printing, metamerism, transitory and tilt images, fluorescence, ther- 
mochronism and so on that are already on the market. 
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Figure 4.6: Schematic showing method of recording Lippmann security Pho- 
tographs 
Both the recording and the processing can be performed on the same 
piece of equipment. After being processed and if desired, the recorded im- 
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Figure 4.7: Passport page with the visible Lippmann OVD when illuminated 
with perpendicular diffuse light and perpendicular observation 
ages can be laminated to a black backing plastic foil. Then the backed or 
unbacked Lippmann frames are laminated to their corresponding security 
documents[89]. 
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Figure 4.8: Lippmann photograph attached to a security document 
In Figure 4.8, a Lippmann photograph (1) is attached to a security 
document (2), the colour of the image in the Lippmann photograph varies 
depending on the angle of observation. Perpendicular observation (3) gives 
the correct colour image; oblique observation (4) shifts the colours toward the 
shorter wavelengths[89]. Due to the Bragg sensitivity, it is not possible to re- 
place a Lippmann colour photograph with a conventional colour photograph, 
as mentioned earlier the security document with the Lippmann photograph 
cannot be copied on a conventional colour copier. 
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4.4.1 Practical Illustration 
As an illustration of what the Lippmann photographic technique can 
offer, a sample passport page was recorded. In this case, panchromatic ultra- 
high-resolution silver-halide material was used instead of photopolymer film. 
The recording has to be done at a relatively large distance from the Lip- 
pmann Optical Variable Device (OVD) and thus, it is difficult to obtain a 
high-resolution image of the Lippmann recording. The Lippmann photo- 
graph itself has an extremely high resolution provided that a high quality 
photographic macro-lens is used in the Lippmann recording equipment. The 
recording film has a resolving power of about 10,000 lines/mm. 
Figure 4.9: Lippmann Photograph (Lippmann OVD) of the passport page 
As seen in Figure 4.9, all the passport information details are recorded 
with high resolution in the Lippmann OVD. 
In Figure 4.11, the OVD was illuminated and recorded perpendicularly, 
which means that a correct colour image of the passport is possible to obtain. 
The colour image changes towards the blue part of the spectrum when the 
image is studied under oblique illumination and observation angles. 
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Figure 4.10: Passport page with Lippmann OVD when the OVD is not visible 
Figure 4.11: Passport page with the visible Lippmann OVD when illuminated 
with perpendicular diffuse light and perpendicular observation 
A thin Lippmann OVD film label (size: 17mm x 24mm) was laminated 
to the passport page in the upper left hand corner. The small Lippmann 
OVD label is backed with black plastic foil. In Figure 4.12(a), the label 
looks completely black since no diffuse perpendicular light was hitting it, nor 
was it observed perpendicularly. In Figure 4.12(b), the passport page was 
slightly tilted and in Figure 4.12(c), the whole Lippmann OVD is visible. At 
this angle, the passport page is perpendicular to the observer. The glossy 
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over laminate reflects a lot of light towards the eye and the reproduction 
camera lens. Upon inspecting the passport, this effect is easily and immedi- 
ately observed and very difficult to simulate in any other way. Further, the 
Lippmann OVD image is an exact copy of the passport page itself. The only 
tool needed for this is a magnifying glass in order to be able to see and read 
the text in the image. 
OVD image not visible OVD image partly visible 
e, (b) 
Entire OVD image visible 
(cl 
Figure 4.12: The effects of tilting the Lippmann OVD attached to the pass- 
port page 
Display Unit for the Lippmann Photographs: A display device based on a 
Visual Plus Slide Illuminator turned upside down, mounted in a holder, was 
made to view the Lippmann photographs. This provides uniform white light 
and could enable, e. g. the passport officer to check the documents with ease 
to detect any fraud. Figure 4.13 demonstrates the use of the display unit. 
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Figure 4.13: Display Unit for the Lippmann Photographs 
4.5 Conclusions 
The Lippmann photographic technique can be optimized further by tak- 
ing the following points into consideration. 
" Exact solutions to the multiple scattering problems can be found when 
the angular distribution of the light scattered by the individual particles 
is of the simple form, for example isotropic. Generally however, this 
is not the situation, and approximate methods of solutions have to 
be developed. The goal however, is that the approximations made to 
provide a mathematical solution will still provide the desired accuracy 
to extract meaningful information. 
"A more realistic models of the emulsion can be developed to include 
effects such as multiple scattering and absorption and with a compar- 
ison with practical results aim to improve the existing models which 
assume a perfect emulsion with relatively no scattering. The sensito- 
metric and imaging properties of an emulsion are principally controlled 
by using various methods of halide precipitation and spectral and chem- 
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ical sensitisation, since these procedures almost totally determine the 
light-scattering and absorption properties of the grains. Methods to 
improve the sensitivity and image sharpness of the emulsion can be de- 
veloped, by using techniques such as coating the emulsion by a reflective 
support which usually increases the speed of the emulsion though with 
a loss in sharpness or by adding light-scattering particles directly to the 
emulsion. The image sharpness can be improved by adding intergrain 
absorbing dyes or particles to the gelatin to decrease the amount of 
light scattered sidewise by the grains. 
" The development process can be fine tuned to get more appreciable 
results for the end product to be commercially viable. With the film 
samples obtained, a spectrophotometer can be used to measure the 
amount of light reflected or transmitted at, each wavelength of the 
spectrum. This method is widely used in industry and gives more 
detailed information about the light-reflecting or transmitting proper- 
ties of the sample. Here, a spectrophotometric curve is plotted showing 
the reflectance or transmittance (or density) at each wavelength. These 
spectrophotometric curves do not directly specify the colour of a sam- 
ple but calculations can be made with the aid of the CIE chromaticity 
diagram[101] to obtain a set of three numbers which are analogous to 
the red, green and blue measurements made by the filter method. 
" During the development process, another important factor that needs 
to be taken into consideration is the time of development. Two impor- 
tant factors: fog and graininess related to the emulsion used increase 
with the time of development. Fog is the term applied to the density, 
which is obtained on parts of the sensitive surface, which have received 
no exposure. Graininess on the other hand is dependent upon the size 
of the developed grains and on the manner in which they are clumped 
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together. 
Thus, the Lippman OVD has been successfully used as a security device 
for passports. The 19th Century technique has been practically demonstrated 
using Slavich photographic plates & film and the Lumiere & GP8 developers. 
The next part of the thesis moves on to Texture Watermarking and Microbar 
Covert Bar Coding Technique. 
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Chapter 5 
Covert Bar Coding 
5.1 Watermarks in Context 
A digital watermark is a digital signal or pattern inserted into a digital 
"document" (e. g. text, graphics, multimedia presentations). As such, it is a 
form of electronic watermark much like the corporate logos used by the cable 
television industry to identify the source of the program on screen, typically 
along the lower periphery of the television screen. Such cable companies, 
we may assume, feel that the advertising advantage of the ever-present, on- 
screen logo, together with the legal benefit of having a source signature persist 
under video recording, more than offset the aggregate user-annoyance and 
distraction. 
Digital watermarks extend these advantages to digital documents. A 
signal or pattern may be digitally imposed on a document prior to sale or 
distribution. The persistence of the watermark under transmission, and some 
common forms of transformation, contribute to our ability to authenticate 
copies. This, in turn, should enable us to protect our ownership rights in di- 
gital information, even in the undisciplined, anarchistic world of the Internet 
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(see Figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1: Digitized copy of artwork from a sixteenth century Aztec manu- 
script. Note that the circular digital watermark is most visible against light 
background. Faint watermarks tend to "hide" in the intense, foreground 
imagery[Source: IBM's Digital Library Project. Used with permission. ] 
In order to explain the Digital Watermarking concept, it is much easier 
to explain what it is not! Digital watermarking is not encryption, which also 
involves file transformation. It is a common practice nowadays to encrypt 
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digital documents so that they become un-viewable without a decryption 
key. Unlike encryption, however, digital watermarking leaves the original 
image or (or file) basically intact and recognizable. Further, decrypted doc- 
uments are free of any residual effects of encryption, whereas visible digital 
watermarks are designed to be persistent in viewing, printing, or subsequent 
re-transmission or dissemination. 
Digital watermarking is also to be contrasted with digital fingerprinting, 
which produces a "meta" file that describes the contents of the source file. 
Cyclic redundancy checking and checksum algorithms are both simple uses 
of file fingerprinting for error detection applications. A more advanced use of 
fingerprinting is to be found in RSA Data Security's use of message digests 
for authentication purposes. Digests are the result of applying a hashing 
algorithm (e. g., MD5, SHA) to a document or file to produce an identifying 
bit string (fingerprint). If the receiver's hash algorithm produces the same 
message digest for the file as the sender's, the file is authentic. Of course, 
this assumes that sender and receiver use the same software, hence the same 
hash algorithm. 
Fingerprints may also serve as a digital signatures. If the message digest 
discussed above were further encrypted, converted to plaintext, and attached 
to the original file or message in transit, the plaintext version of the message 
digest (fingerprint) would also serve as a digital signature for the original 
file. While both fingerprints and signatures accompany unaltered source 
documents, signatures, like their penned counterparts, are embedded in the 
document itself even if in encrypted form. 
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5.2 Watermarks in Use 
Authentication is but one use of digital watermarking. Both symmetric 
and asymmetric hashing algorithms can be used to embed a unique digital 
imprint on a document or file. If the removal of an imprint yields the original 
document (which is to say that the "stripped" watermark is identical to the 
embedded watermark), then the copy is authentic. Once again, this assumes 
that the "stripping" algorithm is available to the end-user. Such authentica- 
tion techniques are usually associated with some sort of encryption for the 
distribution of keys, programs, etc, which are related to the watermarked 
documents. 
In addition, watermarks are also used as a check for non-repudiable 
duplication and transmission. In this case, the owner, creator or sender 
imprints a watermark which is unique for each receiver. The watermark holds 
under subsequent re-transmission, so the "authorized" source of unauthorized 
copies may be easily identified after extraction. A collateral benefit is that 
the intended recipient of a document token could always be identified. 
However, these applications really only apply to the class of invisible 
watermarks. Visible watermarks contribute to document and transmission 
security in different ways. To illustrate, visible watermarks are more overt 
means of discouraging theft and unauthorized use both by reducing the com- 
mercial value of a document and making it obvious to the criminally inclined 
that the document's ownership has been definitively established. We observe 
that invisible watermarks only have this effect if the digital thief is aware 
of the technology and the possibility that watermarks may be present on a 
document of interest. 
There are several characteristics of effective watermarks. For one, they 
must be difficult or impossible to remove. For another, they must survive 
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common document modifications and transformations (e. g. cropping and 
compressing image files). Third, they must, in principle at least, be easily 
detectable and removable by authorized users with such privileges (e. g. law 
enforcement agencies). Invisible watermarks should also be imperceptible, 
while visible watermarks should be perceptible enough to discourage theft 
but not perceptible enough to decrease the utility or appreciation of the 
document. 
5.3 Watermarking Practice 
Watermarking techniques tend to divide into two categories, text and 
image, according to the type of document to be watermarked. In the case 
of imagery, several different methods enable watermarking in the spatial do- 
main from simply flipping low-order bits of selected pixels to superimposing 
watermark symbols over an area of a graphic. Spatial domain watermarking 
is illustrated in Figures 5.2(a) and 5.2(b) that demonstrate how the degree 
of visibility of the watermark depends upon its intensity and the nature of 
the background. 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 5.2: Two watermarked images identical but for the intensity of the 
image. Considerable latitude is available, in terms of placement, size and in- 
tensity to blend the watermark into a graphic[Source: IBM's Digital Library 
Project. Used with permission. ] 
Another spatial watermarking technique uses color separation. In this 
way, the watermark appears in only one of the color bands. This renders 
the watermark visibly subtle such that it is difficult to detect under regular 
viewing. However, the watermark appears immediately when the colors are 
separated for printing. This renders the document useless to the printer 
unless the watermark can be removed from the color band. This approach 
is used commercially for journalists to inspect digital pictures from a photo- 
stockhouse before buying un-watermarked versions. 
An alternative to spatial watermarking is frequency domain. In this 
case, transforms like the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) alter the pixel-values 
of the image for chosen frequencies. Since high frequencies will be lost by 
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compression or scaling, the watermark signal is applied to lower frequencies, 
or better yet, applied adaptively to frequencies that contain important in- 
formation of the original picture (feature-based schemes). Since watermarks 
applied to the frequency domain will be dispersed over the entirety of the 
spatial image upon inverse transformation, this method is not as susceptible 
to defeat by cropping as the spatial technique. However, there is more of a 
tradeoff here between invisibility and decodability, since the watermark is in 
effect applied indiscriminately across the spatial image. 
Watermarking can be applied to text images as well. Three proposed 
methods are: text line coding, word space coding, and character encoding. 
For text line coding, the text lines of a document page are shifted imper- 
ceptibly up or down. For a 40-line text page, for instance, this yields 240 
possible codewords. Figure 5.3 illustrates text line coding as it would appear 
to the casual reader. According to the line code box, the first, second, fourth 
and sixth lines are elevated by 1 pixel, although the alteration is practically 
imperceptible. The effectiveness of such watermarking is confirmed in Fig- 
ure 5.4. Even with the affected lines set apart in red, it is still difficult to 
determine that the lines are elevated. 
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Pome years ago never mind how long ago precisely 
having little or no money In my purse and nothing 
particular to Interest me on shore I thought I 
would sail about a little and see the watery part 
of the world. lt is a way 1 have of drhdn' off the 
spleen and regulating the circulation. Whenever 11 
find myself growing grim about the mouth I account 
It high time to get to sea as soon as 1 can. 
ünecida " o1 of o bos ip oi. Pi. yýecmýý 
Figure 5.3: Text with lines 1,2,4 and 6 elevated from normal position by one 
pixel[Source: IBM's Digital Library Project. Used with permission. ] 
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------ --- Some years ago never mind how long ago precisely 
having little or no money in my purse and nothing 
particular to interest me on shore I thought I 
would sail about a little and see the watery part 
of the world. It Is a way I have of drMa' off the 
spleen and regulating the circulation. Whenever 11 
find myself growing grim about the mouth I account 
high time to get to sea as soon as I can. 
LlneCodc' ® Offset [11 I'? DlsplrA6fmsrk. 
Figure 5.4: Elevated lines highlighted[Source: IBM's Digital Library Project. 
Used with permission. ] 
For word-shift coding, the spacing between words in a line of justified 
text is altered. The plaintext in Figure 5.5 has three words shifted right one 
pixel. Figure 5.6 highlights the affected words. 
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Some years ago never mind how long ago precisely 
having little or no money in my purse and nothing 
particular to Interest me on shore I thought I 
would sail about a little and see the watery part 
of the world. It Is a way I have of drMn' oft the 
spleen and regulating the circulation. Whenever 11 
find myself growing grim about the mouth I account 
It high time to get to sea as soon as I can. 
UneCode 11101010 Offset 1Q 17 DisplayWmarh 
Figure 5.4: Elevated lines highlighted[Source: IBM's Digital Library Project. 
Used with permission. ] 
For word-shift coding, the spacing between words in a line of justified 
text is altered. The plaintext in Figure 5.5 has three words shifted right one 
pixel. Figure 5.6 highlights the affected words. 
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Some years ago never mind how long ago precisely 
having little or no money in my purse and nothing 
particular to interest me on shore I thought I 
would sail about a little and see the watery part 
of the world. It is a way I have of drivin' off the 
spleen and regulating the circulation. Whenever I 
find myself growing grim about the mouth I account 
it high time to get to sea as soon as I can. 
1 
Figure 5.5: Text with three words offset by one pixel[Source: IBM's Digital 
Library Project. Used with permission. ] 
Some years ago never mind how long ago precisely 
having little or no money in my purse and nothing 
particular to interest me on shore I thought I 
would sail about a little and see the watery part 
of the world. It is a way I have of drMn' off the 
spleen and regulating the circulation. Whenever I 
find myself growing grim about the mouth I account 
it high time to get to sea as soon as I can. I 
Figure 5.6: Text with offset words highlighted[Source: IBM's Digital Library 
Project. Used with permission. ] 
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The remaining text watermarking technique involves character coding. 
This involves minor alterations to the shapes of characters - e. g. clipping a 
serif imperceptibly, or extending a descender. An advantage of these methods 
over those applied to picture images is that, by combining two or three of 
these to one document, two documents with different watermarks cannot be 
spatially registered to extract the watermark. Of course, the watermark can 
be defeated by retyping the text. 
5.4 Microbar Pen Scanner 
Figure 5.7: The Microbar Pen Scanner [Adapted from Quick Link Pen Op- 
eration Manual] 
Human interpretation of an image is based on matching templates of geo- 
metrically significant features. Microbar uses fractal geometry to encode data 
in the background of a document i. e. fractals are used to create appropriate 
image texture to camouflage information. This technique is unique and has 
128 
widespread commercial applications. To mention a few of its advantages; the 
system offers a higher degree of security than any other encryption method 
known; the technology used to implement it is very standard and simple and 
therefore can be used for a wide range of products. The main feature is its 
covert nature, which makes it invisible to the naked eye and hence difficult 
for the counterfeiter to imitate. 
Equipment used: Desktop computer with a standard Epson 1240U 
scanner and also a hand held scanner called the Quick Link Pen which is more 
convenient to use and it can store, edit, transfer text for easy management. 
It can also synchronize and transfer data to desktop applications in seconds. 
Normally, in image processing, we like to have an image with as much less 
noise as possible, as noise increases the distortion and reduces the resolution 
of the image. The aim of the Microbar, however, is to introduce noise in 
the image or document which is to be watermarked and the noise generated 
through fractals serves as the watermark and has the covert feature. This 
is difficult for counterfeiters to regenerate as the exact parameters involved 
in the generation of the fractal noise (watermark) is unknown except to the 
person embedding the watermark. Thus the idea is novel and unique and 
has generated much interest for various commercial applications. 
5.5 Covert Bar Coding: The Idea 
"A new product (invisible signature embedded into images) designed to 
work alongside Microbar authentication. 
" Facilitates track & trace down to product individualisation level. 
" Can be used with Digital Printing to allow local control. 
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" Completely invisible for fractal images (e. g. clouds, see Figure 5.44), 
encrypted and covert bar coding. 
" Simultaneous authentication (anti-counterfeit detection) & product in- 
dividualisation reading by scan. 
" Machine readable using flat bed or pen scanner. 
9 Cannot be copied or reverse engineered. 
So to summarise, the two fundamentals underpinning Microbar are Frac- 
tals and Chaos. Fractals give the characteristic of self-similarity and the no- 
tion of `texture'. This combination gives Microbar both its ability for partial 
scanning and scanning in any direction as well as its inherent camouflaging 
potential for images with intrinsic `texture' or complexity and detail. It al- 
lows the scanning at much lower resolutions than those used for printing of 
the document being scanned. 
Chaos is an enabling technology which is used to generate self-similiarity. 
Intuitively, people find the concept of structure from chaos difficult to grasp. 
The Faigenbaum map in the figure below explains this in more detail. Chaos 
also gives an extremely powerful encryption capability. Therefore, this tech- 
nology is used in a stand-alone encryption product. Thus, this makes the 
Microbar even more secure. 
The map in Figure 5.8 is a way of showing the statistical self-affinity 
generated by chaos. The Faigenbaum map plots the output from a chaotic 
algorithm which requires a `seed' or parameter to drive it. In the above ex- 
ample, the various values of this `seed' are shown on the horizontal axis. At 
first, for values upto 2.0, the algorithm outputs converge to a single number 
-1.0. As the `seed' value goes above 2.0, a phenomenon known as bifurca- 
tion occurs and one of two separate numbers are repeatedly generated. At 
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1.0 
I 
Figure 5.8: The Faigenbaum Map[111] 
a `seed' value of around 2.5, bifurcation occurs again with one of four possi- 
ble numbers being generated. At 2.6, bifurcation occurs again generating 8 
possible answers. Beyond this point, we start entering the black shaded area 
which represents mathematical chaos, where any number within the limits 
is able to be output by the algorithm. The interesting points to note are 
the 'white bands' within the black 'sea of chaos'. On closer inspection, these 
bands represent structures similar to the previous points of bifurcation. This 
is mathematical self-similarity which links chaos to fractals. 
5.6 Covert Bar Code: The Fundamentals 
5.6.1 Introduction 
The `Microbar Covert Bar Code' is fundamentally based on the use of 
the `chirp' function. The `chirp' signal is then convolved with a bar code and 
then added to an image for watermarking. It is covert for low signal-to- noise 
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ratios (SNRs) and can be reconstructed using the matched filter principle as 
presented later in this chapter. 
5.6.2 The Chirp Signal 
Chirp signals are commonly encountered in radar and ranging applica- 
tions, but may also be used as the stimulus signal for device characterization. 
Such signals are best designed in the frequency domain. A `chirp' signal is 
a sinusoid whose frequency changes linearly from a starting value to ending 
one. The formula for such a signal can be defined by creating a complex 
exponential signal with quadratic phase which is given by 
p(T) = exp(ikor) exp(ior2) exp(c5), -T/2 < 7- < T/2 
where T is signal length, T is time x speed of light, a is quadratic chirp 
rate/(speed of light)', ko is the carrier wave number (carrier frequency = 
2x speed of light) and 0 is a phase value. 
In reality, the signal is not complex, but a real valued function of time. 
Hence, the real part of p is given by 
cos(koT + aT2 +0) 
The instantaneous phase of this signal is cp = kor+a7.2+q5. The derivative of 
cp yields an instantaneous frequency modulation of f; (t) = ko + 2ar which is 
linear versus r. Hence, the reason why it is also known as the linear frequency 
modulated (FM) signal. 
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Figure 5.9: An example of a chirp signal 
5.6.3 The Matched Filter 
The Matched Filter is one of the most common filters used for pat- 
tern recognition. It uses the principle of correlating a signal/image with a 
matching template of the feature that is assumed to be present in the sig- 
nal/image. If the feature exists, then the filter output i. e. the correlation 
signal/image, produces a local maximum or spike where the feature occurs. 
This is a general process but has special significance when the template and 
feature are based on the chirp function as it produces a robust output when 
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the signal-to-noise ratio is very low. 
Consider the basic linear stationary (convolution) model for a signal s 
as a function of time t, 
s(t) = p(t) ®f (t) + n(t) 
where f is the Impulse Response Function (IRF), p is the Instrument Func- 
tion, n is the noise and ® is the convolution operation, i. e. 
p(t) ®f (t) = J(t - T)f (T)d7- 
A fundamental inverse (deconvolution) problem is to find an estimate f of f 
given s. The Matched Filter is based on assuming a linear convolution model 
for this estimate of the form 
1(t) = q(t) 0 s(t) 
where the problem lies with determining the filter q. The Matched Filter is 
based on finding q subject to the condition that 
,, =If 
Q(w)P(w)dw12 
fI N(w) I2I Q(w) I2dw 
(5.1) 
is a maximum where Q, P and N are the Fourier transforms of q, p and n 
respectively and where the Fourier transform pair is defined by 
r00 
F(w) =Jf (t) exp(-iwt)dt 
Jf (t) = 
2F(w) 
exp(iwt)dw 
and r is a `measure' of the signal-to-noise ratio. In this sense, the Matched 
Filter maximises the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) of the output. 
Assuming that the noise n has a `white' or uniform power spectrum, the 
filter Q which maximises the SNR defined by r can be shown to be given by 
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the simple result Q(w) = P*(w). The required solution is therefore given by 
00 
f (t) = 2ý J P*(w)S(w) exp(iwt)dw 00 
Using the correlation theorem[111], this can be rewritten as 
00 
f (tý = p(t) O S(t) ° Jp(r + t)s(T)dr 
Hence, the Matched Filter is based on correlating the signal s with the in- 
strument function p. 
Derivation of the Matched Filter 
The Matched Filter is essentially a `by-product' of the `Schwarz Inequal- 
ity', which is given by 
00 2 00 00 f 
Q(w)P(W) 
J IQ(W)I2ý fo IP(L, )1adw (5.2) 
00 o 
Using a principle mathematical trick, Q(w)P(w) can be rewritten as 
Q(w)P(w) = IN(w)IQ(w) x 
P(w) 
(5.3) IN(W)l 
Equation 5.3 is then substituted into Equation 5.2, resulting in 
ýo 
o 
Q(W)P(W) 
Z 
= 
Li: 
I N()I Q(W) 
P(w) z 
Nw 
00 foo IN(c7)I2 IQ(w)I2dw I 
IN(w)12&4 (5.4) 
From the result in Equation 5.4 and using the definition of r in Equation 5.1, 
the result can be observed as 
J IN(w)12 
dw 
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If r is to be maximum, then the required result is 
r=f 
IPW2 dw IN(w)I2 
or 
r 00 IN(ý')IQ(w) 
New dcý 
2=ý W foo IN(w)12IQ(W)I2d 
f 
IN(w)12Jý 
But this is only true if 
IN(W)l 
Hence, r is maximum when 
Q(w) = 
P*(W) 
IN(w)12 
The above derivation is for the one-dimensional instance. However, this 
can easily be extended to the discrete two-dimension instance using the i 
and j notations and replacing f with E. For the purpose of this research, 
the one and two-dimensional discrete equations are used for ease of use in 
computational experiments. 
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5.6.4 Recovering 1-D Signal using Matched Filter 
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Figure 5.10: Recovery of 1-D signal using Matched Filter 
10 
With reference to Figure 5.10, (a) is a source (original) signal, (b) is 
the corresponding chirped pulse, (c) is a convolution of (a) and (b), (d) is a 
randomly generated noise signal; (e) is the addition of (c) and (d). Finally 
(f) is the recovered original signal using the matched filter. The original 
signal has to be a discreet (analog or digital) signal. We find that greater the 
width of the chirped pulse, greater is the resolution of the recovered signal. 
This principle works even when the signal-to-noise ratio is 1. The matched 
filter is very robust with respect to other available filters especially for high 
noise levels. This proves that the Matched Filter can be used to give an 
approximate (or exact) reproduction of the original signal. 
100 20C 0100 400 500 600 
Id) Ranaom Noise 
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In the following subsection, the above principle has been extended to 
produce an entire bar code. 
5.6.5 Recovering 1-D Signal in a Barcode 
Figure 5.11: Ist stage of recovering barcode 
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Figure 5.12: Chirp signal 
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Figure 5.13: 2nd stage of recovering barcode 
Figure 5.14: 3rd stage of recovering barcode 
Figure 5.15: 4th stage of recovering barcode 
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Figure 5.16: 5th stage of recovering barcode 
Figure 5.17: Recovered barcode 
Similar to the above case, Figure 5.11 is an extension of Figure 5.10(a) 
but in two-dimensional format. This serves as the original signal. Figure 
5.13 is a two-dimensional chirped pulse which has been obtained from Figure 
5.12 which is a one-dimensional chirped pulse similar to the above case. The 
convolution of the chirped pulse with the original signal gives Figure 5.14. 
Randomly generated two-dimensional noise signal (Figure 5.15) is then added 
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Figure 5.18: Recovered barcode signal 
to Figure 5.14 (convolution of two-dimensional chirped pulse with original 
signal) to give Figure 5.16. The recovered barcode is then obtained in Figure 
5.17 using similar principles to the above case. The actual recovered signal 
in one-dimensional can be seen in Figure 5.18. Thus the similarity can be 
seen between the original signal and the recovered signal which makes it a 
very good technique to be employed in watermarking. 
Figure 5.19: Noisy barcode 
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Figure 5.20: Recovered barcode 
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Figure 5.21: Recovered barcode signal 
The randomly generated noise signal can be varied with respect to its 
signal-to-noise ratio and different outputs (recovered signals) can be ob- 
tained. The lower the signal-to-noise ratio (high density noise), the recovered 
signal remains more obscure. This is shown in Figures 5.19 to 5.21. 
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5.6.6 An Example of Covert Digital Thread 
.! h r... i". _, .-. 
Figure 5.22: An example of Covert Digital Thread 
The above figure highlights a practical application using the `Covert Bar 
Coding Technique'. (Bottom-Up with reference to Figure 5.22) A single bar 
is encoded within the barcode. The barcode is convolved with a `chirp' pulse 
and then is watermarked and embedded within the twenty pound note. By 
varying the opacity of the watermark for a required percentage, the twenty 
pound note is able to hide the watermark and is invisible to the naked eye. 
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5.6.7 Results and Conclusion 
The fundamentals and applications of the `Covert Bar Coding Tech- 
nique' has been presented earlier in this section. However, the focus will 
now be on the performance of the technique. First, the performance on the 
one-dimensional signals is analysed. 
SNR/m 16 32 64 128 256 512 
0.01 92.7916 92.4282 92.6725 93.7943 93.5721 93.6557 
0.1 92.7028 91.6481 92.8374 93.9329 91.4440 92.5375 
1 90.1812 91.4439 88.5063 86.5754 75.0661 69.0597 
10 72.2155 86.0339 77.6890 61.1428 44.6376 58.5943 
100 69.5104 85.0281 78.7635 61.6226 43.4293 57.6690 
1000 69.3505 85.0552 78.6805 61.1531 43.3209 57.7200 
100000 69.3440 85.0527 78.6712 61.2168 43.2995 57.7351 
Table 5.1: Mean Square Error percentages for 1-D Signals 
With reference to the above table, SNR represents the signal-to-noise 
ratio from 0.01 to 100000 and m represents the width of the `chirp' pulse 
from 16 to 512. 
SNR can also be represented in decibel (db) units. The conversion for- 
mula is as follows: 
SNR = 201og1o(r)db 
where I' represents the ratio between the signal energy and noise energy. 
Since the above representation of SNR does not change the results shown 
in Figures 5.23 and 5.25, for simplicity of calculations, SNR has been repre- 
sented as loglo. However, the SNR values in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 (correspond- 
ing to Figures 5.23 and 5.25 respectively) are in decimal units. 
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Mean Square Error (MSE) is widely used to measure how close the 
reconstructed signal is to the original. The MSE gives information about the 
error signal energy or may be called compression noise. In terms of signal-to- 
noise ratio, it makes sense to compare the error energy to the original signal 
energy. The mean square error percentage in this case is defined by 
N 
E(s; 
- f; )2 
MSE(%) _ 'Nl x 100 
Yý(s1 + f; )2 
i=l 
where N is the length of the signal array, i is the array index, si is the original 
signal and fi is the recovered signal. 
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Figure 5.23: Percentage of Mean Square Error for 1-D Signals 
Figure 5.23 is a graphical representation between the mean square error 
percentage and the log (base-10) of signal-to-noise ratio. Depending on the 
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width of the 'chirp' pulse (colour coded in the graph), the higher the signal- 
to-noise ratio, the better the recovery percentage. It can be observed that 
when the peak signal-to-noise ratio is reached for a particular `chirp' pulse 
width, the error rate stabilizes accordingly. 
However, the minimum error rate is approximately 43% (with respect 
to using the same sized width of the `chirp' pulse as the original signal size), 
which can be considered relatively high, but on visual inspection, the recov- 
ered signal is an exact replica of the original signal accompanied by noise. 
If the `chirp' and the additional normalised noise is removed, the recov- 
ery percentage is 100%. This is depicted in Figure 5.24. 
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Figure 5.24: 100% recovery of signal without noise 
The same principle is now applied to a one-dimensional barcode recovery. 
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SNR/m 1 16 32 64 128 256 512 
0.01 97.7116 97.7832 97.8098 97.6374 97.6658 97.7056 
0.1 97.4519 97.4350 97.5224 97.3662 96.9507 97.0649 
1 97.0836 96.2268 96.8865 94.4764 85.8798 72.7079 
10 72.5224 55.8367 33.3333 0 0 20.0000 
100 71.4286 50.0000 33.3333 0 0 20.0000 
1000 71.4286 50.0000 33.3333 0 0 20.0000 
100000 71.4286 50.0000 33.3333 0 0 20.0000 
Table 5.2: Mean Square Error percentages for 1-D Barcodes 
MSE Percentage vs. SNR 
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Figure 5.25: Percentage of Mean Square Error for 1-D Barcodes 
Figure 5.25 is a graphical representation of Table 5.2. On comparison 
with the graph in Figure 5.23, it can be seen that they share identical char- 
acteristics, hence the same conclusions can be drawn. If the signal-to-noise 
ratio is higher, the better the recovery percentage and when the peak signal- 
to-noise ratio is reached (depending on the width of the `chirp' pulse), the 
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error stabilizes accordingly. Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR) is the value 
of the SNR reached by the signal at stabilization, i. e. with respect to Fig- 
ure 5.25, PSNR=1 or in decimal units, PSNR=10 as shown in Table 5.2. 
However, the difference between the two analyses is that in the first case the 
recovered signals are not set at a threshold and hence, accounting for the high 
mean square error. In the second case, the recovered barcodes are set against 
the threshold of its averaged noise (approximately half the difference between 
the maximum and minimum of the barcode intensity which is defined by the 
sum of all the pixel intensities within the barcode), hence the 100% recovery 
of the original barcode as graphically illustrated in Figure 5.25. 
Table 5.2 shows an unusual phenomenon of 0% MSE at m=128 and 
m=256 (widths of `chirp' pulse used), when SNR=10 (decimal units) and 
above. This is because at these instants 100% of the signal is recovered. 
However, when m=512, this model breaks down as a MSE of 20% is achieved. 
This shows that the optimum results are obtained at m=128 and m=256 i. e. 
MSE is dependant on width of chirp pulse used. 
By setting a threshold value for reconstruction, an error-free signal can 
be recovered, the process of which has been illustrated in Figure 5.22 con- 
firming that the method can be successfully used for commercial applica- 
tions. Therefore, the principle of the technique has been incorporated in 
two-dimensional watermarking described later in this chapter. 
5.7 Cross Entropy (cent) 
Let us consider h; to be an array in an image to be watermarked called 
as template or an original image and hi to be a similar array in its counterfeit 
copy or a photocopy of the original. Then we can say E (cent) which is a 
value between 0 and 1 is given by: 
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E(cent) 
0<E<1 
hilog(h2) 
h1 
hi log(hJhi) 
hi log hi - hi log hi 
'1 
ýEhiloghi+Ehiloghil 
ii 
The cent can be described as a discrimination information function; it 
becomes particularly important in the case when we are able to guess an 
initial distribution of a function before calculating a more precise one. 
5.7.1 Resolution dependant Microbar Detection using 
flat bed scanner Epson 1240U 
A photocopy of a Microbar encrypted image shown in Figure 5.26 (the 
area scanned highlighted with blue border) has been scanned with varying 
resolutions from 100dpi to 400dpi. An interesting observation was that the 
Microbar could not be detected at resolutions lower than 300dpi. The aver- 
age value of the cent for Microbar detection was found to be 0.0003197 (at 
300dpi). 
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Figure 5.26: Photocopy of a Microbar Encrypted Image 
An original and its photocopy (counterfeit) were scanned a number of 
times (average of 5 is taken in the results shown) and the cent value (cross 
entropy) displayed on the pen was recorded. The pen has to be held at 
an angle of 75 to 90 degrees with the rollers lightly touching the page. On 
plotting the relationship between the number of scans and the cent value in 
each case, we find that the cent value is higher for the counterfeit document. 
Therefore, based on the cent value, counterfeit documents can be instantly 
differentiated from the original ones, making the process very simple and 
straightforward. 
149 
No. of Scans Original Cent Counterfeit Cent 
1 0.0085 0.0119 
2 0.0077 0.0126 
3 0.0068 0.0171 
4 0.0041 0.0200 
5 0.0077 0.0110 
Table 5.3: Original and Counterfeit Documents Cent Values 
COMPARISON OF CENTVALUE FOR ORIGINAL 
AND COUNTERFEIT DOCUMENTS 
0.025 
j 0.02- 
,, *-, j Original 
Z 0.01 Counterfeit 
0.005 
0 
12345 
NO OF SCANS 
Figure 5.27: Result: Comparison of Cent Value for Original and Counterfeit 
Documents 
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5.8 Two-Dimensional Watermarking: 
Full Digital Watermarking 
5.8.1 The Principle 
" Same principle, but two-dimensional instead of one-dimensional 
" Uses Fresnel zone patterns for coding instead of one-dimensional `chirp' 
" Fresnel coded image used as watermark 
" Reconstruction obtained by correlating with Fresnel zone code (pass- 
word protected) 
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Figure 5.28: Generation of the 2-D Watermark 
Referring to Figure 5.28, the DTL watermark is convolved with Fresnel 
zones to obtain a Fresnel coded image. The Fresnel zones are generated by 
computing the following equation for two-dimensions 
ýp (X, y) = 
11 
dx'dy' exp [ik «x - x')2 + (y - y')2) /2R1 
where x and y are original image arrays, x' and y' are shifted image arrays, k is 
the wavenumber (k = 2ir/A where A is the wavelength) and R is the distance 
of shifted image from aperture. An image to he watermarked (referred to 
as background in Figure 5.28) is then superimposed onto the Fresnel coded 
image resulting in required watermarked image. 
Fresnel zones Fresnel coded 
Ago- 
tee. 
Fresnel code watermarked 
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5.8.2 Recovering the Watermark 
Figure 5.29: Recovering the 2-D Watermark 
Recovering the watermark (Figure 5.29) is a single stage process, wherein 
the watermarked image is correlated with the Fresnel zones resulting in the 
watermark being detected. 
5.8.3 Two-dimensional Fresnel-based 
Watermarking Analysis 
Watermark using Fresnel rings fails when the number of rings are more 
than the size of the watermark. For example, if n= 185 and ni = 200, 
where n and m are square array dimensions of watermark and fresnel rings 
respectively. This is shown in Figure 5.30. 
For SNR, < 0.6 (signal-to-noise ratio): The background image over- 
whelms the Fresnel coded image, hence attempts to recover the watermark 
fail as shown in Figure 5.31. 
For SNR > 0.6: The Fresnel coded image progressively appears to be at, 
the forefront of the background image. However, recovery of the watermark 
is comparatively good as highlighted in Figure 5.32. 
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When the number of Fresnel rings are less than the ideal value (in this 
example the ideal value is n= 40), the recovered watermark appears pro- 
gressively blurred as shown in Figure 5.33. 
When the number of Fresnel rings are more than the ideal value, the 
watermark gradually disappears as shown in Figure 5.34. 
For SNR = 0.6 and n= 40: Figure 5.35 highlights the ideal balance (for 
this example) of the signal-to-noise ratio and the number of Fresnel rings. 
The mean square error (MSE) percentage between the recovered watermark 
and the original watermark is approximately 45.65%;. This value though 
high, is a trade-off between percentage of recovery and the covert nature of 
the watermark. Table 5.4 shows the error percentages when the number of 
Fresnel rings, n and signal-to-noise ratio are varied. 
Figure 5.30: Fresnel rings image larger than watermark 
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Figure 5.31: For SNR < 0.6 
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Figure 5.32: For SNR > 0.6 
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Figure 5.33: When Fresnel rings, Ti < 40 
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Figure 5.34: When Fresnel rings, ri, > 40 
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Figure 5.35: SNR = 0.6, o =, 10 
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-:. ,, t,. l its Fresnel Rings. Fresnel Coded 
Host Image Tl , 
n/SNR 0.2000 0.6000 1.0000 1.4000 1.8000 2.2000 
10.0000 62.8214 12.3258 5.2228 3.8132 3.6919 3.5532 
20.0000 75.1785 36.7246 17.5224 11.4210 9.1586 7.5752 
30.0000 84.9242 44.0793 22.8880 9.3490 5.7453 6.0468 
40.0000 83.9975 45.6482 21.1878 10.7106 5.7975 4.1496 
50.0000 93.1230 64.1557 24.5598 17.9517 12.8544 4.3487 
60.0000 86.7759 58.3094 24.0453 18.8017 8.3377 5.7849 
70.0000 92.8398 64.3518 29.1173 21.1651 15.4439 12.0450 
80.0000 93.3494 66.6484 39.2936 29.8383 22.1633 21.4606 
90.0000 81.9512 56.6206 41.7738 35.5054 31.9598 30.3928 
100.0000 65.8219 20.9614 14.6163 16.0427 13.4982 11.9768 
Table 5.4: Mean Square Error percentages for 2-D Fresnel-based watermark- 
ing (SNR values in decimal units) 
In the above table, the SNR is varied from 0.2 to 2.2 and the number 
of Fresnel Rings, n, from 10 to 100. These values have been chosen purely 
for experimental purposes. It can be seen that the watermark covertness 
increases with increasing MSE and consequently lower SNR's which is in 
accordance with practical results. 
An exhaustive comparison between the Digimarc and Microbar tech- 
nologies cannot be made for the purpose of this thesis due to the Digimarc 
copyright issues. 
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Figure 5.36: Microbar and Digimarc Watermarked Image Comparison 
With reference to Figure 5.36, a comparison between an original im- 
age and a watermarked image with respect to the mean square error has 
been made using both technologies. It has been observed that there is less 
degradation of the watermarked image compared to the original when wa- 
termarking using the Digimarc technology. However, the difference in error 
using the Microbar technology (larger compared to Digimarc watermark) can 
be attributed to other factors, for example for Microbar technology, the wa- 
termarked image has been created in MATLAB (with un-optimised code) 
and has been converted twice from a greyscale to indexed to R, G B (Red- 
Green-Blue) with 24-bit depth image, while the Digimarc watermarked im age 
is created within Adobe Photoshop (an optimised commercial application). 
Furthermore, the Microbar watermark used in this example is the DTL text 
image while within the Digimarc watermarked image is embedded the Digi- 
marc ID and copyright year. Hence, a direct comparison between the two 
techniques cannot be made. 
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5.8.4 Example: Logo-type Watermark (with PIN) 
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Figure 5.37: (a)Document with invisible watermark (b)Recovered Water- 
mark 
In the above example, Figure 5.37(a) shows a document with the 2-D 
watermark embeded within it and is invisible due to its covert nature. Using 
the same principle explained earlier, the watermark has been recovered in 
Figure 5.37(b). The principle works with signature types watermarks as well 
as shown in Figure 5.38(a) and 5.38(b). 
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Figure 5.38: (a)Original document with signature type watermark embedded 
(b)Signature watermark recovered 
5.9 Fractals and Camouflage 
This is a conceptual example of how we hide `Microhar' in a textured 
image. Figure 5.39 is a fractal field made up of grey scale values from 1-255. 
It has the appearance of a rouch surface, like a concrete slab. The 'roughness' 
is termed as the fractal dimension which is a measure of the 'roughness'. It, 
can be seen that the top right hand corner of the image appears different to 
the rest of the image. This is because data has been taken out and replaced 
with completely different information like putting the Microbar signature in 
an image to be protected. It becomes visible because its fractal dicnensiou is 
different to that of the rest of the image. If the fractal dimension is tuned 
such that it matches the rest of the image, it can disappear as shown in the 
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Figure 5.40. 
Figure 5.39: Example: Microbar hidden in Textured Image 
Figure 5.40: Microbar camouflaged with the rest of the Image 
Figure 5.40 shows that by tuning the fractal dimension to match the rest 
of the image, the new information is difficult to discern from its surroundings. 
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It is still there, still different, but our eye-brain interface is deceived by the 
`natural camouflage' of fractals. A similar technique is used in the wild, 
where a leopard's spots and a tiger's stripes blend into the dappled sunlight 
and shadows created by the natural vegetation of their habitats. 
5.9.1 Example: Picturesque Watermark 
Figure 5.41: Fractals in Nature 
The Figure 5.41 shows how prevalent fractals are in nature. The left 
figure is an `original' of a mill stream flowing through woods. The centre 
figure shows a `cloud based' Microbar signature. The right figure shows the 
result of embedding the Microbar signature into the picture at 50% opacity. 
This high opacity value means that the Microbar has been introduced into 
the `original' picture at a level of 50% of the original picture. Typically, we 
embed signatures (watermarks) at anywhere between 10% - 30% depending 
on the nature of the image being protected. This shows that the Microbar 
watermark is very robust and the technique is successful even at high opacity. 
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The difficulty of seeing the very high level of Microbar (especially within the 
trees element of the picture) shows how strong a `fractal' the trees are in the 
first place. This re-enforces the view that: 
. We are, unknowingly, already surrounded by `fractals'. 
" `Natural' images provide a perfect backdrop for Microbar. 
5.10 Application to Document 
Figure 5.42: Left: Non-encrypted Image; Right: Encrypted Image 
In practice, the presence of the Microbar signature within a binary im- 
age is not discernable to the human eye. The Figure 5.42 above has been 
magnified to show the effect but even then we can see that the change is 
minimal. It is only when we magnify the image to extremely high levels that 
we can see the Microbar signature, though even here the effect is somewhat 
exaggerated as shown Figure 5.43. 
166 
ýNý, -% 
, ýAwý 
t+f 
-. 0040V -4 r 
rNa. ýarFý , ý . 
Figure 5.43: Left: Zoomed Non-encrypted Image; Right: Zoomed Encrypted 
Image 
The Microbar works for the protection of Binary Images as well. With 
reference to Figure 5.44, imagine the rectangle on the right is a whole doc- 
ument onto which a Microbar fractal signature has been applied over the 
whole surface. Now, imagine one line from a typical security printed `fine 
line' detail image. This line then becomes 'peppered' with the white dots 
making up the Microbar fractal image. When the image is printed, a certain 
amount of `blur' occurs (no printing machine will completely replicate a di- 
gital image). When such a printed document is then scanned, more `blur' is 
created (no scanner is a `perfect machine; irrespective of the resolution). As 
a result we have two degradations of the image when a document is read and 
we have created our own grey-scale image in the process. When a counter- 
feiter attempts to copy and print a genuine version, further degradation and 
associated `blur' will occur. We essentially compare the levels of grey-scale 
or `blur' of the suspect document with the scanned image of the original. 
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Line Protected Read Copy 
5.11 
Figure 5.44: Use of Microbar for Binary Image 
Microbar Print: Key Benefits 
Figure 5.45: Use of the Pen reader 
Thus, it can be seen that the Microbar is very easy to implement be- 
ing a `print feature', users can continue to print in exactly the same way as 
before. Its covert nature allows incorporation into existing designs negating 
the need to create additional space on a document for authentication as re- 
quired by holograms or other overt security features. It can however work 
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'licrobai 
alongside other security features thus providing corporate reassurance where 
policies do not allow single sourcing. Being machine readable and statisti- 
cally based, it can provide very high levels of statistical confidence around 
accept/reject criteria. Statistical differences generated are so large that they 
could be used as forensic evidence should the need to prosecute arise. The 
security is paramount as both system and physical security is provided. The 
system security refers to the (military strength) encryption of the signature 
on the document as well as ability to send templates to a reader population 
world-wide. The technique is flexible as the scanning can be done using a 
conventional flat-bed scanner good for high-value documents and other au- 
thentication which would be naturally `office-based' or a discreet portable 
pen as described earlier useful for those applications where there is a need 
to authenticate labels, documents, ID cards etc. `in the field' or discreetly 
in store. Easy scanning (whole or part of the document in any direction) is 
a result of fractal design. As mentioned earlier, it can be used for authenti- 
cation, batch tracking and product personlisation. As it requires no special 
inks, taggants or substrates, a print file is encrypted and printing continues 
as before. This makes implementation, total costs of ownership much more 
attractive. Being digitally based, Microbar is suitable for all printing pro- 
cesses using digital print files. It provides a complete solution for optical 
media in that it works with silk-screen printing for CDs, overt Microbar and 
the enabled mouse can be used for software unlocking. Unlike overt features, 
like holograms, which rely on human knowledge and interpretation, Micro- 
bar is a machine based authentication system. This removes all the potential 
problems which the highly subjective nature of human intervention brings. 
Microbar is objective, giving straightforward pass/fail messages and/or track 
and trace information. 
Whether the flat bed scanner or the pen reader is used, the system works 
by first loading into the software a `template' of the expected values generated 
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by a `genuine'. Upon scanning, the software (MATLAB code) compares the 
actual values generated by a `candidate document' with those of the genuine 
held within the template. The distribution of these `templates' can be via 
e-mail and can be secured through the use of any method. 
Microbar is also capable of being read in `real-time'. This has implica- 
tions for high speed reading of currency and cheques going through counting 
and sorting machinery where numbers of items read are measured in feet 
per second. The following section diagramatically explains the application 
of Microbar to labels and documents. 
Binary 
(fine line) 
"ýý. 
r; , ..: 
Fractal (full colour/greyscale/shading) 
Figure 5.46: Application of Microbar to labels and documents 
There are basically two fundamental types of images; binary, which is 
the old, established, traditional form of security print featuring `fine line' 
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details and `fractal' which uses full colour, shading and grey scale. Traditional 
fine line images are called `Binary' because they have either a single colour 
or are blank. Fractal images by contrast, use shading and a spectrum of 
colours. Microbar can work with both binary and fractal images, in either 
a retrospective way, i. e. incorporating into existing designs or can be used 
during the design stage of new documents, labels etc. The preference is to 
use Microbar within fractal images, ideally with high degree of texture or 
complex detail which allows to hide the Microbar signature more completely. 
" Fine Line print 
- Difficult to reproduce 
- In practise looks like `texture' 
41 Fractals 
- Difficult to reproduce 
- Looks like `texture' 
- Fill colour/shading flexibility 
- Links with `real life' images 
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Figure 5.47: Fine Line Print 
Figure 5.48: Fractals 
There is a gradual realisation that the traditional `fine line print' ap- 
proach may have had its day. It was originally conceived due to its difficulty 
to reproduce with the technology available at the time. Interestingly, in 
practice, the fine line detail actually has the appearance of `texture' i. e. it 
often looks like embossing or raised surfaces. In contrast, fractals through 
chaotic generation are also difficult to reproduce and they certainly cannot be 
copied. They also have the capability of looking like texture, however, they 
unlike fine line print, offer the potential of full colour and shading with the 
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much wider applications and flexibility which this offers. Fractals also have 
a closer link with natural images, like clouds, flowing water, rippled water, 
trees, rock formations, etc. Thus this gives the scope to use the technology 
for a much wider range of images and applications. 
Figure 5.49 shows some examples of fractal patterns which can be com- 
puter generated. The embossed pattern can be used as a cheque background, 
the clouds background can be used in many applications. Other patterns, like 
'marble' are a `natural fractal' and can convey a quality image in documents, 
labels, etc. The choice of `fractal textures' depends on the application e. g. 
cheques, documents etc. As all the textures are robust with the watermark 
being covert, the choice could depend on the aesthetic requirement. 
Figure 5.49: Computer Generated Fractal Patterns: cheque background, 
clouds and flow fields 
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Below are some practical applications of fractal designs (Figure 5.50). 
The first one is an identity card and the second is a cheque. 
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Figure 5.50: Covert Microbar in ID card and cheque 
The above two designs are covert. In the case of the cheque, the Micro- 
bar is embedded imperceptibly into the background i. e. the background is 
itself a Microbar pattern. In the case of the ID card, in addition to the em- 
bossed Microbar background, we have superimposed another Microbar into 
the photograph and flag. However we can have them visible as well as shown 
in Figure 5.51. The bar code replacement of the software jewel case is `dual 
purpose'. This provides the usual anti-copy protection and enable Microbar 
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to function as an authentication device. However, it also contains informa- 
tion which can be cross-referenced with the holders details especially when 
applied to an identity card, and may provide a link with the product key 
code on the software which will unlock the loading of the program. There- 
fore, a copy would, in addition to failing the authenticity test, not provide 
the same information content and would therefore fail to co-relate with the 
holders details in case of the ID card and stop the program from loading in 
the case of the jewel case. 
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Figure 5.51: Overt Microbar in ID card and software jewel case 
Thus the `Microbar' is more than just an authentication device. The 
signature is capable of holding data of upto about 15 digits, which, when 
used in conjunction with an appropriately populated database, can hold a 
vast amount of information including 
9 Plant and date of manufacture 
9 Intended channels of distribution 
" Intended countries for sale, etc. 
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In an era when product diversion is becoming as big a problem as 
counterfeiting, access to such information, hidden away in a non-changeable 
medium is becoming a more and more valuable benefit. 
5.12 Example of Fractal Texture 
Watermarking 
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(a) 
Figure 5.52: (a)Bond Paper (b)Fractal Landscape 
Figure 5.52 highlights the process of embedding a fractal landscape into 
a bond paper. The bond paper (test example) is scanned into Adobe Photo- 
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shop as shown in Figure 5.52(a). An appropriate fractal landscape is created 
(Figure 5.52(b)) in MATLAB and is then imported in Adobe Photoshop. 
The fractal landscape is resized to the exact height and width of a section 
of the border highlighted in red in Figure 5.52(a) and thereafter embedded 
in the image. Inspite of the intricate design of the bond paper used in this 
example, the watermark remains covert, thus proving its robustness. 
Figure 5.53: Variation of watermark opacity 
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Figure 5.53 shows the robustness of the watermark with variation in 
watermark opacity. The watermark in the figure is created with a spectral 
exponent, ,0 of 2.4170 and seed random number generator of 
117. 
Opacity/ß 1.7000 2.2000 2.7915 3.0000 3.5000 5.0000 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5.0000 0.0197 0.0223 0.0261 0.0279 0.0323 0.0413 
10.0000 0.1691 0.0872 0.1020 0.1091 0.1262 0.1614 
15.0000 0.6172 0.1828 0.2136 0.2283 0.2639 0.3367 
20.0000 1.5566 0.3234 0.3775 0.4032 0.4655 0.5920 
25.0000 3.1106 0.5019 0.5846 0.6239 0.7187 0.9105 
30.0000 5.2453 0.7101 0.8271 0.8824 1.0157 1.2845 
50.0000 8.9629 1.8317 2.1211 2.2564 2.5808 3.2222 
100.0000 15.3969 6.0376 6.9109 7.3096 8.2480 10.0186 
Table 5.5: Variation of watermark opacity and spectral exponent, ß 
In Table 5.5, spectral exponent ß has been varied from 1.7 to 5 for opac- 
ity values ranging from 0 to 100 and the MSE has been determined. Again, 
these values are purely for experimental purposes. Figure 5.54 shows the 
graphical relationship between these quantities. Noise can be defined by its 
power spectrum in the form f -R as a function of frequency. Most promi- 
nent is white noise (noise having a frequency spectrum that is continuous 
and uniform over a specified frequency band) with spectral exponent, Q=0. 
As /3 increases, the fractal dimension decreases, introducing more noise in 
the image i. e. for ,ß>2, noise changes from white to black (noise that has 
a frequency spectrum of predominately zero power level over all frequencies 
except for a few narrow bands or spikes). The graph shows that as the water- 
mark opacity increases, the mean square error also increases linearly. It can 
be observed that for fl = 1.7, the graph deviates due to brown noise (noise 
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with brownian motion) present in the image compared to the other values 
of Q considered in the analysis. When the fractal dimension is between two 
and three, the noise levels are average resulting in low degradation of the 
image with the watermark present. However, when the fractal dimension is 
lower than two (0 = 5.0 in this analysis), there is more black noise present 
resulting in high error. Thus, the fractal texture watermarking technique is 
a robust scheme as it works fairly well even with high watermark opacity 
levels which are chosen by the user (in most cases, the maximum being 30%) 
depending on the application. 
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Figure 5.54: MSE versus Watermark Opacity 
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5.13 Conclusion 
Thus, over the past decade, the growth of the digital economy and the 
increasing popularity of digital imaging products has given counterfeiters and 
pirates new and powerful tools at affordable prices and fuelled the digital 
threat to printed and digital content of all kinds. 
New digital security tools, such as digital watermarking, have emerged 
as viable counter measures to digital threats. Today, digital watermarking is 
deployed in a wide range of systems and has been commercially hardened by 
leading vendors. Digital watermarking systems have the flexibility to be im- 
plemented across a spectrum of printing and document platforms. They can 
be layered with other overt and covert security elements to create a stronger 
overall defence to raise the barrier to attack. Further, digital watermarking 
can be incorporated into new and existing designs without requiring new ma- 
terials or changes in production, making it a viable and easily implemented 
feature. 
Security-class digital watermarking can be designed to be robust to re- 
moval or to indicate content alteration. These features can be deployed in 
the same document. The result is new authentication, detection, communi- 
cation, tracking and control applications that enhance the security and value 
of media content - including video, images, documents and packaging. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion and Further 
Research 
After the events of September 11th 2001, much emphasis is being placed 
on security throughout the world and a lot of research is being carried out in 
the field of security and applications of Digital Watermarking in areas such 
as video and audio, internet websites, etc. In the case of the audio water- 
marking, the main concern however, is that the watermark will be audible 
and degrade the fidelity of high quality recordings. Myriad techniques for 
secreting information flow exist; eliminating them is an impossible task. In 
order to protect ourselves, we must apply the dynamics that serve so well 
in other unpredictable information security risk venues: assess the risk, find 
ways to quickly detect the exploit's use, determine an appropriate response 
and use whatever means available to impede the perpetrator allowing time 
for detection and reaction mechanisms to work. 
However, digital watermarking does have some limitations which have 
also to be considered. My research presented in this thesis gives an account 
of the application of Lippmann photography in security and moves on to 
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fractals as a digital watermark for similar applications. 
6.1 Limitations of Digital Watermarking 
As of this writing, a counterfeiting scheme has been demonstrated for a 
class of invertible, feature-based, frequency domain, invisible watermarking 
algorithms. This counterfeiting scheme could be used to subvert ownership 
claims because the recovery of the digital signature from a watermarked 
image requires a comparison with an original[74]. 
Standard watermarking involves the creation of a watermarked image 
by encoding a signature into an original image. Authentication proceeds 
in two stages. First, the watermarks signature is "removed" from the wa- 
termarked copy. The watermark signature is the "difference" between the 
original (white) and the watermarked copy of the original (blue). Next, the 
extracted signature (blue) is compared against the original signature (gold). 
Identity signifies authenticity of the copy. 
Figure 6.1: Basic Watermarking technique 
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The counterfeiting scheme (Figures 6.1 and 6.2) works by first creat- 
ing a counterfeit watermarked copy (violet) from the genuine watermarked 
copy (blue) by effectively inverting the genuine watermark. This inversion 
produces a counterfeit signature (violet) as well. 
Figure 6.2: Watermark "inversion" for counterfeiting 
The trick is that the original image and bonafide signature stand in 
the same relationship to the watermarked image as the counterfeit image 
and counterfeit signature (Figure 6.3). Thus, the technique of establishing 
legitimate ownership by recovering the signature watermark by comparing a 
watermarked image with the original image breaks down. While it may be 
demonstrated that at least one recipient has a counterfeit watermarked copy, 
it can not be determined who it is. 
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Figure 6.3: Counterfeit logic 
This research suggests that not all watermarking techniques will be use- 
ful in resolving ownership disputes in courts of law. There will likely be non- 
commercial applications, or those with limited vulnerability to theft, where 
"good enough watermarking" will suffice. More sensitive applications may 
require non-invertable or non-extracting watermarking techniques. These 
issues are under consideration at the present time. 
6.2 The Future of Digital Watermarking 
The enormous popularity of the World Wide Web in the early 1990's 
demonstrated the commercial potential of offering multimedia resources th- 
rough the digital networks. Since commercial interests seek to use the digital 
networks to offer digital media for profit, they have a strong interest in pro- 
tecting their ownership rights. Digital watermarking has been proposed as 
one way to protect such interests. Though much research remains before 
watermarking systems become robust and widely available, there is much 
promise that they will contribute significantly to the protection of propri- 
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etary interests of electronic media. Collateral technology will also be neces- 
sary to automate the process of authentication, non-repudiable transmission 
and validation. 
Watermarking is still an interesting research area with many interesting 
problems. 
The following issues are worth considering for the future: 
" Where will it be useful? 
" Will watermarking only be used as a second-tier security system? 
9 Will there be significant theoretical developments? 
" Legal and political issues: 
- Watermarking technologies have not been tested in court 
- Is Watermarking the `feel-good' technology of multimedia? 
6.2.1 Video Watermarking 
A video sequence cannot simply be treated as an ordered collection of 
images: 
" Visibility issues in the use of `still' image watermarks 
. Visibility issues in stop frames 
9 Human perception of motion is not accounted for in visual models for 
still images 
" Embedding the same watermark in all the frames of a video sequence 
is not secure, an attacker can correlate across the entire sequence to 
estimate the watermark (temporal collusion) 
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" Embedding completely different watermarks in successive frames of a 
video sequence is not secure 
9 Successive video frames are highly correlated, an attacker can exploit 
this estimate and remove a watermark 
" The techniques for compressing video do not necessarily encode each 
frame of the sequence identically 
" The synchronization of the audio with the video sequence may be a 
consideration for watermark protection 
" Video Watermarking can use still image approaches but may have prob- 
lem in MPEG with B and P frames 
" Hash parts of the compressed video stream 
" Techniques could be used to prevent multiple viewing, copying and 
editing (e. g. inserts) 
" Another point to consider is can the watermark survive the conversion 
back to an analog signal? 
" Video watermarking cannot trivially extend image watermarking tech- 
niques, additional attacks are possible and computationally very ex- 
pensive 
" Unique attacks on video watermarks such as frame shuffling/insertion 
and inter-frame collusion should be investigated 
6.2.2 Two-Dimensional Digital Watermark 
An extensive review on existing two-dimensional watermarking schemes 
has been presented in Chapter Three. A lot of research is being done on 
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various methods to extend the one-dimensional watermarking to the second 
dimension. Methods such as FFT (Fast Fourier Transform), DCT (Discrete 
Cosine Transform), DFT (Discrete Fourier Transform), Wavelets, Linear Pre- 
dictive Coding, Lapped Orthogonal Transforms, Fractals are used to embed 
the watermark. Some watermarking schemes are based on Fractal Compres- 
sion Algorithms i. e. on the resolution of the inverse problem for Iterated 
Function Systems (IFS). 
6.2.3 Three-Dimensional Digital Watermark 
At the Stanford University, USA, research is being carried out about the 
possible use of three-dimensional watermarking in artifacts and collectibles. 
The Digital Michelangelo Project involved digitizing the sculptures and ar- 
chitecture of Michelangelo. The three-dimensional watermark would be in- 
troduced in the computer model of the artefacts to prevent the replication. 
For further information, please refer to [112]. 
6.3 Conclusion 
Given the nature of the technology and the scope of the business issues 
that are affected, it is difficult to predict with any certainty where we will 
be in 5 years time. Nevertheless, the following predictions are presented as 
a reasonable set of possibilities: 
" Watermarking techniques and tools will become more common and 
increasingly sophisticated. 
"A stego process will be developed to embed trojans, worms and viruses 
in media such as images or audio files and have them become active by 
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viewing or listening to the files. In 2001, the Nimda worm demonstrated 
that it was possible to get a virus just by visiting an infected web site. 
In January of 2002, viruses were being delivered by Macromedia flash 
images. One day, merely viewing a bitmap image might cause a virus 
attack on your PC. 
" Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) will include images as part of their 
attack signatures. 
" Anti-virus software will be developed with steganalytical capabilities 
to detect viruses in audio and image files. 
"A strong tamper-resistant, economically viable digital watermark will 
be developed. 
The person who develops the last item will undoubtedly become very 
rich. There is probably no better motivating factor for learning about Digital 
Watermarking! 
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Appendix A 
Mathematical Modelling of the 
Lippmann Process; Work done by 
Nareid and Pedersen[107] 
The first researchers to perform computer simulation of the Lippmann 
process were Nareid and Pedersen[107]. For monochromatic recording, Ko- 
gelnik's coupled-wave theory can be applied to Lippmann photography. For 
polychromatic recording, superposition of several frequencies in the record- 
ing light gives rise to aperiodic space gratings for which the Kogelnik theory 
cannot be applied. Instead, Nareid and Pedersen based their modelling on 
the theory of wave propagation in a stratified medium combined with first 
Born approximation. Fournier and Burnett investigated old Lippmann pho- 
tographs using modern electron microscopy. They recorded a monochromatic 
volume grating in DuPont photopolymer material using filtered light (520nm, 
10nm bandwidth) from a slide projector. Recently, Rich and Dickerson pre- 
sented a report on recording colour photographs on both Slavich PFG-03c 
plates as well as emulsions prepared by them according to old Lippmann 
methods. 
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Because of the difficulties in obtaining isochromatic plates, a combina- 
tion of the interference recording method and the three-colour technique was 
proposed by Lippmann. By making a sequential recording through three 
colour filters (blue, green and red) it was possible to individually control the 
exposure times through the three filters, thus obtaining good colour balance. 
Given a sufficient emulsion thickness and the correct processing methods, 
very pure spectrum colours can be obtained[89]. 
Mathematical Modelling done by Nareid and Pedersen 
In the computer modelling of the Lippmann process spectral response, 
we discretize the model of the developed emulsion by subdividing it into a 
large number of homogenous layers with constant refraction index[107]. The 
layer thickness is chosen freely, and it is found that no appreciable quantiza- 
tion noise is observed with a layer thickness less than A/20. Then the entire 
emulsion is modelled by a stack of 500-1000 layers (Temporal Coherence 
F. tnction). 
For each layer the wave equation is solved exactly, and the solution is 
matched to those of the adjacent layers. This leads to the well-known exact 
matrix formulation of wave propagation in stratified media. Each layer is 
represented by a characteristic matrix 
M(0) - 
cos S-p sin a (A. 1) 
-ip sin 6 cos 6 
where 0 is the layer thickness and for normal incidence, p=N is the complex 
refractive index of the layer, while S= kN0 is the complex phase delay of 
the layer. For a sequence of layers, the total characteristic matrix is now 
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simply given as the product of those of the individual layers, i. e.; 
mll m12 
= M(0) (A. 2) Mtotal 
M21 m22 
The reflection and transmission coefficients of the emulsion are now 
found by the formulae 
R= 
(mli + ml2pl)pl - (m21 + m22pl) (A. 3) 
(mll + ml2pl)pl + (m21 + m22pl) 
= 
2p1 
T 
(mll + ml2pl)pl + (m21 + m22pl) 
(A. 4) 
Here pl and pl refer to the first and the last layers respectively. The 
reflectivity and transmissivity are then found from 
R= JR12 T= Pi IT12 (A. 5) 
The complex refractive index is computed for each of the 500-1000 layers 
and stored in an array. The spectral response is then computed by applying 
the matrix solution to the entire stack of layers for each of the frequencies in 
question. Further results are shown overleaf. 
The Figures A. 1 (a), (b), (c), (d) show the spectral response of a single 
frequency recording with linear index modulation of different modulation 
contrast in the loss less case. 
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Figure A. 1: Spectral response of single-frequency recording in the lossless 
case for (a)µ, ß=0.01, (b)µ=0.02, 
(c)µ, ß=0.05, (d), u,, =0.10 
As the modulation contrast is increased, the pattern is amplified until 
the central peak is saturated i. e. the reflectivity reaches R=1. This causes a 
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.: a: a; 
broadening of the central peak, while the secondary peaks are further ampli- 
fied. The broadening of the central peak is a Bragg resonance phenomenon. 
As the index modulation increases, a larger part of the incident wave energy 
is reflected at each modulation period, and, as a result, the incident wave 
will be extinguished before it extends through the emulsion. Therefore the 
broadening of the central peak can be seen as the result of a reduced effective 
depth of the scattering volume. 
The Figures A. 2(a) and (b) show single-frequency recordings with loss. 
The dashed lines refer to the loss less curves for comparison purposes. The 
above single frequency results are in close agreement with the well-known 
results of Kogelnik's coupled wave analysis. 
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Figure A. 2: Spectral response of single-frequency recordings with loss 
The Figure A. 3 shows the result of a wideband recording in the loss 
less case. These curves all show strong spectral distortion relative to the 
rectangular input spectrum. This distortion is due to the fact that only one 
side of the temporal coherence function is being recorded in the emulsion. 
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Figure A. 3: Spectral response for wideband recording in the lossless case 
The Figure A. 4 shows a wideband recording with 50% absorption. 
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Figure A. 4: Spectral response of wideband recording with 50% loss 
The results are similar to the earlier results with an interesting differ- 
ence. In the loss less case we have reciprocity i. e. the reflectivity is the same 
if the emulsion is illuminated from the other side, but with absorption this 
reciprocity is lost. The upper curve shows the result of ordinary reconstruc- 
tion i. e. illumination from the front side of the emulsion, whereas the lower 
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curve shows the corresponding result for illumination from the backside of 
the emulsion. 
The effect of film nonlinearity is tested by the extreme case of a hard- 
limiting emulsion in which the refractive index is set equal to the cut off level 
if it exceeds that level. The results are shown in the Figures A. 5(a), (b), (c) 
and (d). 
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Figure A. 5: Illustration of the effects of film nonlinearity; (a)no clipping, 
(b)50% clipping, (c)75% clipping, (d)comparison between the results with 
75% clipping and with no clipping 
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This shows that the process is virtually insensitive to film nonlinearities. 
This is because nonlinearities like clipping introduce higher harmonics with- 
out causing serious deterioration in the first harmonic of the spatial index 
modulation signal. These higher harmonics have Bragg resonances at multi- 
ples of the mean recording frequency and will not contribute to the spectral 
response in the visible part of the spectrum. 
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Appendix B 
Optical Diffraction Theory and Image 
Formation[63] 
In Chapter 4, a model for generating speckle was demonstrated based on 
lowpass filtering white Gaussian noise. This `standard approach' for produc- 
ing a basic texture that occurs in nearly all coherent imaging systems is based 
on a convolution model for the image - the convolution of the object function 
with the point spread function of the imaging system. This model is of funda- 
mental importance to all imaging systems and understanding where it comes 
from is therefore necessary if the reader wishes to appreciate the physics of 
imaging systems in general. This is one of the underlying themes of what 
may be called image understanding and requires some advanced analysis as- 
sociated with the propagation and scattering of wavefields. This appendix 
has been written to help those readers who are interested come to terms with 
the theory of image formation, which is fundamental to image understanding. 
Starting from first principles (i. e. by solving a well known wave equation), 
we take the reader through a calculation in which the analytical techniques 
used are fundamental to modelling most imaging systems. The emphasis is 
on optical imaging and optical image formation and the principles of what is 
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commonly known as `Fourier optics'. However, many of the concepts, ideas 
and analytical techniques can be applied to other imaging modalities. The 
whole aim of this analysis is to quantify coherent and incoherent (optical) 
image formation and thus relate some fundamental results of physical optics 
to the digital imaging models used upon which fractal image analysis, like 
any other form of image analysis and processing, ultimately depends. 
We start by investigating the scalar theory of optical diffraction and 
develop the so called Kirchhoff diffraction theory. This leads directly to 
two types of optical diffraction models known as Fraunhofer and Fresnel 
diffraction. In turn, the former model for diffraction leads us to investigate 
the Fourier transforming properties of a lens and consider the principles of 
Fourier optics (the Abbe theory of imaging) in which a lens (in the focal 
plane) can be taken to perform a Fourier transform of the object that is being 
focused. This principle leads directly to the basic convolution model for an 
optical imaging system and the concept of optical image formation in general 
from which specific models for coherent and incoherent image formation can 
be derived. 
Scalar Diffraction Theory 
The phenomenon of diffraction is common to 1D transverse (and hence 
scalar) waves such as water waves, true scalar waves such as in acoustics 
and vector waves as in optics. All three cases appear to exhibit the same 
magnitude of diffraction phenomena. 
In order to approximately describe optical diffraction, it is reasonable 
to first adopt a scalar model for light. This type of model is concerned with 
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a monochromatic scalar `disturbance' 
V (r, t) = U(r) exp(-iwt) 
where U is the scalar complex amplitude, w is the angular frequency (=27r x 
frequency), t is time and r is a three dimensional vector which in Cartesian 
coordinates is given by 
r=xx+yy+zz 
In free space V satisfies the homogeneous wave equation 
VZV 
1 C1 2 
-2 =0 
C2 & 
where c is the velocity of light and U satisfies the homogeneous Helmholtz 
equation 
V2U + k2U =0 
where 2ir 
cA 
Here, k is the wavenumber and A is the wavelength. 
Scalar diffraction theory (which essentially stems from solutions to the 
above equation - subject to careful interpretation of the physical significance 
of such solutions) should be regarded as a first approximation to optical 
diffraction. 
The observed intensity I (the observed quantity at optical frequencies) 
can be taken to be given by (by definition) 
I =I U 12 
Except in free space, U is not (in general) a Cartesian component of the 
vector electric or magnetic field. Scalar diffraction theory is accurate if. 
(i) The diffracting aperture is large compared to the wavelength. 
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(ii) The diffracted fields are observed at a reasonable distance from the 
screen. 
Kirchhoff Diffraction Theory 
Consider a scalar wave field U described by the homogeneous Helmholtz 
equation 
(V2+k2)U =0 
Let UU be the field incident on a surface S and introduce the following (Kirch- 
hoff) boundary conditions 
au aus U= Ui, 5ii = an on 
In the case of an aperture formed by constructing a hole in a screen, 
the conditions above apply over the plane of the aperture and Uj may be 
considered to be the field incident on the plane of the screen in the absence 
of the screen itself. 
The Kirchhoff boundary conditions ignore edge effects at an aperture 
and thus will only be valid for apertures very much smaller than a wavelength. 
The diffraction theory which stems from a solution to the Helmholtz equation 
based on these boundary conditions is called the Kirchhoff diffraction theory. 
Green's function solution 
Consider the Green's function G which is the solution to 
(V2 + k2)G = -E(r - ro) 
and given by 
G(rIr0, k)= 
4ir r- ro exp(ikI r- ro 
ý) 
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We can construct two equations: 
GV2U+k2GU=0 
UV2G + k2UG = -US 
Subtracting these equations and integrating over a volume V we obtain 
fJf USdV = 
fff (GV2U - UV2G) 
v 
Using the shifting property of the delta function together with Green's 
theorem, we obtain a solution for the field U at ro, i. e. 
= 
if ( aU ac\ I dS U(ro) `G an -U aft 
s 
Introducing the Kirchhoff boundary conditions we arrive at the basic 
Kirchhoff diffraction formula given by 
U(ro) (c7i -U ac dS ý än dS 
s 
This equation is sometimes called the Kirchhoff integral. To compute 
the diffracted field using the Kirchhoff integral an expression for U{ must be 
introduced and the derivatives 8/8n with respect to U; and G computed. 
Consider the case where the incident field is a plane wave field of unit 
amplitude (with wavenumber k =I k 1, k= k/k). Then 
U{ = exp(ik " r) 
and 
aU` 
= ü- Vexp(ik"r) =ik"nexp(ik. r) =ikn"kexp(ik"r) än 
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The calculation of äG/c9n is more complicated. 
and 
öG 
_n"VG On 
VG =xa 
exp(ik (x - xo)2 +... ) +. . ex 41r (x - xo)2 + ... 
. 
= -x4ý exp(ik (x - x0)2 + ... ) [(x - x0)2 + . 
]-'(X - xo) 
+x 
ik (x - xo) exp(ik (x - xo)2 + ... ) + ... 4i (x - x0)2 + ... 
xexP(ik 
(x-xo)2 t... ) x-xo 
4a (x-xo)2+... (x-xo)2+... (x-xo)ýý ... 
= mh ik- 
1ýG 
1 r-ro 
where 
_ 
r-r0 
m r-rod 
Therefore, 
- =n"m(ik- 
1 
IG an I r- ro 
In most practical circumstances the diffracted field is observed at dis- 
tances Ir- ro I where 
I r-roI»A 
This condition allows us to introduce the simplification 
VG = ikmG 
so that aG 
. ikn"tG an 
The Kirchhoff diffraction formula then reduces to the form 
U(ro) = ik ff exp(ik " r) (ii "k-n" m)GdS 
s 
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Fraunhofer Diffraction 
Fraunhofer diffraction assumes that the diffracted wavefield is observed 
a large distance from the screen. The point of observation is in the far field. 
For this reason, Fraunhofer diffraction is sometimes called diffraction in the 
`far field'. Mathematically, it represent an asymptotic solution to the problem 
posed by the Kirchhoff diffraction formula given above. 
The basic idea is to exploit the simplifications that can be made to the 
Kirchhoff diffraction integral by considering the case when 
Irl«IroI 
As the point r moves in the domain of integration, the complex exponent 
describing the Green's function changes rapidly but if ro »r where ro 
roI and r. IrIthen 
11 
(r - ro ( ro 
and 
n"k-n. thr n"k+n"ro 
where 
ro ro =- ro 
In this case, the Kirchhoff diffraction integral reduces to 
U(ro) = 
ika JJ exp(ik " r) exp(ik Ir- ro ß)d5 4irro 
s 
where 
a=n"k+n"ro 
The next simplification that can be made under the condition ro »r 
is to the exponent 
exp(ikIr - rod) 
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Now, 
r- ro I= [(r - r°) " (r - r°)] 3 
_ [r2-2r"r°+r02] 
2 
= ro 1- 2r rÖ 
° +r o 
Introducing a binomial expansion of this result, 
r2 
r-ro I= ro-r. ro. }. 2r . }.... 0 
ro-r"ro; r «ro 
the Kirchhoff diffraction integral reduces to 
U(ro) 
ik2 
exp(ikro) 
Jf 
exp(ik " r) exp(-ikro " r)dS 4irro 
s 
We are now in a position to introduce the geometry of the `aperture 
system' which can be described using the Cartesian coordinates: 
r=xx+yy+zz 
ro = xxo + yyo + zzo 
Here, xo and yo can be taken to describe the position on a flat screen at 
a distance zo from the diffracting aperture. Consider the following physical 
conditions: 
k=z The aperture is illuminated by a plane wave at normal 
incidence 
io ^_- z The diffraction pattern is observed only at small angles 
kz --º 0 The aperture is `infinitely thin' 
The first two conditions give 
aNn"k+n"io=2 
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and with the third condition we obtain 
U(xo, yo, zo) _ii 
expo ro) ff 
exp -Ö (xxo + yyo) dxdy 
s 
This equation gives the amplitude at (x0, yo, zo) in the far field when the 
aperture is illuminated by a plane wave at normal incidence. 
Since a point of observation lies in a plane (the observation screen) 
located at a fixed distance zo from the aperture, 
ro = ýrXö+Yo -E zö 
ý°+yö 
3 
x0 1+ 
z2 0 
= zo+2°+yö 2z° 
Using this expression for ro in the exponent exp(ikro) but using ro = zo 
elsewhere, we have 
exp(iokzo) (2 
oyo) 
Jf 
ZO 
U(xo, yo) exp `ik exp -(2X0 + ? l1Jo) dxdy AZ 
(- 
S 
Finally, let the aperture be filled with an arbitrary distribution f (x, y) 
that is zero outside S, then 
z 2) 
°O 
i U(xo, Yo) = 
eXPzo kzo) 
exp 
(iký 
2zoýlo 
%f 
(x, 1/) exp 
ý- k (220 + U11o) dxdy 
0 -oo 
where U is the amplitude of the Fraunhofer diffraction pattern produced by 
the aperture amplitude f at a distance zo from the aperture. f can be taken 
to describe the `shape' of the aperture. 
Apart from the factors in front of the integral, U is simply equal to 
the 2-D Fourier transform of f evaluated at the coordinates (noting that 
k= 21r/A) 
u= 
O 
and v= 
yo 
ZOA zOA 
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In practice, the observed quantity (optical field) is the intensity I given 
by IU 12. We can therefore write 
[f I (xo, Yo) =a zö . 
(ý, y)) 12 
where Jr is the Fourier transform operator given 
by 
00 
y)] =ff (x, y) exp[-2iri(ux + vy)]dxdy 
-oo 
This result is the Fraunhofer diffraction formula and is based on the 
following assumptions: 
(i) The aperture is thin (compared with the wavelength of light). 
(ii) The diffraction pattern is observed in the far field. 
Well known examples of Fraunhofer diffraction 
Rectangular aperture axb 
In this case, 
f(x, y) = 
1, lxl_z; IyI<2 
0, otherwise 
and 
a/2 b/2 
fr[f (x, y)] =JJ exp[-i2ir(ux + vy)]dxdy 
-a/2 -b/2 
= ab sinc (irua) sinc (irvb) 
The intensity pattern is therefore given by 
22 
I (xo' yo) =ab since 
iraxo 
since 
7rayo 
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Circular aperture with a radius of a 
1, r<a f ýýý y) =r= x2 
-+, y2 
0, otherwise 
This involves the Hankel transform and a result for the intensity given 
by 
I(ro) _ 
ir2a4 2J1(z)\ 
2 
T2 -Z2 
0zI C/ 
where z= 2iraro/\zo and ro = xo -+ yo. The first minimum occurs when 
z=3.83, i. e. when 1.22Azo 
rmin =a 
This diffraction pattern is also the distribution seen at the focus of a well- 
corrected lens when a point monochromatic source is imaged. For a distant 
source, zo Nf- the focal length. Defining the F-number as F=f /a, we get 
rm; n = 1.22AF 
The value of rmin determine the resolution of the image in the focal plane 
of the lens. The smaller the value of r1 i the better the resolution. Thus, 
the smaller the F-number of a lens the greater its resolving power. 
Fresnel Diffraction 
Consider the Kirchhoff diffraction integral derived earlier 
U(ro) - 4ýirký Jf exp(ik - r) exp(ik Ir- ro I )dS o 
s 
where 
a=n"k+n"ro 
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Fresnel diffraction stems from considering the expansion of Ir- ro I to 
second order and retaining the term r2/2ro, i. e. 
r2 ýr-rof = ro-r"ro+2r0 
r2 
ro-r"ro+2r 
0 
This approximation is necessary when the diffraction pattern is observed 
in what is called the intermediate field or Fresnel zone. 
ik " r) exp(-ikro " r) exp ik 
rz dS if U(ro) ik ö exp(ikro) exp( 4r 
( 
0 s 
Consider a Cartesian coordinate system 
r=xx+yy+zz 
ro=xxo -I-Yyo+zzo 
where xo and yo are taken to represent a position on a flat screen at a fixed 
distance zo from the aperture and let 
kz plane wave at normal incidence to the aperture 
io z observations at small angles only 
kz -º 0 `infinitely thin' aperture 
Then, 
exp(ikro) k 
exp 
[_ik eJJ ( ik ro xxo + y? /o) exp 
[2ro 
( U(xo, yo) °i 47rro 
s 
22 + y2) dxdy 
As with the analysis associated with Fraunhofer diffraction, we substi- 
tute 
ro=zo+ 2 zo 
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into the exponent exp(ikro) but use ro = zo elsewhere. By introducing an 
aperture amplitude function f (x, y), the amplitude function is then given by 
2+ yo U(xo, Yo) _A 
exp(ikzo) 
exp 
(ik 
o zo 
00 
-z (xxo + yyo) exp 
[! 
x2 + AZ) dxdy xff (x, y) exp 
1zö 
-00 
This result describes Fresnel diffraction - the diffraction pattern observed 
in the intermediate field. Apart from the factors in front of this integral, U 
is simply equal to the 2-D Fourier transform of the function 
f (x, y) exP 12 
o 
(X2 + y2) 
The term 
exp 
[2 
0 
(z2 + y2)] 
is a quadratic approximation to a spherical wave. In simple terms 
UN spherical wave x F[f x spherical wave 
Noting that 
ik 22 ik ik zZ 
2o 
(Xo + yo) + 
ZO 
(-xxo - Yyo) +2 ýý + ?l) 
2=2o [xo - 2xxo + x2 -I- yö - 2yyo + y2] 
= 2ý [(XO - X)Z + (yo - y)2] 
we can write the Fresnel diffraction formula in the form 
i U(xo, yo) - 
expzo kzo) Jf (z, y) exp 
i7r ýýxo - x)Z + (yo - y)2] dxdy zo 
-00 
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From the last equation we see that U is essentially (ignoring scaling 
constants) given by the convolution of the function 
f (x, y) 
with 
or 
exp [x2 +y2} 
(2zo 
U(x, y) _' 
exp(ikzo) zo) 
.f 
(x, y) ®®exp 2 
[x2 -}- y2]l C 
where ®® denotes the 2-D convolution integral. 
Examples of Fresnel Diffraction 
As an example, consider using the last expression for U to evaluate the 
Fresnel diffraction pattern from a square aperture of width a, i. e. 
0, otherwise. 
In this case, U is given by 
aa 
.i 
exp(ikzo) irr U(xo, yo) exp [(ýo -- x)2 + (iio -y dxd ZO J azo 
) ýl 
aa 
which can be written in the form of two integrals Il and 12; thus, 
U(xo) yo) _ 
-exp(k 
_ 
zo) It(10)12(Yo) 
Since each integral is identical in form, we shall consider only Il given 
by 
a 
Ii(xo) = exp (x0 - x)2 dx [;; 
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Let 
F2o /i(xo 
- x) 
so that Cz 
Ii(xO) (2) = 
fexp 
where 
i= az0 \X+ 2 
a) 
and C2 z 
zo 
Defining the Fresnel integrals 
aa 
C(a) =J cos 
22 dt, S(a) _ sin 
(Lt2 
dt 
00 
and noting that 
z=z7 
we can write 
Il(xU) 
_ 
'2° 
([ý' (S2) 
- C(41)] + i[S(S2) - s(Z1)]) 
The amplitude field U is given by 
U(x, Y) = 
exp(i kzo) ([C(ez) - C(CO) + i[S(e2) - S(C2)1) 2 
X ([C(ri) - C(71)] + i[S(r12) - S(ill)]) 
where 
Ali = azo 
(+ 
2) and ?iF 
(y 
2) 
The corresponding intensity is 
I(xo, yo) = 
4(I 
LC IZI Lq f2) 
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where L(ý) denotes the length of the vector 
[C(6) 
- 
C(6)] + i[S(e2) - 
S(6)] 
The characteristic behaviour of this vector is represented graphically by 
the Cornu spiral. The Cornu spiral is a plot of S(a) vs. C(a) and can be 
used to graphically solve for the complex amplitude or intensity in a Fresnel 
diffraction problem. 
On the Fourier Transforming Properties of a 
Lens 
At the plane of focus of a well-corrected lens, the following complex 
amplitude is observed (Fraunhofer condition): 
Z2 
U(xo, Yo) =i 
exp(ikzo) 
exp ikx 2-I- "f*[ f (X I ßl)1 ZO zo 
Thus, if a transparency whose amplitude transmittance is t (x, y) is 
placed just in front of a lens and then illuminated by a unit plane wave 
at normal incidence, the observed complex amplitude at the focal plane is 
given by 
U(xo, yo) _i 
exp(ikf) 
exp 
(ikY)2 
o ý[t( x, ýl)] f 
where f is the focal length of the lens and 
00 
. ý'[t(x, y)] =J 
t(x, y) exp[27ri(ux + vy)]dxdy; u-X, v= YO 
-00 
f ýf 
The amplitude is therefore almost given by a Fourier transform - there 
is an additional quadratic phase factor - and the intensity is given by 
I(x, y) =a f2 I . [t (X, y)] 12 
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It is interesting to ask whether a transparency can be placed a distance d 
in front of the lens so as to give an exact Fourier transform? The amplitude 
T (x, y) generated by the transparency in front of the lens is given by the 
Fresnel diffraction formula 
i exp(ikd) ir T (x, y) =d t(x, y) ®®exp ad 
(x2 + y2) 
and a lens performs a Fourier transform on the field T. Therefore in the focal 
plane 
U(xo, Yo) =i 
exp(ikf) exp iký° 
/l 
Using the convolution theorem and noting that 
(eXp R(x2 + y2)] / Adexp[-iirad(u2 + v2)] 
we have 
y)] =)= 
expdikd) ) p[- d(u2 + v2)] . FTx Tuv - it(u, v ex pia 
where t= . 
ý'[t] and 
exp[-7riad(u2 + v2)] _ fr 
(exp fad 
(y2 + Y2) 
L 
1) 
The field U is therefore given by 
U(xo, yo) _ -T exp[ik(f + d)] exp fx 
[(x 
+v) 
Ad 2] x exp [_i7r(Af)2(x+Y)] t(u, v) 
_-1 ex ik 
ri (., + 2) d)] Zu, v) 701- 
Now, when d=f 
U(xo, yo) f exp[ik(f + d)]t(u, v) 
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can be used to filter the spatial frequency components of a source distribu- 
tion via the application of certain optical masks in the focal plane of the first 
lens - spatial filtering. For example, spatial filtering can restore the quality 
of a collimated laser beam by blocking all spatial frequencies due to the in- 
teraction of the beam with dust particles. In general, any `noise' induced by 
the (multiple) scattering of light with a complex of subwavelength objects 
(such as dust particles) modifies the spatial frequencies with high values and 
so can be removed by application of an optical lowpass filter (a mask placed 
at the focal plane of a lens). 
In general, the use of a lens system to generate the Fourier transform of 
an image (forward Fourier transform) and to recover an image from this tr- 
ansform (inverse Fourier transform) provides an optical method of processing 
signals and images. This is known as optical signal processing. Optical signal 
processing exploits the Fourier transforming properties of a lens to process 
(optically filter) an image in the same way that a fast Fourier transform can 
be used to process (digitally filter) a digital signal. 
Optical Systems and Image Formation 
An optical `system' may be defined as that which produces a set of 
output functions from a set of input functions. Physically, it may be an 
electrical circuit (inputs and outputs are voltages) or an optical system where 
the inputs and outputs are either complex amplitudes or intensities. From 
the point of view of `linear systems theory', the physical nature of the system 
is unimportant. A general system can be represented by the operator S: 
9(x) y) = s[f (x, y)] 
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A linear system has the property that 
S[afi(x, y) + bf2(x, y)] = aS[fi(x, y)] + bS[fz(x, y)] 
for all inputs fl and f2 and all constants a and b. Linearity implies that 
an output function can be broken down into elementary functions, each of 
which can be separately passed through the system; the total output is then 
the sum of the `elementary' outputs. 
The `shifting property' of the delta function allows us to consider any 
input function to be a linear combination of weighted and displaced delta 
functions: 
00 00 
f (x, y) =11f (x', y')b(x - x')b(y - y')dx'dy' 
00-00 
giving an output 
w oc 
9(x, y) = S[f (x, y)] = 
11 
f (z', y')S[S(x - x')b(y - y')]dx'dy' 
00-00 
The system response at (x, y) due to a delta function input at (s', y') is 
called the impulse response function 
P(x, y; x', y') = SV(X - x')a(y - 01 
In optical as well as many other imaging systems, the quantity p is called 
the point spread function. For a linear optical system: 
00 00 
9ýýý y) = 
11 
f (x', y')P(x, y; xý, yl')dx'dy' 
-00-00 
Note that the optical diffraction formulae are of the same form where 
for Fraunhofer diffraction 
j, 1i exp(ikz) P(x, yý y) 
z 
(ik(x2 
-- exp -z (2z'ß + fly') 2z 
[ 
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and for Fresnel diffraction 
P(x, y; x', y') _i 
expzikz) exp 2z[(x - x')2 + 
(y - y, f 
If the impulse response function of a linear system depends only on 
the coordinate differences (x - x') and (y - y'), and not on each coordinate 
separately, i. e. 
P(x, y; x', ii) = p(x - x', y- yý) 
then we obtain an expression for g which involves the simple convolution 
relationship 
00 00 
9(x, y) =JJf (x', y')p(x - x', y- y')dx'dy' 
00-00 
Such a system is called stationary. In optical imaging, a stationary op.. 
tical system is called isoplanatic. Isoplanicity requires that the point spread 
function is the same for all field angles and implies that the aberrations 
are independent of field angle. Many real imaging systems are (to a good 
approximation) both linear and isoplanatic. 
The convolution relationship between input and output suggests using 
Fourier transform (FT) techniques which, via the convolution theorem, give 
G(u, v) = F(u, v)T(u, v) 
where 00 00 
T(u, v) =JJ 
-00-00 
i. e. 
p(x, y) exp[-2iri(uz + vy)jdxdy 
FT of output = (FT of input) x (FT of impulse response function) 
The quantity T is called the system transfer function. In optical imaging 
systems, T is called the optical transfer function or OTF. The OTF is just 
the 2-D FT of the point spread function. Note that 
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(i) The convolution relationship only applies to linear stationary optical 
systems. 
(ii) There is no unique OTF for an optical system with field-dependent 
aberrations (non-stationary). 
(iii) There is no unique OTF for an optical system when an object is illumi- 
nated by spatially partially coherent light (non-linear system in both 
complex amplitude and intensity). 
Incoherent Image Formation 
Consider the case where the object plane is illuminated by a plane or 
spherical wave - by perfectly spatially coherent light. Let the complex am- 
plitude immediately after the object be denoted by Uin(x, y) and Uouc(x, y) 
be the complex amplitude at the image plane and let the complex ampli- 
tude at (x, y) in the output due to a unit strength point at in the input 
be p(x, y; x', y'). The total amplitude at (x, y) due to all such points in the 
object plane is then given by 
00 00 
Uout(X, Y) - 11 Uin(2', y')P(x, y; x', y')dx'dy' 
-00 -00 
For an isoplanatic optical system, this reduces to 
00 00 
Uout(x, y) -11 
Uin(x', y')P(x - 
2, y- y')dx'dy' 
CO --oo 
Note that a spatially coherent optical system is linear in the complex am- 
plitude. Consider the case of narrowband light that is not perfectly spatially 
coherent. The general complex representation of the time-varying scalar field 
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is called the analytic signal V (r, t); it is defined such that 
realscalarfield = R[V(r, t)] 
For narrowband light, the analytic signal can be written as a product 
of a `slowly varying' function - the time-varying complex amplitude U(r, t) 
times exp(-iwt), i. e. 
V(r, t) = U(r, t) exp(-iwt) 
The instantaneous intensity is defined as 
I (r, t) =I U(r, t) 12 
whereas the time-averaged intensity I(r) (i. e. that observed by an optical 
detector), is equal to 
T 
I ýr) Tlr o 2T 
,fI 
(r't)dt 
-T 
In general, the time-varying complex amplitudes are related by 
00 00 
Uout (X, y, t) - 
ff 
Uin (x', y', t)p(x, y; x'y')dx'dy' 
-00 -00 
Coherent illumination implies U(x, y, t) = U(x, y) does not vary in time. 
The average intensity is therefore given by 
T 
Lout (x, Y) =l im 2T 
I Uout (XI y, t) 12 dt 
-T 
00 00 
=ff P(x, y; x', y')p*(x, y; X') y') 
-00-00 
T 
x lim 
11 
Ui. (x', y', t)Ui (x", y", t) dt dz'dy'dz"dy" T--oo 2T 
-T 
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The term in [] is called the mutual intensity of the narrowband light 
or 
T 
Jin(x', y'; x", y") = lim 
1I 
Uin(x', y', t)Un(x", y", t)dt 
T-yOO 2T 
-T 
Jin(r', r") _ (Uin(r', t)Uä(r", t)) 
Incoherent light is defined to be such that 
J(r', r") =I (r')ö(r' - r") 
In other words, two neighbouring points r' and r" have uncorrelated 
fields, for any r' # r". Using the definition for incoherent light above, the 
expression for 'out becomes 
00 00 
jout(x, y) =1J P(x, y; xl, y? )p*(x, y; xl, 0 
-00 -00 
xl n(x', y')b(x' _ xýý)b(y' _ y)dx'dy'dxdy" 
or 00 00 
Iout (x, y) =fJ 
-00 -00 
p(x, y; x', v') (Z i1 (x', y')ds'dy' 
The quantity I p(x, y; x', y') 12 is the intensity point spread function. For 
an isoplanatic optical system, this result reduces to 
00 00 
Iout(x, y) = 
11 iin(x', yI) 1 p(x - x', y- VI) 12 dx'dy' 
00-00 
where the bar over I has been omitted when referring to the intensity -a 
time average is always assumed. 
For perfectly incoherent illumination, an optical system is linear in in- 
tensity and, if isoplanicity holds, the output (image) intensity is equal to the 
input (object) intensity convolved with the intensity point spread function. 
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If p is normalized to unit volume (it is, since P(0,0) = 1), p 12 is not, 
so we normalize it by dividing by its infinite integral: 
Ax, y)12 
00 00 
.f .fI p(x, y) 12 
dxdy 
-00-00 
The incoherent optical transfer function (IOTF) T (u, v) is the Fourier 
transform of the (normalized) point spread function; applying the autocor- 
relation theorem to the top line and Parseval's theorem to the bottom line, 
00 00 
ff P(e, il)P*(Z + \zu, r7+ azv)dZdi 
T(u, v) _.. 
ff1 P(e, 77) 12 dedz, -00-00 
where P(ý, i) is the inverse Fourier transform of p(x, y), 
co 00 
2ýP(e, 
n) =JJ P(z, y) exP 
[iE(x 
+ 17Y) dxdy 
00-00 
and is the pupil function. The equation above for T basically states that 
the IOTF is equal to the (normalized) spatial autocorrelation of the pupil 
function. Note, that the IOTF relates the input and output intensity spectra, 
Iout (u, v) = Iin(u, v)T (u, v) 
The spatial frequencies are intensity frequencies and are not the same 
as the amplitude frequencies produced in a coherent optical system. This 
expression for T can be written in the form 
00 00 
ffP (ý - (Azu)/2, r7- (Azv)/2) P' (t + (azu)/2, rr + (Azv)/2) dýdq 
-w -00 T (u, v) _ 00 00 ffI P(E,, q) 12 ddi7 
-00-00 
From this result it follows that: 
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(i) T(0,0) =1 (because of normalization). 
(ii) T(-u, -v) =T* (u, v) (Fourier transform of a real quantity). 
(iii) T (u, v) <T (O, 0) (using the Schwartz inequality). 
The modulus IT1, or modulation transfer function (MTF), describes 
the transfer or modulation of sinusoidal components of the object. The phase 
of T, describes spatial shifts of the sinusoidal components. 
Coherent Image Formation 
With coherent light, the complex amplitude of the image is equal to that 
at the object plane convolved with the amplitude point spread function (for 
an isoplanatic system): 
where 
00 
Uous(x, y) = 
11 cio 
U; (2, y')h(x - x', y- y')dx'dy' 
00-00 
00 00 
p(x, y) =CJJ P(u, v) exp -i 
Az (ux -ý vy) dudv 
-00 -00 
and P is the pupil function of the optical system, i. e. the complex amplitude 
in the exit pupil. The constant C is usually chosen so that 
00 00 
11 p(x, y)dxdy = P(0,0) =1 
00-00 
The pupil function P is, for a cleax pupil, defined by 
P(v, v) = 
exp[ikW(u, v)], , (u, v) E aperture 
o, otherwise 
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so that P(0,0) =1 and therefore C=1. The function W is called the 
wave aberration function. A shaded or apodized pupil can be handled by 
introducing an absorption term A thus: 
P(u, v) = A(u, v) exp[ikW(u, v)] 
Taking the Fourier transform of Uot and using the convolution theorem 
we can write 
Uout (u, v) = uin (u, v)T (u, v) 
where Uot is the spectrum of image amplitude, U; n is the spectrum of object 
amplitude and T is the coherent optical transfer function (COTF). Note that 
00 00 
T(u, v) =JJ p(x, y) exp[-2iri(ux + vy)]dxdy = P(Azu, Azv) 
00-00 
i. e. the COTF at spatial frequency (u, v) is simply equal to the pupil function 
at coordinates. (Azu, Azv). 
The intensity distribution I (x, y) of a coherent image is given by, 
I (x, y) =I vout l2 
= IP(x, y) ®®U;. (z, Y)Iz 
The model can be used to develop computer generated speckle patterns 
where U; n(x, y) is constructed using white Gaussian noise. Physically the 
noise function represents a first approximation to a (rough) surface from 
which coherent light is scattered. 
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Appendix C 
Simulation of the Lippmann 
Interferential Photographic Technique 
(Paper) 
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Simulation of the Lippmann Interferential Photographic 
Technique 
Hans I. Bjelkhagen and Savita De Souza 
Modern Optics, SERC, Hawthorn Building, De Montfort University, Leicester 
LE1 9BH 
Abstract 
Lippmann photography is an old colour photographic technique in- 
vented in 1891 by Gabriel Lippmann. Lippmann developed the first theory 
of recording monochromatic and polychromatic spectra. The current pa- 
per describes a new optical security application of this technique as well as 
describes the theory behind the simulation of the Lippmann process. Cur- 
rently, this type of technique can be applied as a unique security device on 
security documents, like passports, identification cards, credit cards, driv- 
ing licenses etc. This method offers a very high degree of security and has 
many advantages. Lippmann photographs are very similar to holograms 
currently used in this field, but this technique gives a unique recording of 
each document so that a much higher degree of security can be achieved. 
1 Introduction 
Lippmann photography is an old colour photographic technique invented In 
1891 by Gabriel Lippmann. Lippmann developed the first theory of record- 
ing monochromatic and polychromatic spectra. This technique Is mainly the 
photographic recording of an interference or standing wave-pattern caused by 
interference between incoming light and its own reflection. Lippmann interfer- 
ential photography was the first direct way to make colour photographs. The 
current project is based on a new optical security application of this technique. 
Currently, this type of technique can be applied as a unique security device on 
security documents, like passports, identification cards, credit cards, driving H.. 
cences etc. This method offers a very high degree of security and has many 
advantages. To list a few of these advantages: 
" The recording of a Lippmann OVD (Optical Variable Device) is rather 
simple to perform, as no specially equipped laboratory is required. 
" The cost of a Lippmann OVD is low. 
" The Lippmann OVD has a very high archival stability. 
" The Lippmann OVD is Bragg sensitive, which means it changes its colour 
depending on the angle of illumination and observation. 
" The Lippmann OVD can record latent images, used as security devices on 
documents. 
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. The Lippmann OVD cannot be copied by conventional colour photography 
nor can it be copied on colour copy machines. 
" The manufacturer of the film can strictly control the access to the special 
photopolymer material required for the recording. 
" The Lippmann OVD can be laminated to a light absorbing material, for 
example a black plastic foil, which means that it is not possible to see 
through the Lippmann film. 
" Since the resolution of the Lippmann OVD is extremely high, a reduced im- 
age of the security document can be laminated to the document, occupying 
only a limited area of it. 
Lippmann photographs are very similar to holograms currently used In this 
field, but this technique gives a unique recording of each document so that a much 
higher degree of security can be achieved. It is based on Bragg diffraction from 
photographically recorded volume gratings, in which the index and absorption 
variations occur mainly in the direction normal to the film plane. The Lippmann 
OVD is a new and unique type of OVD, which belongs to the interference security 
image structures (ISISs). The main advantage of this device is that it can be 
individually made, a unique label for each document. 
2 Brief description of the photopolymer recording tech- 
nique 
A Lippmann photograph can be recorded on a photopolymer material in the 
following way. The photosensitive polymer layer must be rather thin, of the 
order of a few micrometers only. The photopolymer layer must be coated on a 
flexible transparent base and a special type of reflecting foil must be laminated on 
top of the photosensitive polymer layer in absolutely perfect contact with it. A 
preferred choice is the colour photopolymer material with an emulsion thickness 
of about 2 to 3 µm. DuPont has manufactured such experimental materials. 
The polymer film laminated to the reflecting foil must be exposed in a special 
camera. If the recording material is not perfectly isochromatic, a correction filter 
may be required in front of the camera lens to obtain correct colour balance. 
After being exposed to the image-forming information in the camera, the film 
must be processed. The reflecting foil is detached from the photopolymer film 
and the photopolymer layer must be exposed to strong white light or UV light 
for development. After that, the photograph is put in an oven for a certain 
time to increase the brightness of the image. The whole processing technique 
of the photopolymer film is completely dry. Based on this fact, an automatic 
recording and processing machine for the recording of Lippmann security labels 
can be developed. After being processed, the transparent photopolymer label is 
laminated to its corresponding security document. The polymer film contains no 
dyes or any fading chemicals, which means that the archival stability is expected 
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to be very high. The photograph is simply a piece of plastic material with 
the information recorded in it as an optical phase structure, refractive index 
variations within the photopolymer layer. 
3 Principle of Lippmann Photography 
The recording material has a rather low light sensitivity due to the demand for 
high resolving power for recording Lippmann photographs. The photosensitive 
emulsion coated on Lippmann plates is brought in contact with a highly reflecting 
surface. Lippmann used mercury in contact with the emulsion. This mirror 
reflects the light into the emulsion, which then interferes with the light coming 
from the other side of the emulsion. Stationary standing waves of the interfering 
light produce a very fine fringe pattern throughout the emulsion with a periodic 
spacing of . t/(2n) that is recorded (A is the wavelength of light in air and n is the 
refractive index of the emulsion). The colour information concerning the object 
is recorded in this way. For example a large separation between the fringes in 
the emulsion indicates that the recorded wavelength is located at the red end of 
the spectrum. More closely spaced fringes indicate a shorter wavelength, such as 
green or blue. The description applies only when rather monochromatic colours 
are recorded. When the developed photograph is viewed in white light, different 
parts of the recorded image produce different colours due to the separation of 
the recorded fringes in the emulsion. The light is reflected from the fringes, 
creating different colours corresponding to the original ones that produced them 
during the recording. It is obvious that there is a severe requirement on the 
resolving power to record the fringes separated in the order of half the wavelength 
of the light. It is also clear that the processing of these plates is critically 
important, as one cannot change the separation between the fringes since that 
would create wrong colours. To observe the correct colours, the illumination and 
the observation must be at normal incidence. The colour of the image changes 
with the change in colour. The change in colour is known as iridescence, which 
is a very important feature of the Lippmann photograph and is an important 
attribute of the Lippmann photograph as a document security device. Thus 
the Lippmann image is recorded as a Bragg structure in the film. Lippmann 
photography involves no phase recording; the recorded interference structure is 
a result of phase-locking the light by the reflecting mirror. Figure 1 shows the 
principle of the technique. 
A special recording-processing device must be designed and manufactured in 
which a roll of the photosensitive film, prelaminated with a reflecting foil, is ex- 
posed. Special illuminating lamps, such as strong halogen lamps are required to 
record the security documents with a reasonably short exposure time. There are 
two modern materials suitable for recording, panchromatic ultra-high-resolution 
silver-halide materials and panchromatic photopolymer materials. After being 
exposed to the image-forming information in the camera, the Lippmann film 
must be processed. The processing technique of the photopolymer film is corn- 
228 
Emulsion 
Photographic 
Glass Plate \. 
Mercury 2n 
Figure 1. Principle of Lippmann Photography 
pletely dry. Hence due to this fact, an automatic recording and processing ma- 
chine for the production of Lippmann security labels can be developed. After 
being processed, the transparent photopolymer label is laminated to its corre- 
sponding security document. The polymer film contains no dyes or any fading 
chemicals, which means that the archival stability is expected to be very high. 
The photograph is basically a piece of plastic material with the information 
recorded in it as an optical phase structure. Figure 2 shows the method of 
recording Lippmann security photographs. 
4 Security Application of the technique 
The procedure is as follows: First the document information has to be exposed 
to the recording film, using a special camera. Then the film has to be processed. 
There are two methods for this depending on the material used, photopolymer 
materials are processed using dry processing and silver-halide materials use wet 
processing. An automatic processing machine is required. After the processing 
is complete, the recorded images can be laminated to a black backing plastic 
foil. Then the Lippmann image is laminated to the corresponding security doc- 
uments. The figure 3 shows a Lippmann photograph attached to a security 
document. This figure is Bragg sensitive and hence perpendicular observation of 
the image gives the correct colour and oblique observation shifts the colour to- 
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Figure 2. Schematic showing method of recording Lippmann security photographs 
wards the shorter wavelength. This is a very important feature of the Lippmann 
photographs and hence it makes it virtually impossible to copy such images on 
conventional photocopiers or even to replace the Lippmann photograph with an 
ordinary photograph. 
5 Simulation of the Lippmann process 
It has been determined that the calculations for the simulation process are one- 
dimensional calculations. 
The transmission line model is a very powerful method for analysing 1D wave 
propagation in stratified media. Mathematically it is equivalent to the transfer 
matrix method but instead of 2x2 matrices one uses recursion relations, which 
yield simpler algorithms, especially for reflection coefficient calculations. 
6 Reflection coefficient by the transmission line model 
We first show how the plane wave response of a vertically stratified medium can 
be computed by use of the transmission line model. We only consider plane 
waves in the ±z direction but the method is readily generalized to arbitrary 
incident fields by means of a Fourier expansion of the x, y dependence (the an- 
gular spectrum expansion). We assume the stratified medium to consist of N 
layers of finite thickness on top of an infinitely thick bottom layer. The mth la er 
(m =0,1,2 ... 
N) has thickness d, (dN -4 oo), a refractive index n. = fm/EO, 
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Figure 3. Lippmann photograph attached to a security document 
and a wave impedance 777,, = rio/nl, where %= µo/EO :: z 1207r(2 is the free 
space wave impedance. At any point in the medium the impedance Z is defined 
as the ratio between the tangential components of the electric and the magnetic 
fields of the composite wave, i. e., the superposition of the up- and down-going 
plane waves. The impedance combines the two quantities that are continuous 
across the layer interfaces. With Z,,, being the impedance at the top of the mth 
layer, we have the following, well known iteration formula: 
1+ Zm ,- "' exp (2ib, n) +, 7 
Z 
+1 m=0, 
m1 20 17 
where 5m = kn ndm is the transmission "phase-shift" for the mth layer (the wave 
number being k=w µoeo = w/c). Since we only have a down-going wave in the 
infinite bottom layer, the impedance there simply equals the wave impedance of 
the layer: ZN = TiN. Starting at the top of the bottom layer, we can use the 
above equation to compute the impedance at all the interfaces iteratively, until 
we finally reach that of the surface layer. For our purpose it is more convenient 
to work with the reflection coefficient. It is defined as the complex ratio between 
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the electric fields of the up- and down-going waves. At any point the reflection 
coefficient is related to the impedance Z by 
Z-77 
Z+ 77 
where 77 is the local wave impedance. The above two equations yield the following 
recursion formula for the reflection coefficients at the top of each layer: 
Pm = 
Pm ± Pm+1 
exp (2iknmd, n); m=0,1, ... ,N-1 
(6.1) 
1+ PmPm+1 
where pN =0 and 
o im+l -']m _ 
nm - nm+1 (6.2) Pm = 
71m+1 + 71, n 'lm -F rim+1 
is the Fresnel reflection coefficient for the interface between the mth and the 
m+ 1th layer. The iteration starts at m=N-1 and is terminated when we 
reach the reflection coefficient po at the top of the upper layer, i. e. the resulting 
reflection coefficient of all layers of the stratified medium. 
The above equations are very efficient for numerical computations. In the 
non-dispersive case the refractive indices ram are independent of the frequency so 
the frequency dependence enters only through the wave number k. In a simple 
MathCAD implementation the reflection coefficients po from 174 layers and for 
1024 different frequencies are computed in about 7 sec. 
In the low frequency limit k -, 0, the first equation yields Zm = Zm+l which 
implies that ZO = ZN =17N and: 
k 
PO = 
17N - 770 (6.3) 
SIN+t70 
This feature should be retained also in approximate models. 
7 The first Born approximation 
The equation (6.1) shows that po is generally a non linear function of the param- 
eters of the medium. However, a linear model is obtained in the weak scattering 
or first Born approximation. It applies for Jp°, j, (p, "I 41, in which case we can 
use the approximation 
Pm -I- P. +1 n Pm + Pm+l 1+PmP, n+1 
in Equation 6.1. We then obtain 
Pm (Pm + Pm+l) exp (2ikn nd n) 
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and the iteration becomes trivial, yielding: 
N-1 
Pö =E Pm exP 
(2ikIs) 
m=0 s=0 
where the superscript B is used to indicate the first Born approximation. In the 
low frequency limit k -º 0, we now obtain 
N-1 
Pö An # 
rlN - i0 (7.1) 
M=O 
77N + 1170 
which, however, is not consistent with Equation(6.3). This inconsistency is re- 
moved when the Fresnel coefficients in equation 6.2 are approximated by: 
p 77m+l - 77m ,1 ? 7m+1 Pm - In 
( 
'1m+1-ß'7m 2 T]m 
Then equation 7.1 yields 
N-1 (?? N 
--1,1. PO 
ýPm=1 11N-170 
M-0 
2% 77N +'Ij0 
The consistent first Born approximation is therefore given by: 
N-1 m 
pö=2 in 
77m+l 
exp 2ik E r, ad. (17m M=o 8=0 
N-11 
nm+l m 
=-E-In( ) exp 2ikEn, d, 
m=0 
2 n'" 
. =o 
In the continuous limit (d, n -+ dx, N -º oo) we now obtain the usual formula: 
, 
p (k) 
2 fo dzd lodz n(z) exp (2ik n(z')dz') 
At this point we introduce the two-way optical path-length: 
(z')dz' u= u(z) =2 
fo 
n 
as a new integration variable. We then obtain: 
B (k) /°O dlnn(u) (iku) Po (k) = -21000 Jo du duexp 
00 
= 
2ik du In [n(u)] exp(iku) 
0 
where the last expression follows from an integration by parts and the fact that 
we have assumed n(O) = 1. 
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8 Display Unit for the Lippmann Photographs 
A display device based on a Visual Plus Slide Illuminator turned upside down, 
mounted in a holder, has been made. It is used for convenient viewing of the 
security documents. This provides uniform white light and will enable, e. g., the 
passport officer to check the documents with ease to detect any fraud. Figure 4 
demonstrates the use of the display unit. 
Figure 4. Display Unit for the Lippmann Photographs 
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Computer simulation of the Lippmann photographic process 
and recording experiments using holographic materials 
Hans I. Bjelkhagen* and Savita De Souza 
De Montfort University, The Centre for Modern Optics 
Hawthorn Building, The Gateway, Leicester LE1 9BH 
United Kingdom 
ABSTRACT 
The old Lippmann color photography technique (invented 1891) has been investigated. Today, high-resolution 
panchromatic recording materials are on the market suitable for Lippmann photography. The holographic 
panchromatic silver-halide materials from Slavich in Russia, as well as the panchromatic photopolymers from 
Du Pont in the USA can be used for recording Lippmann photographs. In particular, the Slavich emulsion 
has been investigated for recording Lippmann photographs. In order to understand the Lippmann technique 
better, computer simulations of the recording and reconstruction process have been undertaken. A Lippmann 
color photograph is unique and almost impossible to copy, which makes it suitable for the document security 
application. A new Optical Variable Device (OVD) technique is under development. This type of photograph 
can be applied to personal documents as a new optical security device, e. g., passports, ID cards, etc., can carry a 
Lippmann OVD. The recording of a Lippmann photograph requires a special panchromatic recording material, 
e. g., silver halide materials or photopolymer materials. 
Keywords: Color photography, Lippmann photography, interferential photography, optical security, optical 
variable devices, photopolymer materials, silver halide materials 
1. INTRODUCTION 
After the invention of black-and-white photography in the 19th century a lot of research was devoted to the 
possibility of recording natural color images. In 1886 Lippmann developed a general theory of recording colors 
as standing waves in a light-sensitive emulsion. However, most of his time was devoted to perfecting a suitable 
recording emulsion for his experiments. In 1891 he succeeded in recording first a spectrum and later color 
photographs. Lippmann was a awarded the Physics Nobel Prize in 1908 for his photographic technique known as interferential photography or interference color photography. His early work was published in several papers'-4. In this type of photography, color is recorded in a photosensitive film as a black-and-white interference structure. The photographic image in a Lippmann photograph is Bragg sensitive, which means it is suitable for the optical document security application. The preserved 100-year-old Lippmann photographs are very beautiful, having 
extremely high resolution and good color contrast. There are several recent publications on this interesting 5'16. imaging technique 
Optical Variable Devices (OVDs), such as holograms, are now common in the field of document and product 
security17. The Lippmann photograph represents a new type of OVD, which belongs to the interference security image structures (ISISs). It offers additional advantages over embossed hologram for unique document security 
applications. The main advantage of this new device is that it can be individually made, which means, a unique label for each security document such as passports, identification cards, etc. This particular application has is 
. been introduced by Bjelkhagen'so 
*Correspondence: Email: hansholo®aol. com; Telephone: +44-116 250 6374; Fax: +44-116 250 6144 
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Figure 1. Principle of Lippmann photography 
2. LIPPMANN PHOTOGRAPHY 
The principle of Lippmann photography is shown in Figure 1. Because of the demand for high resolving power 
for recording Lippmann photographs, the recording material has a rather low light sensitivity. To record such it 
photograph, Lippmann used an ultra-high-resolution photosensitive emulsion in contact with a highly reflecting 
surface such as mercury. This mirror reflects the light into the emulsion, which then interferes with the light, 
coming from the other side of the emulsion. Stationary standing waves of the interfering light produce a very fine 
fringe pattern throughout the emulsion with a periodic spacing of A/(2ri) that is recorded (A is the wavelength 
of light in air and n is the refractive index of the emulsion). The color information concerning the object is 
recorded in this way. For example, a large separation between the fringes in the emulsion indicates that the 
recorded wavelength is located at the red end of the spectrum. More closely spaced fringes indicate a shorter 
wavelength, such as green or blue. This description is correct only when rather monochromatic colors are 
recorded. 
When the developed photograph is viewed in white light, different parts of the recorded image produce different 
colors due to the separation of the recorded fringes in the emulsion. The light is reflected from the fringes, 
creating different colors corresponding to the original ones that produced them during the recording. It is 
obvious that there is a severe requirement on the resolving power to record the fringes separated in the order 
of half the wavelength of the light. It is also clear that the processing of these plates is critically important, 
as one can not change the separation between the fringes since that would create wrong colors. To observe 
the correct colors, the illumination and observation must be at normal incidence. If the angle changes, the 
color of the image will change. This change of color, known as iridescence, is a very important feature of the 
Lippmann photograph as a document security device. The Lippmann image is recorded as a Bragg structure 
in the emulsion. 
Modern holography shows similarities to Lippmann photography. In both cases an interference pattern is 
recorded in a high-resolution emulsion. The Bragg diffraction regime applies to both categories. The funda- 
mental difference is that, in the Lippmann case, there is no phase recording involved; the recorded interference 
structure is a result of phase-locking the light by the reflecting mirror. In holography, the phase information 
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is actually recorded, being encoded as an interference pattern created between the light reflected from the ob- 
ject and a coherent reference beam. Recording of monochromatic or polychromatic spectra must be treated 
differently in Lippmann photography. The recording of monochromatic light in a Lippmann emulsion is easy to 
understand, and it is similar to recording a reflection volume hologram. A broadband polychromatic spectrum, 
such as a landscape image, is very different. In this case, the recorded interference structure in the emulsion is 
located only very close to the surface of the emulsion in contact with the reflecting mirror, a consequence of the 
short coherence length of broadband light. 
What is so interesting with Lippmann photography is it possibility to record the entire spectrum of light 
reflected off objects, which no other imaging technology can do. Most color imaging techniques today are based 
on Maxwell's three color (RGB) principle. 
3. THEORY OF THE LIPPMANN PHOTOGRAPH 
Lippmann developed the first theory of recording monochromatic and polychromatic spectra4. He applied 
Fourier mathematics to optics, as recently pointed out by Marraud and Fournier21. In the early days of 
Lippmann photography, Meslin22, Schtt23, and Wiener24 contributed to the theory of the Lippmann process. 
-s ý-----tom 
Fii ý. - .x 
Figure 2. 
In Figure 2, if -x is the direction of light coming from the object, and x is the direction of the reflected light, 
we have the intensity of the interference pattern as a function of x, i. e. the emulsion is exposed to a standing 
wave. This is shown in Equ. 1 below: 
Z 27rx i=c"sin A (1) 
If we assume that we have no absorption or scattering taking place in the emulsion, the density variation in the 
emulsion will be proportional to the intensity distribution as illustrated in Figure 3. 
X 
Figure 3. 
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If we consider the case when we have the simultaneous recording of two different wavelengths in an emulsion, 
the resulting intensity distribution is given by: 
i'=il+i2=c" 
(sine i +sine 
27 Z) 
Figure 4. 
(2) 
In Figure 4, Al = 563nm and )t2 = 482nm. 
In the case of recording white light in a Lippmann emulsion, we need to integrate the intensity variation over 
the whole visible spectrum. Hence Equ. 1 has to be integrated between A,. ed to a,,; otet. 
r 
.F. J S(A) . F(A) " E(A) " sing 
27rxd. 
\= c. 
rot 
I, 
ol 
sis -rxdA (3) AA 
where c= S(\) " F(A) " E(A); 
S(A) is the intensity of the light source as a function of the wavelength 
F(A) is the portion of the reflected light from the object as a function of the wavelength 
E(A) is the sensitivity of the photographic emulsion as a function of the wavelength 
For a Lippmann emulsion, we assume an isochromatic plate and hence E(A) is constant. 
3. 
Figure 5. 
If S(A), F(A), E(A) are constant, then c is a constant and hence can be taken out of the integral sign. The 
graphical representation is shown in Figure 5. 
The above theory is the most simplistic approach but it gives a feeling of how the Lippmann process works. In reality, the recording material is not free of absorption and scattering and these properties have been taken into consideration by Phillips et a127. These factors will be considered in future work using the Light Tools 
simulation software. 
239 
Lehmann25, a German photo scientist and early practitioner of Lippmann photography, performed recording 
experiments to verify that the theoretically predicted interference patterns actually were recorded 
in the emul- 
sion. He used optical microscopy to record microphotographs of emulsion samples 
in which three different 
recordings had been performed. The predicted interference patterns 
described above were recorded in the emul- 
sion as shown in Figures 6-8. The magnification of the emulsion is 
between 7,000 and 10,000 times in these 
photographs recorded by Lehmann25. 
Figure 6. Monochruui led light Figure 7. Two wavelengths recording Figure 8. Hio ulh; tnd 
(A = 625 nm) (A = 482 nm and 563 nm) (Peaked at about A= 575 nm) 
Fournier and Burnett26 investigated old Lippmann photographs using modern electron microscopy, where sim- 
ilar interference structures recorded in the emulsion were revealed, although with a much better resolution. 
In addition, they described similarities between Lippmann photography and holography. Another important 
contribution was made by Phillips et al. 26 comparing the theory of Lippmann photography and holography. 
4. SIMULATION OF THE LIPPMANN PROCESS 
The first researchers to perform computer simulation of the Lippmann process were Nareid and Pedersen. 25'29 
For monochromatic recording, Kogelnik's coupled-wave theory30 can be applied to Lippmann photography. For 
polychromatic recording, superposition of several frequencies in the recording light gives rise to aperiodic space 
gratings for which the Kogelnik theory cannot be applied. Instead, Nareid and Pedersen based their modeling 
on the theory of wave propagation in a stratified medium combined with first Born approximation. 
4.1. Simulation of the Lippmann process 
It has been determined that the calculations for the simulation process are one-dimensional calculations. The 
transmission line model is a very powerful method for analysing 1D wave propagation in stratified media. 
Mathematically it is equivalent to the transfer matrix method but instead of 2x2 matrices one uses recursion 
relations, which yield simpler algorithms, especially for reflection coefficient calculations. 
4.2. Reflection coefficient by the transmission line model 
We first show how the plane wave response of a vertically stratified medium can be computed by use of the 
transmission line model. We only consider plane waves in the ±z direction but the method is readily generalized 
to arbitrary incident fields by means of a Fourier expansion of the x, y dependence (the angular spectrum 
expansion). 
We assume the stratified medium to consist of N layers of finite thickness on top of an infinitely thick bottom 
layer. The m'th layer (m = 0,1,2... N) has thickness dm (dN - oc), a refractive index Tim = Em/(O , and 
a wave impedance 77,,,, = Tjo/rim, where 1o = µc/co -- 1207rc is the free space wave impedance. At any point 
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4.3. The first Born approximation 
The Equ. 6 shows that po is generally a non-linear function of the parameters of the medium. However, a linear 
model is obtained in the weak scattering or first Born approximation. It applies for 1p° I, lp1l «1 in which 
case we can use the approximation 
Pm + Pm+1 0 Pm + Pm+l, 1+ PnPm+1 
in Equ. 6. We then obtain 
Pm = (P0m + Pm+l) exp(2iknmdm), (10) 
and the iteration becomes trivial, yielding: 
N-1 m 
pö = pm exp(2ik n, de), (11) 
m=o s=o 
where the superscript "B" is used to indicate the first Born approximation. 
In the low frequency limit k-0, we now obtain 
N-1 
Pö ,E P° # 
77N - 770 (12) 
, m=0 
TIN + 'n0 
which, however, is not consistent with Equ. 8. This inconsistency is removed when the Fresnel coefficients in 
Equ. 7 are approximated by: 
po _ 
? 1m+1 - rlm 111(Tim+l /rlm) (13) 
7)m+1 + r]m 2 
Then Equ. 12 yields 
N-1 
PO -' 
E 
Pm - rl 
In (77N/170) = 
? )N - 770 
, m_0 
? )N + r)0 
The consistent first Born approximation is therefore given by: 
N-1 m 
Pö =2 1n(ijm+i/iim) exp(2ik E n, de) 
m=0 s=0 
N-1 m 
21n('nm+l/r7m)exp(2ikEn, d, ) (15) 
m=0 8=0 
In the continuous limit (dm - d, N, oo) we now obtain the usual formula: 
B1 dlogn(z) Iz Po (k) 2 
loo 
dz 
dz exp(2ik n(z')dz') 
At this point we introduce the two-way optical path-length: 
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u= u(z) =2J2 n(z')dz' 
0 
as a new integration variable. We then obtain: 
(17) 
p (k) _ -2 J dull u(u) exp(iku) 0 
k du ln[n(u)J exp(iku) (18) =2 ik 
where the last expression follows from an integration by parts and the fact that we have assumed n(O) = 1. 
5. RECORDING MATERIALS FOR LIPPMANN PHOTOGRAPHY 
New and improved recording materials combined with special recording and processing techniques have made it 
possible to develop the new OVD method. In particular, the ultra-high image resolution, the Bragg sensitivity 
of the image, the archival image color stability, the difficulty in copying such photographs, and the possibility 
to individually record them, make them suitable for the document security application. The optimal recording 
material for Lippmann photography has to be isochromatic to give a correct color recording. Most holographic 
materials are not isochromatic and therefore color correction filters may be needed for the recording of Lippmann 
photographs. 
There are two holographic recording materials suitable for Lippmann photography: panchromatic ultra-high- 
resolution silver-halide materials and panchromatic photopolymer materials. Silver-halide materials requires 
wet processing. As regards such materials, only the new ultra-fine-grain panchromatic emulsions from Slavich 
can be considered31,32 In our case, the PFG-03C emulsion coated on film has been used. The grain size is 
between 10 nm and 20 nm for this emulsion. Some characteristics of the Slavich PFG-03C material are presented 
in Table I. 
Silver halide material PFG-03C 
Emulsion thickness 7 nm 
Grain size 10 - 20 nm 
Resolution - 10000lp/mm 
Blue sensitivity -1.0-1.5 10-3j/CM2 
Green sensitivity « 1.2-1.6 10-3j/CM2 
Red sensitivity -0.8-1.2 10-3j/CM2 
Color sensitivity peaked at: 633 nm, 530 nm, 450 nm 
Table 1. Characteristics of the Slavich PFG-03C emulsion 
The panchromatic holographic photopolymer materials from E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. 33 are also suitable 
for Lippmann photography. They requires only dry processing (UV-curing and baking). This fact makes them 
particularly suitable for Lippmann OVD security products. Although, less sensitive than the Slavich silver- 
halide emulsion (which is also slow, according to modern photographic standards), it has its special advantages 
of easy handling and dry processing. However, a special type of photopolymer material is required for Lippmann 
photography. Successful recordings of Lippmann photographs in thin experimental photopolymer materials were 
reported by Bjelkhagen. 9 
A Lippmann photograph can be recorded in photopolymer materials in the following way. The photosensitive 
polymer layer has to be rather thin, in the order of a few micrometers only. The photopolymer layer must be 
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coated on a flexible transparent base and a special type of reflecting foil has to be laminated on top of to the pho- 
tosensitive polymer layer in absolute perfect contact with it. The panchromatic photopolymer material having 
an emulsion thickness of about 2 to 4 pm is preferred. Such experimental materials have been manufactured by 
DuPont, e. g., the HRF-700X071-3 film. This particular polymer batch number was used for the first successful 
Lippmann photographs. ' Before the recording takes place, a reflecting mirror foil has to be laminated to the 
polymer film. As a reflecting surface, silver sputtered (800A) polyester film without the standard anti-dust 
oxide (InO) top layer was used. The mirror foil is laminated to the photopolymer material under safelight. 
A color correction filter may be needed in front of the camera lens to obtain correct color balance, since the 
photopolymer materials are not very isochromatic. 
6. SECURITY APPLICATIONS OF LIPPMANN PHOTOGRAPHY 
The possibility to use Lippmann photography for document security and counterfeit-resistant purposes was 
described in earlier publications. 18-20 For example, the application of a Lippmann photograph on security 
documents can be performed in the following way. The first step is the actual exposure of the document 
information (e. g., printed text, codes, signature, color photograph, etc. ) to the recording film, similar to 
conventional photography, using a special macro lens. A special recording-processing device must be designed 
and manufactured in which a roll of the photosensitive film, prelaminated with a reflecting foil, is exposed. 
Special illuminating lamps, such as strong halogen spotlights are required to record the security documents with 
a reasonably short exposure time. After being exposed, the film must be processed. An automatic processing 
machine is required for this purpose. Actually, both the recording and the processing can be performed in the 
same piece of equipment. Because of the dry processing technique, the DuPont photopolymer materials would 
be the most suitable for an automatic Lippmann OVD system. 
After being exposed to the image-forming information in the machine, the reflecting foil is detached from the 
photopolymer film and the photopolymer layer is exposed to strong white light or UV light. After that, the 
film has to pass through a hot section of the machine to increase the brightness of the image. The principle of 
such a system is shown in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9. Recording and processing equipment for Lippmann OVDs. 
After being processed the recorded images can be laminated to a black backing plastic foil. Then the photopoly- 
mer OVD is laminated to its corresponding security document. In the following a sample of a passport with a Lippmann OVD is presented. 
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Figure 10. Lippmann OVD attached to a security document. 
Referring to Figure 10, in which a Lippmann OVD (1) is attached to a security document (2), the color of 
the image in the Lippmann OVD varies depending on the angle of observation. Perpendicular observation (3) 
gives the correct color image, oblique observation (4) shifts the colors toward shorter wavelengths. Because 
of the Bragg sensitivity, it is not possible to replace a Lippmann color photograph with a conventional color 
photograph, nor can the security document with the Lippmann photograph be copied in a color copier. 
As an illustration of what the Lippmann OVD looks like, a sample passport page was recorded. In this case, 
the Slavich PFG-03C silver-halide emulsion was used instead of a photopolymer film. The results are shown 
in Figures 11 to 13. The Lippmann OVD itself has an extremely high resolution provided that a high-quality 
photographic macro-lens is used in the recording equipment. The recording silver halide emulsion itself has a 
resolving power of about 10,000 lines/mm. Only black-and-white digital photographic reproductions are used 
in this paper. The reader is advised to consult reference 18 to see color reproductions of Lippmann document 
security photographs. Figure 11 is a black-and-white photograph of the recorded sample passport Lippinann 
image in which all the passport information details are recorded with high resolution in the Lippmann OVD. In 
Figure 12, the passport with the Lippmann OVD label laminated to the passport page in the upper left corner. 
Then the passport page was illuminated and observed perpendicularly, which means that a correct color image 
of the passport is obtained. The color image change towards the blue part of the spectrum when the image 
is studied under oblique illumination and observation angles. At other angles the Lippmann OVD only looks 
like a dark plastic area, Figure 13. The fact that the Lippmann OVD switches between being completely black 
and suddenly being bright, displaying a color image of the passport page is very striking. Upon inspecting the 
passport, this effect is easily and immediately observed and very difficult to simulate in any other way. Further, 
the Lippmann OVD image can be compared with the passport page itself. The only tool needed for this may 
be a magnifying glass in order to be able to see and read the text in the high-resolution image. 
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Figure 11. B/W reproduction of a Lippmann photograph (Lippmann OVD) of the passport page. 
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Figure 13. The passport page with the 
Lippmann OVD not visible. 
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